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THE MEDIA, DIPLOMACY, AND TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

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THE MEDIA, DIPLOMACY, AND TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

TUESDAY, JULY 30, 1985

House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 10:10 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward F. Feighan presiding.

Mr. Feighan. The subcommittee will come to order. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. We will begin with Congressman Lantos and myself. There are several other committees in progress this morning as well as the conference committees, particularly the Foreign Affairs Committee's Conference Committee on the State Department authorization. So we will have members joining us intermittently throughout this session and this afternoon's session.

The subcommittee meets today to investigate the role of the media and diplomacy particularly during a crisis situation such as a terrorist attack, or hijacking, or a hostage situation such as we experienced recently in Beirut.

I would like to thank the chairman of this subcommittee, Lee Hamilton, for his willingness to hold these hearings, and I would like to thank all of our witnesses who will appear today in three separate panels for agreeing to share their expertise with us.

Today's hearing is an opportunity for us in Congress to have a full and a fair discussion of what clearly has become a critical relationship between the media and our diplomatic and security branches in handling crises overseas. We are focusing on terrorism in Europe and the Middle East.

It is the Middle East particularly that has been and no doubt will continue to be the center stage for terrorism, especially those actions directed against the United States. Radical factions in Libya, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and elsewhere have all demonstrated their readiness to use terrorism as a means of promoting their causes.

As the face of warfare continues to change from the conventional to the symbolic warfare of terrorism, the media is caught in a historic dilemma. How to cover acts of war against the United States in which their role is itself a critical dimension.

It is that dilemma that we meet to discuss today. Is there a line to be drawn between the pros and the cons of aggressive media coverage of crises; and if so, do we lose, what do we lose, and what do we gain.

We will begin this morning with a panel of distinguished experts on this subject. Mr. Jody Powell, former White House Press Secretary under President Carter, and currently a syndicated columnist; Prof. Fred Friendly, professor emeritus at the Columbia University School of Journalism; and Prof. Ben Bagdikian, dean of the Berkeley School of Journalism. I would like to welcome them here.

Before we begin with that panel, we are very fortunate and very honored to have with us our colleague, Congressman Tom Luken, who is a member of the Energy and Commerce Telecommunications Committee, who has been very deeply involved, critically involved, in this very issue of the role of television in covering an overseas crisis and an act of terrorism against the United States or its citizens.

He has been in fact as well a significant critic in the Congress of the media's role in some terrorist situations. Congressman Luken, we would like to welcome you to the subcommittee this morning, and ask for your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS A. LUKEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO

Mr. Luken. Thank you, Chairman Feighan, and my congratulations to you and Chairman Hamilton for conducting these timely hearings. I respect your leadership in this matter, and I am appreciative of your invitation to speak before the real experts come on.

Whoever controls network television commands awesome power. Thus, it is with great concern that we address the question of whether the medium, the TV medium, was used as a terrorist weapon in the recent TWA hostage crisis. Television critics have had a field day. A typical blast in the wake of the hostage ordeal was recorded in Time magazine on July 15.

And I quote, "There under laboratory conditions, journalism met terror. In a pure culture uncontaminated by civilization, the results are not encouraging. Terror needed a partner in crime to give the event life. The media, television above all, obliged. Even voices within the industry seem appalled by what they saw and heard.

"John Chancellor acknowledged that, 'We were far too available to every side. Our failure to control ownership of the story may have been the problem.' "

Consequently, after the ordeal, calls have been issued forth for a summit, a summit of television broadcasters, to examine the reasons why the air waves were given over to people whose sole claim to exclusive network time was that they were forcibly holding Americans who were kidnaped.

Yes, good friends of TV and the media, such as Mr. Fred Friendly, who will testify today, have observed that the media have yet to learn how to avoid serving as the ransom that is now paid to terrorists who take hostages, particularly American hostages.

Thus, a call for a meeting of broadcasters should include on its agenda consideration of mutual guidelines, self-regulation, self-regulation of all broadcasters to avoid these excesses next time. To give warning to potential abductors of Americans that they will not in the future have such an easy time with networks falling all over each other to provide the shows choreographed by the captors.

I call upon the networks and other broadcasters to engage in that vital introspection and to look hard for ways to avoid a repetition of past mistakes. These mistakes which have been cited frequently within the industry and by TV critics including offering terrorists live TV, unedited TV, time for their diplomatic messages, and allowing anchors frequently to be used as diplomats and negotiators.

The issue of TV becoming a coproducer of hostage drama, coproducer with the terrorists, is too big, too important to be relegated to individual organizations putting out interoffice memos applicable to only one network. Such guidelines would fast become blurred and yes, forgotten in the heat of competition on the scene by news teams which are keenly aware that the competition has a different set of rules and regulations.

Prompted by the urgings of media commentators such as Ron Powers of CBS Sunday Morning News and David Gergan, former White House director of communications, recently I wrote to all four networks on July 17 suggesting a media summit on these issues.

It was not an original idea with me, as I have indicated. Twelve members of the Energy and Commerce Committee's Telecommunications Subcommittee had joined with me in a statement on this concept previously. In response, interestingly, one of the respondent networks acknowledged that it has already had informal conversations with other news organizations to open up communications during such a crisis.

At the same time apparently to contradict, this respondent rejected any mutally arrived at agreements for journalistic standards or practices during a hostage crisis.

Another network rejected out of hand the idea of mutuality, because it said that it had its own guidelines. And secondarily, because guidelines are not a complete solution. I think obviously such grounds are inadequate.

One network admitted its concern about becoming part of the story. That is really the basis, I think, of our consideration. It also emphasized that audiences must frequently be reminded of the prevailing conditions, that is that the hostages are under duress.

Paradoxically, the other network seemed to ignore the submissive condition of the hostages and the influences that they were under. This network defended its interviews of kidnaped hostages on the absurd basis that the captives were given a choice before the interview whether or not to be interviewed.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to insert into the record of these hearings my letter to the networks to which I referred and the responses that I have received. I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.[1]

Mr. LUKEN. The two remaining networks have yet to reply. One example of the problems of competition and the need for prior agreement is demonstrated by pool coverage. Some network officials have stated that pool coverage would have made life safer for the reporters, and would have reduced the leverage of the captors. But pool coverage was rendered impossible, because of the competition.

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[1] See appendix 1.

Now is the time in the quiet of the lull between the storms of these crises for deliberate preparation for the next hostage trauma. Whether pool coverage is a good idea or not is not the question. It is certainly a plausible suggestion, and should be considered now.

Clearly, the lessons of Iran were already lost when TWA flight 847 flashed onto the world's stage. So that the lessons of TWA flight 847 do not fade away, I renew my call upon the leaders of television to roll up their sleeves and seek common ground for agreement to protect hostages in the next crisis.

Finally, I repeat at the conclusion for emphasis that Government need not and should not be a party to the discussions within the television industry. Congress can and should, as I think this subcommittee is doing today, act as the goad and the catalyst to ensure that discussions take place. And the administration will inevitably have counsel on matters such as diplomatic aspects and law enforcement. But the meetings, I repeat, should be controlled as to agenda and decision by the involved media alone.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be glad to respond to any comments or suggestions.

[Mr. Luken's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS A. LUKEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO

Whoever controls network television commands awesome power. Thus, it is with great concern that we address the question of whether the TV medium was used as a "terrorist weapon" in the recent TWA hostage crisis.

Television critics have had a field day. A typical blast in the wake of the hostage ordeal was recorded in Time magazine of July 15, and I quote:

"There, under laboratory conditions journalism met terror, in a pure culture, uncontaminated by civilization. The results are not encouraging. Terror needed a partner in crime to give the event life. The media, television above all, obliged."

Even voices within the industry seemed almost appalled by what they saw and heard. John Chancellor acknowledged that "we were far too available to every side * * * our failure to control ownership of the story may have been the problem."

Consequently, calls have issued forth for a "summit" of television broadcasters to examine the reasons why the airwaves were given over the people whose sole claim to exclusive network time was that they were forcibly holding kidnapped Americans.

Yes, good friends of TV and the media, such as Fred Friendly who will testify here today, have observed that the "media have yet to learn how to avoid serving as the 'ransom' that is now paid to terrorists who take hostages."

Thus, the call for a meeting of broadcasters should include on its agenda consideration of mutual guidelines, self-regulation of all broadcasters, to avoid these excesses next time, to give warning to potential abductors of Americans that they will not in the future have such an easy time, with networks falling all over each other to provide the shows choreographed by the captors.

I call upon the networks and other broadcasters to engage in that vital introspection and to look hard for ways to avoid any repetiton of past mistakes.

These mistakes include offering terrorists live TV, unedited TV, time for their diplomatic messages, and allowing anchors to be diplomats and negotiators.

The issue of TV becoming the coproducer of hostage drama (with the terrorists) is too big, too important, to be relegated to individual organizations putting out interoffice memos applicable only to one network. Such guidelines would fast become blurred, yes forgotten, in the heat of competition on the scene by news teams which are keenly aware that the competition has a different set of rules and regulations.

Prompted by the urgings of media commentators such as Ron Powers, of CBS Sunday Morning News, and David Gergen, former White House Director of Communications, I wrote to all four networks on July 17 suggesting a media summit on these issues.

Twelve members of the Energy & Commerce Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance, on which I serve, had endorsed the concept previously.

Interestingly, one of the respondent networks acknowledged that it already had informal conversations with other news organizations to open up communications during such a crisis. At the same time, conversely, this respondent rejected any mutually arrived at agreements for journalistic standards or practices during a hostage crisis.

Another network rejected out of hand the idea of mutuality because it had its own guidelines and secondarily, because "guidelines are not a complete solution." I find these grounds inadequate.

One network admitted its concern about becoming "part of the story." It also emphasized that audiences must frequently be reminded of prevailing conditions, i.e. that the hostages are under duress. Paradoxically, the other network seemed to ignore the submissive conditions of the hostages and the influences they were under. This network defended its interviews of kidnaped hostages on the absurd basis that the captives were given a choice whether or not to be interviewed.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the record of these hearings my letter to the networks and the responses I have received. The two remaining networks have yet to reply.

One example of the problems of competition and the need for prior agreement is "pool coverage". Some network officials have stated that pool coverage would have made life safer for the reporters and would have reduced the leverage of the captors. But pool coverage was rendered impossible because of competition. Now is the time, in the quiet of the lull between the storms of crises, for deliberate preparation for the next hostage trauma. Whether pool coverage is a good idea is not the question. It is a plausible suggestion and should be considered now.

Clearly the lessons of Iran were already lost when TWA flight 847 flashed onto the world stage. So that the lessons of TWA flight 847 do not fade away, I renew my call upon the leaders of the television industry to roll up their sleeves and seek common ground for agreement to protect the hostages in the next crisis.

Finally, I repeat, at the conclusion that Government need not, should not, be a party to the discussions within the television industry. Congress can act as the goad, the catalyst, to insure that discussions take place, and the administration will inevitably have counsel on the matters such as the diplomatic aspects and law enforcement. But the meetings should be controlled, as to agenda and decision, by the involved media alone.

Mr. Feighan. Thank you very much, Congressman Luken. Clearly, you offer a very thoughtful challenge, and I am sure that many would agree, a controversial challenge. And I am hopeful that the panelists who follow you both in this morning's session and this afternoon will be responsive to some of the observations that you have made, and particularly to the challenge that you and your colleagues on the Energy and Commerce Committee have made.

I would like to invite you to join us this morning as a member of this panel, and pose directly some of these questions and challenges to some of the following witnesses. Again, thank you very much for your testimony.

Mr. Luken. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee.

NETWORK'S DEFENSE OF ITS INTERVIEW WITH TWA HOSTAGES

Mr. Lantos. May I have a question, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. Feighan. Please, Mr. Lantos, proceed.

Mr. Luken. I would appreciate it.

Mr. Lantos. First, I want to commend my colleague for taking the leadership on this matter. And since you have requested unanimous permission to insert the correspondence in the record which will now be part of the record, I am not violating any confidence in asking you which network defended its interviews of kidnaped hostages on the absurd basis that the captives were given a choice whether or not to be interviewed?

Mr. LUKEN. ABC.

Mr. LANTOS. ABC. Did they offer any rationale beyond what you call an absurd basis, and I concur with your characterization?

Mr. LUKEN. Well, you have it, The copies are available, and you can draw your own conclusion. But my opinion would be no. I think that it was probably a slip on their part, that it perhaps is not a considered statement.

Mr. LANTOS. It is a mind boggling statement.

Mr. LUKEN. But what I got out of it was just exactly what I have stated. Namely, that in defending their interviews of hostages, they pointed out that first they asked those hostages whether or not they thought, those hostages thought that their statements might be damaging. And so they were according to the network given an option, an election, a choice.

Obviously, there is not much choice, as we all know, for hostages under such a situation. And I think that that was not a defensible defense. I would not single out this particular network, however. I assume that they would not put that statement in a second time.

But I think that it is an example of the fact that the members of the press and the members of the media are not always the best defenders of the first amendment. And they are not always the best defenders. I think that they suffer the same problems that the rest of us do in sorting out these problems.

And I will say going farther that it is a very difficult area, and that is the reason that I emphasize that I think Government should not be involved except as a catalyst and as a goad. Because when we get to the question of interviewing hostages and of putting any rules and regulations on the media, and I am only talking about interviews of hostages. Everything that I have said only applies to hostages.

It does not apply to reporting generally, and it does not apply to reporting on these questions. But only interviewing hostages under the situation of coercion. That is what I have confined these remarks to. And it is such an important area, because it is likely to recur again. We already have hostages even today that are being held.

Who knows that those hostages who are now being held somewhere in Lebanon, that their captors may be soliciting right today, or maybe thinking about soliciting the networks or others about interviews.

So I think that the networks should be publicly meeting and considering what their reaction should be, and how these interviews should be conducted.

TERRORISTS' USE OF THE MEDIA

Mr. LANTOS. If I may propound another question. What you just said intrigues me. And on first blush, I certainly would not agree with your position. You are restricting your effort to hostages.

Mr. LUKEN. Terrorist-controlled hostages.

Mr. LANTOS. Terrorist-controlled hostages. But it is clear to you, Congressman Luken, is it not, that terrorists may choose to use the media themselves rather than make the media available to the hostages? You have no view about media providing full access to the airwaves to the terrorists themselves?

Mr. LUKEN. Yes. I think that you have corrected me. I am really talking about terrorist-controlled situations.

Mr. LANTOS. Because it seems to me——

Mr. LUKEN. The recent example is hostages, but what I am saying applies to any terrorist-controlled situations.

Mr. LANTOS. To any terrorist-controlled situations whether the interviews are with hostages or the terrorists themselves, whether they wish to make any statements?

Mr. LUKEN. Yes. They have a particular poignancy and a particular application where hostages are involved. And the situation where hostages are involved is a classic one whether the network becomes involved in producing the drama.

The drama is especially pointed. It is especially dramatic, if you will, if we have a hostage situation. Terrorists who do not control hostages do not have the same advantage of coproducing the drama with the television as when they do have hostages.

Mr. LANTOS. How would you react to the hypothetical situation where a terrorist would threaten to blow up certain facilities unless he is given full and free access to the networks without there being any hostages?

Mr. LUKEN. Well, I think that these are the situations that the networks should be discussing amongst themselves, not within their own company operation, interoffice considerations, but I think that these are the considerations that they should be discussing. And they should be advising us and the American people what their decisions are in such matters.

I do want to set it down. I think that it is a very difficult question that you pose. But I do not think that there are any easy answers, and I do not think that they are going to be arrived at in any satisfactory fashion at all in the rather slipshod way that the networks have officially gone about it up to now.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you. If there are no further questions from members of the panel, I again thank you, Congressman Luken. And given the thoughtfulness that you have put into this issue and the expertise that you have developed, we would welcome your participation on the panel this morning. Thank you.

I would like to call now our first panel for this morning again consisting of Mr. Jody Powell, former White House Press Secretary under President Carter. Mr. Fred Friendly, the dean of the Columbia School of Journalism; and Mr. Ben Bagdikian of the Berkeley School of Journalism. Gentlemen, if you would join us at the table.

While you are taking your seats, I would like to note that the chairman of our Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Congressman Lee Hamilton, is with us this morning, and again I would like to thank him and his staff for the work that they have put into fashioning today's hearings and for addressing what I think we all agree is an extremely important topic.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Powell, could we begin first with your testimony, followed by Mr. Friendly, and concluded then by Mr. Bagdikian, and then we will address questions either individually or collectively to the members of the panel.

Mr. Jody Powell.

STATEMENT OF JODY POWELL, SYNDICATED COLUMNIST AND FORMER PRESS SECRETARY TO FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER

Mr. POWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first say that I am honored by your invitation to be here this morning, and particularly to be here with such distinguished company. I might also say that I am grateful that this summons did not come 4 or 5 years ago when I was a Government employee rather than a columnist and, thus, in the position to be held accountable for what I say.

If I may, I would like to offer a very few observations, as briefly as possible, and I will be glad, of course, to expand on any of them later if anyone is interested in doing so.

It seems to me that the two hostage crises of 1980 and 1985 do offer a good opportunity for both comparing and commenting upon press coverage. Having watched them from two very different perspectives, I would offer the following points for your consideration.

Like most other Americans, I expect, including I might say many journalists, I found press coverage of both crises to be, on occasion, sensationalized, excessive and even tasteless. I do not mean to imply that those shortcomings are not serious, and I certainly think they are worth discussing. But I do think it is also worth pointing out what that coverage, at least in my opinion, was not.

It was not, I think, despite all we have heard on the subject, motivated by political, partisan, or philosophical bias. It would be difficult to argue, I think, that news reporting was significantly tougher on President Carter than on President Reagan, or vice versa. Nor, it seems to me, was the coverage and the mistakes and excesses involved in it motivated by some hidden policy agenda among journalists, some preference for a more cautious or a more aggressive approach to the problem.

It is not that journalists do not have those preferances, many of them do, but even knowing the views of many of my new colleagues, which range from very aggressive to quite restrained, I found it next to impossible to find evidence of those views in their news reporting.

I would note, by way of illustration, that press coverage in the early weeks of the Iran crisis helped to promote, in my opinion, a public attitude favoring caution and restraint. Some months later, that same coverage by the same journalists was contributing to an attitude that might be described as "Get it over with anyway you can, but get it over."

Most imporantly, I do not think that in either 1980 or 1985 press coverage undermined the national interest by impeding efforts to gain release of the hostages or by prolonging the crisis.

I should note, Mr. Chairman, that some of my former colleagues in Government disagree with that last point. And I understand their views even though I do not share them, and will be glad to deal with them later if you wish.

As my comments a few moments ago imply, what press coverage did do, of course, in 1980 and 1985, was to increase political pressures on the President. Now, that is uncomfortable if you happen to be in the White House, but I am not sure it is avoidable or something that should concern us too greatly.

Presidents are elected, it seems to me, to do what they believe to be in the national interest, whatever the political pressures. They are big boys and deserve to be held accountable for their own actions. Blaming the press for bad policy cannot be an acceptable out.

And I might say parenthetically that it seems to me that in both 1980 and 1985, President Carter and President Reagan did what they believed to be in the national interest without regard to political pressures.

By the same token, Mr. Chairman, I do not think we can allow journalists to blame government for their errors and excesses. In 1980, Walter Cronkite did not count off the days, and ABC did not promote the totally inaccurate notion of an America held hostage because the President or the Government made them do it.

In the most recent crisis, the administration made every effort to downplay the story. No comments from the White House and precious few from the State Department for the first 72 hours or so. Nevertheless, by Sunday morning the story was dominating the news media of all sorts. It was about to roll over the people in the White House, and they were put in the position of having to rush the President back from Camp David and announce—call and announce—a National Security Council meeting in order not to appear indifferent or not in charge.

If there is a solution, or perhaps I should say a means of improving the situation with regard to excess and sensationalism, I think it is most likely to come from the very source that caused it in the first place, and that is, competition. If there was one really positive contrast between press coverage this year as opposed to the Iranian crisis, it was in exactly that area, I think.

This time around, analysis, scrutiny, criticism of the way the fourth estate was doing its job was a major part of press coverage. There were charges and countercharges, thoughtful critiques, and irresponsible polemics almost every day of the crisis. Now, that, I would submit, is real progress.

Journalists, I think, are like politicians and the rest of humanity, for that matter, in that one of the best ways to get us to do what is right is to introduce into our hearts and minds a healthy fear of what will happen to us if we do what is wrong. As most politicians understand, and as journalists are beginning to learn, there are few fears that are more healthy than that of being held up to public censure and ridicule before several million of your fellow countrymen.

I do not see an answer, as I gather most here do not, in law or regulation, primarily because I doubt anyone's ability to figure out a way to outlaw excess sensation or even tackiness. But I do favor keeping the dust stirred up and I do favor keeping the public spotlight on the fourth estate and how it does its job.

I recognize that this will inevitably involve some criticism that is inaccurate, sensationalized, and excessive, but even that may not be all bad. Those in my new profession who not know what it is like to be hit upside the head for doing what you thought was the honest and decent thing might find it an edifying and humbling experience.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. **Feighan**. Thank you, Mr. Powell.

Mr. Friendly.

STATEMENT OF FRED W. FRIENDLY, EDWARD R. MURROW PROFESSOR EMERITUS, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM

Mr. **Friendly**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I hope your record will show that I am not, have never been, and never will be dean of the Columbia School of Journalism. The mistake happens a lot, and I forgive you for it, and I even think Dean Elliot will.

Mr. **Feighan**. The record will stand corrected. Thank you.

Mr. **Friendly**. Thank you.

I have beside me, not the Bible, but the Constitution of the United States. Hugo Black gave me my first copy and I keep it with me because it is a miracle, and the first amendment is a miracle. And we are bumping into a lot of our miracles coming and going.

President Lyndon Johnson once said, "We come by our miracles easier than we seem able to manage them." Terrorism is a management crisis of miracles. Three miracles, perhaps four, if you add the first amendment—the jet airplane, the television, and the satellite—all in my lifetime, have made it possible for a few anarchists or murderers to take the law of civilization and the attention of the world into their own hands. When they succeed, we are all hostages, not just the passengers of the plane, but all of us and especially the President of the United States and television. And it is the television spotlight that is the real ransom the terrorists demand and usually get.

I am not here to curse the darkness or to say that the coverage of the hostage situation in Iran and in Lebanon was a disaster. It is my judgment that the news media—including television—conducted itself as well as it could, under the circumstances, probably assured the safety of the 39 men aboard TWA Flight 847, and, indeed, may have hastened their liberation.

However, there were some egregious errors, mostly caused by the haphazard frenzy of competition and that dangerous word "exclusive" or the phrase "Network X" or "Newspaper Z has learned . . ." Those cliches, often shrouded in secrecy, are an echo of the yellow journalism of a different age and have no place in an era of instantaneous communication.

The press, as has been said, is in the human interest business, and the Government, particularly the President, is in the national interest business. When these two powerful forces collide, the results can be dangerous, sometimes even bizarre. Out of the blur of flashing images, wirephotos and 2-inch headlines that were scattershot across the country for nearly 3 weeks, the one haunting moment that should jar all of us is a morning anchorman turning to Nabih Berri during an interview and asking, "Any final words to President Reagan this morning?"

Now, the network involved in that serious lapse blames it on an anchorman who does not report to the news division. But, members of the committee, whose fault is that?

It is now time for a post mortem. The careful examination promised after the 444 days of Iran terrorism never happened, never materialized. It will be a shameful exercise in irresponsibility if the record of the Beirut hostage confrontation is not analyzed by the news media and by our Government as well. The administration needs to tell the media exactly what news coverage hurt and what helped. And obviously much of the coverage did help, or the attorney general and the Justice Department would not now be issuing subpoenaes for much network videotape of the coverage for the identification of the terrorists.

The third worst outcome of the Lebanon tragedy would be if the Government of the United States imposed restrictions on reporting during a terrorist crisis. The second worst outcome would be to require a blue ribbon panel of network executives and Government officials to confer and come up with a long list of agreed-upon pledges and guidelines. This, in my judgment, would be impossible to write because every crisis is a no-mans land, and even if you could write them, they would be impossible to enforce. I am sorry to disagree with you, Congressmen.

But the most tragic course of action would be for American journalism—and I include the news magazines and the newspapers—to continue their defensive posture, and it is defensive, over those 17 days and to learn nothing and to do nothing.

No matter how you relive these days of terror no matter how much you reexamine the cruelties of the terrorists, we as a nation and we as a profession were exploited. What should be happening now and in the weeks and months ahead is a serious examination, a post mortem. Everyone from the reporters in the field to the gatekeepers, the editors and they play a major role, executives in control of these remarkable engines of communications, all must sit down in an organized way with their foes and their friends and ask these hard, agonizing questions. What did we do right? What did we do wrong? How can we do it better next time? For there surely will be a next time.

Mr. Chairman, professionals in the newsroom, the hearing room and the situation room are supposed to be individuals with the insight and discipline to look inward and evaluate their own performances in those fanatic circumstances when the roof falls in. It is what all professionals are trained to do, and journalists should not exclude themselves even though we have a first amendment. The danger is that if we do not critique ourselves, the Government, you, may step in to fill that void.

Terrorism is the new war, a species of guerrilla warfare whose battlefield is the television screen and the front page. It is more frightening and grotesque than anything, except possibly the threat of nuclear war, because no pact between superpowers can control the theater of terror. Tragically, the final result of the imperfections of the coverage of flight 847 is that television probably inadvertently advanced the cause of terrorism—encouraged another hijacking. While at the same time paradoxically saving the 39 hostages.

That is why I have come here today, because I hope that I shall never need to be invited again and that this committee will never again have to reconvene for this particular purpose. I have come here to urge my colleagues in the news media to examine their methods. For them to do nothing is almost to dare you in Congress on behalf of all the people of the United States to fill this void, and this would be an incursion on our hallowed and unique first amendment rights. It would be, ironically, the ultimate price to pay for the blight we call international terrorism.

Thank you.

Mr. **Feighan**. Thank you very much, Mr. Friendly.

[Mr. Friendly's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRED W. FRIENDLY, EDWARD R. MURROW PROFESSOR EMERITUS, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM

My name is Fred Friendly. For 16 years I was an executive at CBS News. I am now the Edward R. Murrow professor emeritus at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and director of the Columbia University Seminars on Media and Society, which has conducted numerous seminars on terrorism.

Like my colleagues, I am here to answer your questions, but I have a brief statement that I should like to enter into the record.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, President Lyndon Johnson once said, "We come by our miracles easier than we can manage them." Terrorism is a management crisis of miracles. Three miracles---the jet airplane, the television, and the satellite---have made it possible for a few anarchists or murderers to take the law of civilization and the attention of the world into their own hands. When they succeed, we are all hostages, not just the passengers on the plane, but all of us and especially the President of the United States and television. And it is the television spotlight that is the real ransom the terrorists demand and get.

I'm not here today to curse the darkness or to say that the coverage of the hostage crisis was a disaster. It is my judgment that the news media---including television -- conducted itself as well as it could, under the circumstances, probably assured the safety of the thirty-nine men aboard TWA flight 847, and, indeed, may have hastened their liberation. However, there were some egregious errors, mostly caused by the haphazard frenzy of competition and that dangerous word "exclusive" or the phrases "Network X" or "Newspaper Z has learned..." Those cliches are an echo of the yellow journalism of a different age and have no place in an era of instantaneous communication.

The press, as has been said, is in the human interest business, and the government is in the national interest business. When these two powerful interests collide, the results can be dangerous, sometimes even bizarre. Out of the blur of flashing images, wire photos and two-inch headlines that were scatter shot across the country for nearly three weeks, the one haunting moment that should jar all of us is a morning anchorman turning to Nabih Berri during an interview and asking, "Any final words to President Reagan this morning?"

Mr. Chairman, it is time for a post mortem. The careful examination promised after the 444 days of Iran never happened. It will be a shameful exercise in irresponsibility if the record of Beirut's hostage confrontation is not analyzed by the news media and by our government as well. The administration needs to tell the media exactly what news coverage hurt and what helped. And obviously much of it did help or the government wouldn't be issuing subpoenaes for so much network videotape of the coverage for the identification of the terrorists.

The third worst outcome of the Lebanon tragedy would be if the government of the United States imposed restrictions on reporting during a terrorist crisis. The second worst outcome would be to require a blue ribbon panel of network executives and government officials to come up with a long list of agreed-upon pledges and guidelines. They would be impossible to write because every crisis is a no-mans land, and even if you could write them they would be impossible to enforce. But the most tragic course of action would be for American journalism---and I include the newsmagazines and the newspapers---to continue their defensive posture over those seventeen days and to learn nothing and to do nothing.

No matter how you relive those days of terror, no matter how you reexamine the cruelties of the terrorists, we as a nation and we as a profession were exploited. What should be happening now and in the weeks and months ahead is a serious examination, a post mortem. From the reporters in the field to the gatekeepers, executives in control of these remarkable engines of communication all must sit down in an organized way with their foes and their friends and ask those hard, agonizing questions: What did we do right? What did we do wrong? How can we all do it better next time? For there will surely be a next time.

Mr. Chairman, professionals in the newsroom, the hearing room and the situation room are trained individuals with the insight and the discipline to look inward and evaluate their own performance in those circumstances when the roof falls in. It is what all professionals should do, and journalists should not exclude themselves. The danger is that if we don't critique ourselves, the government may step in to fill the void.

Terrorism is the new war, a species of guerrilla warfare whose battlefield is the television screen and the front page. It is more frightening and grotesque than anything, except the threat of nuclear war, because no pact can control the theatre of terror. Tragically, the final result of the imperfections of the coverage of Flight 847 is that we have probably advanced the cause of terrorism -- encouraged another hijacking. That is why I have come here today because I hope that I shall never need to be invited again and that this committee will never have to reconvene for this purpose. I have come to urge my colleagues in the news media to reexamine their methods. For them to do nothing is almost to dare you in Congress on the behalf of all the people to fill the void, and that would be an incursion on our hallowed and unique First Amendment rights. It would be the ultimate price to pay for the blight we call international terrorism.

Mr. **Feighan**. Mr. Bagdikian.

STATEMENT OF BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, DEAN OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY

Mr. **Bagdikian**. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me say that in addition to being the dean of the journalism school, most of my career has been as a journalist, including a period as a correspondent in Europe and the Middle East and at one time being an editor in charge of national news at the Washington Post.

I will confine my statement to two main points; namely, that I believe that controlled reporting, whether or not it is done voluntarily, is in danger of producing more rather than less violence; and, according to a lot of past experience and research, could result in heightened levels of irrational public behavior.

I recognize the many excesses of journalistic coverage during this hostage crisis and in 1980. And I recognize that much of it was for self-serving competitive reasons, that it also undoubtedly produced great satisfaction among the terrorists at the time, and may well have made negotiations more difficult. But I would like to confine myself at this time to some of the dangers of taking a unified, controlled approach to news coverage in these situations.

Furthermore, adjusting news coverage in order to deny satisfaction to the source is just as bad as adjusting it in order to produce satisfaction. I think both result in flawed news. Unfortunately, important news is not always made by the good guys.

But aside from those general observations, I would like to make two main points.

It has been suggested that massive coverage by the news media may produce repetition in the future among groups who also desire world attention. And it is said that if such criminals are denied this kind of vivid exposure on television and on front pages, it will remove or reduce the stimulus for others who may try the same kind of violence.

I think it is inevitable that the worldwide publicity did provide satisfaction to the perpetrators at Beirut. The idea of being on television display in a momentary position of power must appeal to many groups. But I believe that arbitrary control of news coverage will not reduce political violence and has at least an equal chance of increasing it.

We are dealing here not with a businesslike public relations agency. We are dealing with people who are willing to kill and be killed for their cause. And, furthermore, only the most isolated psychopathic individuals commit this violence solely or mainly to get publicity. Most groups, including those who hijacked the TWA plane, are interested in wide exposure but they also have specific political demands. Except for clearly psychotic individuals without political aims, the publicity is a way of creating pressure for concessions on political goals. And because political violence is their method and publicity about the violence increases the pressure for concessions, it is understandable that there is a temptation to deny them the publicity in the hope that it will reduce their demands. But I think it will not. Most such groups, I think, will simply escalate the violence to a level that is no longer possible to conceal or to keep subdued in the news, regardless of guidelines.

When politically motivated people are willing to die for their cause, the simple act of denying them public exposure, I think, will not frustrate them. There is enough explosive power readily available in the world and the nature of modern commerce is so vulnerable that such groups can find ever more frightening ways to break through filters of silence in the news.

Permit me one point of example. According to news reports, the original hijackers demanded that the more moderate Amal militia join in controlling the hostages. At first the Amal militia declined. As a result, the hijackers beat and killed an American and pushed his body out of the plane. At that point, the Amal militia agreed to take over. The implication was clear that until there was a serious consideration of their demands, body after body would be thrown out of the plane. And it is this escalating process that I think would be stimulated by artificially controlled or subdued news.

In addition, scholars of propaganda, rumor and public hysteria, like the late Gordon Allport, discovered two concurrent events that maximize the possibility of irrational public responses—I am talking about responses in the American audience. One of those conditions is when the public becomes intensely interested or anxious about a subject.

In the case of violence against fellow Americans, as at the Beirut Airport and other similar acts, it is inevitable that the public learn about the existence of the crisis and will become angry and anxious.

The other element that makes for irrational public response once the public interest is aroused, is if there is only limited information or if the public does not believe the information it is given. Under those circumstances the odds of speculation and rumor go up and so do the odds for wild or irrational behavior. I believe that as this happens, the odds also increase for unwise or irrational official responses.

I think it is precisely during times of crisis and anxiety that the public needs not only as much information as possible but has to believe that it is being told everything significant that is available. In the recent hijacking we often saw more than we needed to know. But I think that is far better than not being told enough, or believing that we are not being told enough.

I will not dwell on what others will testify to at length, so I will just mentioned in passing that, first, the massive and frequently overheated coverage by the news media did not present a simple message that glorified the hijackers. Whatever else it did, it dramatized the horror that the hijackers inflicted on their victims, and I doubt that the result was sympathy for the hijackers or their cause.

Second, the history of attempts to control news of dramatic, anxiety-producing events is one of failure and futility. It simply does not work. I believe what my colleagues here at this table have said, that the media ought to do some soul searching among themselves, ought to analyze what they did right and wrong. But I think that stiff guidelines will always break down under messy, uncontrollable conditions typical of hijacking.

If there were guidelines that controlled the American media—as for example in England, where there are agreements and legal sanctions on coverage by the British press on the royal family, we might then be confronted with guidelines for our media which are not binding on other national media. And we might then be in the position that if our media decide to use artificially subdued coverage, but in England, France, Germany, Japan, and so forth there would be television and other printed accounts of an American situation which would not appear in this country. We would then have the curious situation that other populations would get news that we would not, and I think that would not hold up.

The problems, therefore, of mandatory or rigid rules create more problems than I think they solve.

But my main points are quite aside from that. Even if the controls worked, unless the guidelines developed by the media themselves were flexible, they have a danger of increasing political violence and a danger of producing speculation, rumor and hysteria among the public.

Thank you.

[Mr. Bagdikian's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, DEAN, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY

Members of the Committee, my name is Ben Bagdikian. I am Dean of the Graduate School of Journalism of the University of California at Berkeley. Most of my career has been as a journalist, including a period as a foreign correspondent in Europe and the Middle East and as national editor of The Washington Post. I have written books that analyze and criticize the news media.

I will confine my statement to two main points, namely that I believe that controlled reporting, whether done voluntarily or not, is likely to produce more rather than less political violence; and that controlled news under those circumstances will, according to past experience and research, create more public hysteria and irrational behavior than does the present competitive coverage with all its flaws.

I recognize the reasons given in favor of altered news coverage of events like the Beirut kidnapping and murder. Much of the coverage was excessive for strictly self-serving, competitive reasons and in the process it obliterated other important news. It favored physical drama to the exclusion of vital background that would make the drama more understandable. And the resulting publicity undoubtedly produced some measure of satisfaction among the groups committing political violence and may well have increased difficulties of behind-the-scenes negotiations. I acknowledge the disadvantages of the present uninhibited, competitive coverage.

In the fear, anger and humiliation of events like the TWA hijacking, the desire for revenge, for preventing repetitions, and the disapproval of some news media behavior make it easy to overlook the lasting disadvantages of voluntary or mandatory central control of news in general but also in precisely this kind of frightening episode.

Adjusting news coverage in order to deny satisfaction to the source of the news is just as bad as adjusting the news to satisfy the source. Both result in flawed news. Unfortunately, important news is not always made by the good guys. And filtering news in order to produce some pre-determined result is called propaganda and has no place in responsible reporting in a democracy.

But aside from that general observation, I would like to make two main points.

First, it has been suggested that massive coverage by the news media may product repetition in the future among groups who desire world attention for themselves and their causes. It is said that if such criminals are denied this kind of vivid exposure on television and the country's front pages it will remove or reduce the stimulus for others who may try the same kind of violence.

I think it is inevitable that the worldwide publicity did provide some satisfaction to the perpetrators at Beirut. The idea of being on television display in a momentary position of power must appeal to many groups around the world. But I believe that the arbitrary control of news coverage, will not reduce political violence and has at least an equal chance of increasing it.

We are dealing here not with a businesslike public relations agency. We are dealing with people who are willing to kill and be killed for their cause. Furthermore, only the most isolated psychopathic individuals commit this violence solely or mainly in order to get publicity. Most such groups, including those who hijacked the TWA plane, are interested in wide exposure but they also have quite specific political demands. In fact, except for clearly psychotic individuals without political aims, the publicity is a way of creating pressure for concessions on political goals. Because political violence is their method and publicity about the violence increases the pressure for concessions, it is tempting to deny them the publicity in the hope that it will reduce or cancel the demand for political concessions. But I think it will not. Most such groups will simply escalate the violence to a level that is no longer possible to conceal or to keep subdued in the news.

When politically motivated people are willing to die for their cause, the simple act of denying them public exposure will not frustrate them. There is enough explosive power readily available in the world and the nature of modern commerce is so vulnerable that such groups can find ever more frightening ways to break through filters of silence in the news.

Permit me to give one generalized example and one specific one. Even in the Soviet Union where there is total control of press and television, and where anti- and even non-governmental public acts are among the most hated by the authorities, individuals and groups who feel strongly enough about their cause also escalate their physical acts until they must be acknowledged.

The specific example comes from the TWA hijacking. According to news reports, the original hijackers demanded that the more moderate Amal militia join in controlling the hostages. At first the Amal militia declined. As a result, the hijackers beat and killed an American and pushed his body out of the plane. At that point, the Amal militia agreed to take over. The implication was clear that until there was serious consideration of their demands, body after body would be thrown out of the plane. It is this escalating process that I think would be stimulated by controlled or artificially subdued news.

Let me conclude with the effect that controlled news would have on audiences in the United States and elsewhere. Scholars of propaganda, rumor and public hysteria, like the late Gordon Allport, discovered that two concurrent events maximize the possibility of irrational public responses. One begins when the public becomes intensely interested or anxious about a subject. In the case of violence against fellow Americans as at the Beirut airport and other similar acts, it is inevitable that the public will learn about the existence of the crisis and will become angry and anxious.

The other element that makes for irrational public response once the public interest is aroused, is if there is only limited information or the public does not believe the information it is given. Under those circumstances the odds of wild or irrational behavior go up sharply. I believe that as this happens, the odds also increase for unwise or irrational official responses.

It is precisely during times of crisis and anxiety that the public needs not only as much information as possible but has to believe that it is being told everything that is available. In the recent hijacking we often saw more than we needed to know. But that is far better than not being told enough or believing that we are not being told enough, leading to rumor and hysteria.

I will not dwell on what others will testify to at length, so I will do so only in passing. First, the massive and overheated coverage by the news media did not present a simple message that glorified the hijackers. Whatever else it did, it also dramatized the horror that the hijackers inflicted on their victims. I doubt that the result was sympathy for the hijackers or their cause.

Secondly, the history of attempts to control news of dramatic, anxiety-producing events is one of failure and futility. It simply does not work. The problems it creates are generally more socially and politically troublesome than any created by uncontrolled news. The unpleasantness of excessive coverage is, for all the flaws, less dangerous than the tensions in the public and among officials when there is an attempt to control news of what is essentially an uncontrolled scene.

But my main points are that quite aside from that, even if the controls worked, they would probably increase political violence rather than decrease it and it would produce more irrational public behavior than all the anger and humiliation aroused by seeing uninhibited and sometimes thoughtless coverage.

Thank you.

Mr. **Feighan**. Thank you very much, Mr. Bagdikian. I would like to thank all the panelists for extremely provocative testimony this morning.

Let me begin, if I can, with this question. Each of you have offered testimony that suggests in varying degrees that the networks covering the situation in Beirut at times engaged in conduct that could be described as excessive, irresponsible, sensationalistic, tasteless, again characterizations in varying degrees from each of you.

If we were then to debate what conduct those networks should engage in in order to correct those problems in any future experience, it seems as though there is a building concensus that it should not be imposed by the government, that it should come from within the industry itself. Is not that fairly naive, is that not pollyannish to think that the networks that are in the business of gathering news, that are seeking exclusives not for the altruistic reason of being able to present to the nation and to the world the first instance report of a particular incident, but they are doing it for very significant financial reasons? Is it not, in fact, naive to think that given the constraints, the forces that those networks operate under that they are going to impose on themselves some kind of standards that would prevent them from meeting their economic responsibilities, not to mention their journalistic responsibilities?

Mr. **Friendly**. Well, I think that is the message you have to get across. That the word exclusive is a dirty word; that exploitation and competition, for whatever reason, and it really is not ratings and it really is not money, Mr. Chairman. It is the business of everybody watching on three television sets. It took me 20 years after I left CBS, 18 years, to learn that everybody does not watch three television sets at once. It is a very artificial kind of competition.

Somebody said to me at one of the networks the other day, I said, "How are you?"

He said, "Terrible, Network Y," happened to be talking about ABC, "scooped us today."

"What did they do," I said.

He said, "Well, they had a picture of the pilot with a gun at his head and we did not get it."

And I said, "Well, what do you care about that for? That is going to be forgotten in 12 hours which network had it, which didn't."

It is an artifical set of circumstances. The competition is not really that real. Ratings do not go up and down and they should not be counted during a crisis situation anyhow. It as Mr. Justice Holmes said for us to all to become more civilized to make progress. We need professionalism.

In World War II when the network that I used to work for did measurable good work, the Murrows, the Severeids, the Hotlets were not in the competition business, were not in the artificial rating business. We need to become more professional. We need to become better educated. Not just at our journalism schools, but there needs to be education for journalists in their thirties, in their forties, in their fifties, and there needs to be much better gatekeeping by people who say I do not want to put that on the air without us putting it into context.

When too much competition comes in, context goes out the window, and that is what was missing in the entire crisis—context.

REASONS FOR EXCESSES IN MEDIA COVERAGE

Mr. BAGDIKIAN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I think I agree with Fred Friendly, except that I think that while competition produces most of the excesses and tasteless scramble for exclusives, and although I do think that ratings are not out of the minds of producers and executive producers, there are certain advantages to competition in journalism and that the danger of mandatory or official sanctions is very great. I think there has to be an analysis by the news media, but I think in the end it is going to be public pressure that will make the difference.

I think you gentlemen can produce some pressure, but I think it has to be suggestive pressure rather than statutory. And I agree, Mr. Chairman, that it is naive to think that if we denounce the networks for some of the tasteless and unjournalistic acts they produced that they will somehow have a religious experience and change. I think that would be naive.

But I think it is probably a good idea to consider what has happened in the media over the last 20 or 30 years. Those of us who are no longer in our teens remember the media 30 years ago being far more tasteless in print than they are today. Public pressure, not religious experiences, and also internal discussions and analysis within the profession, changed some of the habits that existed and were common 20 or 30 years ago—habits of blood and guts on page 1, and of thoughtless sensationalism. There is much less of it today. The change takes time.

Broadcasting is a younger medium and much more eager for its riches. But I think public pressure there also will have an effect. I think if we are going to take the advantages of competition, not just in the media, but in our civil and business life, we have to be careful of reducing it to a point where we lose some of its advantages.

Mr. POWELL. I really have very little to add except to say that I certainly do agree that it is naive to expect any group of human beings to consistently do what they ought to do if left totally to their own devices. The question, it seems to me, is how do we go about it in a way that is consistent with our long-term interests in society. We have knocked on networks here coming and going. I think we ought perhaps to say parenthetically that print is not perfect either. Some of the worst examples of horrendous news coverage that I saw from the other side of the fence in 1980 were in the print, in print media. It does not have quite the reach and emotional impact but it is by no means simon pure. We ought not to let print get away with saying, "well, we have problems but at least we are not as bad as those people in television."

That is somewhat of a digression, but the question is how do we introduce that healthy, that healthy fear, or how do we look over the shoulder of journalists. It seems to me that the best people for looking over the shoulders of other people in this society are journalists. And to the extent we can encourage that process that has already begun over the past few years of journalists being willing, at least on occasion, to criticize and point the accusing finger at the rotten apples in the journalistic barrel, even as we do in politics and government and labor and whatever, that is the surest and best way to get some people's attention. And I think the comment was exactly right. It is not a case of Saul on the Damascus road here. It is a case of promoting a more sophisticated understanding of one's self-interest.

Mr. **Feighan**. Thank you very much, gentlemen. The chairman of our subcommittee, Mr. Hamilton.

COVERAGE OF THE TWA HIJACKING

Mr. **Hamilton**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I commend you for this hearing this morning. All of us recognize that it was your idea and I think it was an excellent one.

I want to say to our panelists that I am most grateful to them for insights into a problem that I, for one at least, have not thought enough about.

I guess my questions are two. What really was wrong with the coverage of the hijacking? Mr. Friendly, you said it was not in context. I will accept that. You said it was tasteless and others have said it was tasteless. I am not for tasteless television, and I suspect most of us are not. But specifically can you tell me what was wrong?

Now, let me throw out some things that happened to kind of get your reaction to them. We had reports on American troop movements and the fact that the Delta Force was moving into place. Is that something the television media ought not to report?

We had a news report that Syria intended to release the TWA hostages as soon as it got them, and that report could have delayed the release of the hostages. Nobody can be sure of that. We had reports that seemed to be quite sympathetic to the terrorists, giving them an opportunity to explain their point of view. Is that improper television?

We had an awful lot of repetition. Is that, in itself, improper—just to have repetition of news?

Through the media, we may have transferred negotiations to a public forum, and most of us who have been engaged in negotiations recognize the more public it becomes the more difficult it becomes, as a negotiator. But how can you stop that?

WHAT WAS WRONG WITH THE MEDIA COVERAGE?

So, the first question is what really was wrong with the coverage of the hostages.

The second question is what can we do here, following this analysis that we are going through here today. We are not going to pass any legislation controlling news, and if we did, it would probably not be constitutional.

When the network people get together and talk about these things, I would be surprised if they agree on any kind of guidelines. And if they did, they will not pay much attention to them the next crisis you have, my suspicion is. So, when you go through all of this analysis, what can we reasonably expect to happen?

Mr. **Friendly**. Well, I would like to avoid a check list of all the egregious errors, redundant as that sounds. But I will give you a couple. I think the news media got too big for its britches. I think when David Hartman said what do you want me to tell the President, or words to that effect, we became negotiators. We push ourselves away from being negotiators. We say we are not negotiators. We report what happens.

Murrow used to say, "Don't let our tripod get in the way." The tripod was everywhere, and I think we have to remember that the President and the Secretary of State have that job to do. And I think the question you just asked, in addition to being asked of us, should be asked of the State Department, the Defense Department, the White House, the FBI.

We are so defensive in the news media, I among them, that you need to have both sides sit down and say on day four this is what happened that made our job impossible. On day nine this is what happened. That exchange could well take place at the Library of Congress under Dr. Borstin, whom I happen to know is interested in this subject. He talks about the professionalization, which is what I talk about. But let me give you a couple of examples.

On, I believe it was June 24, a network had a lot of interviews with the hostages. As far as I know, they were not edited. Network Y, which also used them, said five times these were done by hostages in the presence of terrorists and you, the viewer, have to take that into consideration to see what they said. The other network said nothing like that. And they said these pictures were made by the Amal and you ought to bear that in mind. The other did not do that for reasons that they perhaps can explain.

My colleague, Dean Bagdikian, said he did not think that the terrorists were shown in the sympathetic light. I would have to disagree with that. I heard not only Mr. Conwell, whose testimony from the field should have been better put into context and who he was and who he worked for should have been reflected for the viewer to decide upon, but I also heard all kinds of people, there and here, saying what the terrorists or the hostagetakers have done has given us better insight into what is happening in the Middle East.

Well, I do not think it did. I think it gave us some false ideas about what is happening in the Middle East. I do not want to be political. I am not a Zionist, I am not an anti-Zionist. I think equating the 740 prisoners in Israel with the 39 hostages was grotesque, and I think it lacked context. And I think most people believe that and most people will always believe that.

You cannot shoot your way with the threat of violence and by killing somebody into an equation equal to those of prisoners of war who were taken and were about to be returned.

So, I think there was a lack of context and there was a lack of standing over the television camera. The viewer sees a box, a miracle box. He sees 19 inches if he has got a big screen. The television reporter, and particularly the anchor people here, need to stand beside them and say this is what you cannot see. Let me put that into context for you so that you understand that everything is

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being said under pressure of duress and of terror, that the terrorism is right there on the camera, and to report it as if it were just another event that had happened is unfair to the viewer, to the President and mostly to our profession.

Mr. **Bagdikian**. Mr. Chairman, I could not agree more that one of the major flaws of the television coverage of this crisis and many others was a lack of context, a lack of sufficient background, socially, politically, why this event occurs, who the people are. This was usually obliterated in favor of action footage, the apple bitten too often by journalists.

But I have to disagree that it was a mistake to record what the hijackers had to say about their cause. I do not think that was a mistake. I think, distasteful as it was, it is wrong to shield the American public from what somebody says who is momentarily in the news. This does not mean it has to be sympathetic, it does not mean it has to be proposed by the medium, but it is bad reporting not to report it. The news is not always made by the good guys. And I respectfully disagree that the American public ended up with sympathy for the hijackers.

If there was momentary hope that the hijackers were civilized and would somehow feed the hostages, of course, that is momentary, that is romantic, but I think the net result was horror at what they did and disapproval of what they did.

So, I would not say that hijackers and terrorists should never be permitted to have their say on the media insofar as it is significant in this situation.

Mr. **Friendly**. That is not what I said, Mr. Bagdikian.

Mr. **Bagdikian**. But I mean it is a danger to assume that if the media report something that a terrorist says, that it is, per se, bad reporting. I think it is not necessarily. But what the media needs to do is be more sophisticated on what is truly significant, and there I think the flaws are great.

Mr. **Friendly**. If I could have 20 seconds. We are both old enough to have been a party to reporting the late Senator Joseph McCarthy. The criticism of the news media in history will be that it was just garbage in, garbage out. And when he said there were 200 and *X* Communists in the State Department, that was just put on the air and nobody said the Senator knows that is not true, there is no fact to answer that.

Now, I believe that what Murrow and others are remembered for is that they put that into context. They did not let the Senator just shoot off his mouth. It took a long time to happen. I believe we have a similar responsibility, and I trust you do too, that when terrorists say things that are not true, and hostages say things under the duress of the terrorists, we have an awesome responsibility to put that into context. That is not editorializing; that is news analysis that you teach better than anyone.

Mr. **Bagdikian**. I totally agree with that. But I think that the utterances, to begin with as a basic fact, need to be reported.

Mr. **Feighan**. I hesitate to interrupt that dialog. It is fascinating, but I hope it will continue in the context of some other questions as well.

Mr. Powell, did you have some response as well?

DAMAGE DONE TO THE MEDIA'S REPUTATION

Mr. POWELL. I think the thrust of that series of very good questions, it seems to me—well, there are two things and correct me if I am wrong.

The question of what specific harm, what really specifically went wrong? What damage was done?

To that I would have to answer quite frankly, that my guess is that the greatest long-term damage—from poor press coverage—was done, not to the Government of the United States, not to our long-term national interest, not to the foreign policy interest of Israel or of Syria, or to the hostages in the broader sense, but to the reputation to the fourth estate, and to the degree of public support that journalism needs to continue to do its job.

The follow-on to that question is well, then, what do we do about it; and, quite frankly, it seems to me that the discussion to this point, including particularly my own, helps to illustrate how very, very difficult it is to come up with specific "Thou Shalt Nots" in dealing with these situations.

It is certainly true that, as Mr. Friendly points out, if you are going to put somebody on, who is testifying literally or figuratively at gunpoint, you ought to say so, and it is certainly true that the fourth estate has a responsibility if they give somebody live air time to point out to the public when they lie.

I would submit we don't do a great job of doing that even with figures in this country.

So, we—when you get down to the nitty gritty of what one, what specific agreements and guidelines, and so forth, can be drawn that we can find refuge in when the fat is in the fire, it's mighty tough. You are talking about how does one go about defining tackiness or sensationalism, or excess and that sort of thing?

And I think you have to fall back on—we do have a sense of what it is when we see it. And if there is a purpose to all this, I would suggest that it is perhaps to sell arms to both sides in the conflict and debate and discussion and criticism that is beginning to go on in the fourth estate, to provide ammunition to people from CBS, that want to beat up on ABC, from the Washington Post that want to beat up on the Los Angeles Times, and let them have at each other. I think we are likely to get more good out of that than anything else.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Gilman?

SHOULD RESTRAINTS ON THE MEDIA BE VOLUNTARY OR MANDATORY?

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for arranging this very timely session today, at a time when we had the families of the "Lebanon seven" hostages before us in another meeting earlier this morning. They focused attention on the need they saw for even more publicity for the Lebanon seven, and we can compare it to the way the publicity was handled for the hostages in the TWA crisis.

We have a contrast of opinions on how to attack this problem.

I am interested in what Mr. Friendly had to say with regard to some volunteerism in the media, and I am concerned about what direction this can take and can it be effective? Can that volunteerism come about? And can it be implemented?

Is that a practical approach? Or should there be some mandates?

Mr. Friendly. I hope that the mandate does not come from Government. I think it is best to come from public opinion, and I think that you need the brooding spirit in the newsroom. You need leadership. You need something other than leaders goading the troops on to beat network Y or network Z, or newspaper K, and there is a great deal, Congressman Gilman of trafficking in success.

To my certain knowledge, networks went out and said, "Tell the New York Times. Tell the Washington Post. Tell the Los Angeles Times—that we had six exclusives today, and they only had two." That's obscene. That's trafficking on the bodies of hostages. It comes from unprofessionalism.

What you need is a brooding spirit, leadership in the newsroom. You need someone who will say, "I won't permit that to happen. This news organization which has been 50 years in the making"—maybe 100 if it was a newspaper—"was not built on that kind of silly, frivolous profiteering. We have standards here; the standards are ingrained in our gut, in our soul, in our professionalism."

I agree with Mr. Powell's statement that the news media took the worse beating. I think one other institution did, and that is, that we are going to have more hostage taking. That's why I'm here. I am not here in the springtime of my senility to come down and point my finger at my colleagues and say, "You did this wrong, or did that wrong."

But in the end of the day, what you have to be concerned with, what I, as a former professionalism have to be concerned with, is have we made hostage-taking a euphemism for terrorism more attractive.

I think that happened.

Now, you can't blame that on network Y or network Z, but it's a state of mind that lacks standards and professionalism, and I think by putting attention on that and making them, and those who criticize them, not only us, but people in Government, say, "This is what you did right; this is what you did wrong." That they will carry that forth the next time that there is a terrorist activity, as there most surely will be.

Mr. Gilman. Well, how can we make certain that there will be that voluntary effort, that something will be implemented?

Mr. Friendly. Well, I think one way you do it is by having a hearing like this, by in your personal contacts putting that pressure on, and by the press, which is the best curator of them all ventilating these issues.

I think the media has a lot to answer for. We want it that way. We can't have a first amendment if we are not willing to defend what we do and also criticize what we do.

I went to a seminar the other day—the place doesn't matter, with a lot of professional broadcasters, and some of their critics.

We have not only thin skins; we have no skins. Instead of saying, "Yes, that was a mistake; we will try to do it better," there was an excuse for everything. Excuses are not going to solve this problem.

I think they did a pretty good job, but the case is so serious. It is like war; it's—how do you think the Secretary of Defense is going to feel when he looks at this and says, "Well, can I trust them if we ever have to have a preemptive strike that the Congress is for?"

How can we figure that we are dealing with professionals?

It may be necessary to report that. There is still arguments about whether we should have reported the Bay of Pigs or not. Honest journalists will disagree. But we are never going to make any headway until we get this center stage and part of a deliberation which—it's as important, the way we report our wars—and terrorism is a war—as the way we wage them.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, I hope that your message is loud and clear for the industry, and for the professionals in journalism field today that if they don't do something to impose upon themselves some standards that there is a vacuum out there that may be filled by the Congress.

Mr. Bagdikian, would you care to comment?

Mr. BAGDIKIAN. Yes, sir; I agree with Fred Friendly that the excesses come from a state of mind, a kind of competitiveness that is detached from journalistic significance. I disagree with him that it is unrelated to ratings and profits. That state of mind is sustained by rewards and praise for people who do insignificant exclusives that make for frequently silly or irresponsible talk by anchors.

In the best journalism schools we teach against this kind of thing. But it reminds me that a former critic of journalism, A.J. Leibling, said that what a school of journalism can do is limited until you can send to that school publishers and broadcast executives. It is one of those cases in which you can't deal just at the bottom where the rewards and punishments tend to sustain sensationalism, but you have to also begin at the top.

CAN VOLUNTARY STANDARDS BE ADOPTED

Mr. GILMAN. Do you think some voluntary standards can be adopted? Would they be adhered to?

Mr. BAGDIKIAN. If they are voluntary, that means there is no certainty. But I think that there ought to be forums in which the responsible people, truly responsible people who are in charge—the editors, the executive producers, the vice presidents in charge of, and even the chairmen of the boards—can see an analysis of what was right and what was wrong, and draw from that generalized principles that most thoughtful journalists themselves adhere to, but which are exceeded in the frantic race for ratings.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Powell, would you care to comment?

DO PRESS AND MEDIA COVERAGE PROMOTE TERRORISM

Mr. POWELL. Two quick things. I just think we ought to maybe think a bit more on the question that has been raised here about the degree to which journalism, press coverage promotes or encourages terrorism.

In one sense, I think that statement is almost undeniable in a sense that in some theoretical construct in which there were no news, perhaps there would be somewhat less terrorism. I am not sure how much less.

In a more real world, however, it might be worth considering what, whether anyone of us here, if we were in a position to dictate without question what every network, camera crew did, what everything that appeared on the American networks—if we thought we could, in fact, do that in such a way that would any more than marginally influence the incidence of terrorism.

I doubt that we could consistent with what I think would be a desire on the part of all of us, to also serve the function of informing the people, and allowing the democratic process to proceed.

I'm not sure there is a big window there in which if we do this and that and the other, we will somehow significantly reduce the attraction of terrorism in the modern world.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Friendly wanted to respond briefly.

Mr. FRIENDLY. Well, just briefly.

I think we can do it by not hyping it. I heard announcements on the air. "Wake up early tomorrow to network Y where you will hear the latest on the hostage situation."

The Super Bowl didn't get more promotion, and the Super Bowl is a game. We can't go on treating terrorism, which is a form of war as if it were a game. We hype it, and we have got to stop doing that. We have got to stop advertising it. We have got to stop promoting, and we have got to stop the news executives. What you must have learned, Mr. Powell, during the 444 days and nights——

Mr. POWELL. It is always debatable in retrospect whether you learn anything from those or not——

Mr. FRIENDLY. Well, I think we have to learn what President Carter learned, and what Jody Powell learned.

But we do know that they watch American television, and if they can't watch it, there is somebody on a telephone telling them exactly what was on the air.

It is an inbred cybernetic circuit. They know whether you put it on the air or not.

We need to get across the fact that you can't shoot your way onto our air. If President Carter or President Reagan were to say to network X or network Y, I want a half hour to talk about this, give me that air time, or I order you to put the hostages on because that is the only way we are going to get the terrorists out of it, we wouldn't do it.

But we are supplicants to that, because we use the excuse of competition, and we have got to stop hyping the terrorist situation. I know that's what we did wrong. I have to tell you that they know it, although you will have a hard time getting them to say that in this room.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

Mr. POWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We find ourselves in very awkward and different positions here. Normally Mr. Friendly is defending the fourth estate, and I'm doing the bashing. Now we find ourselves switched——

Mr. FRIENDLY. I thought I was defending it.

MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS

Mr. POWELL. I'm enjoying myself here.

I just wanted to say two things. With regard to Iran, as I think I've made clear, Lord knows I found myself extremely angry on many occasions during those 444 days. However, I have to say that in my judgment, looking back on that, even though those people in that Embassy and others in the government over there certainly enjoyed, certainly got carried away with their role and with American television, I don't think that's what prolonged that crisis.

I think that crisis was prolonged much more because of what was going on inside Iran. I mean, if you want to look at Iranian television, maybe that's the place to look, or look at the Iranian press. But it was a local political issue there. And if you had cut, if you'd abolished "Nightline," if Walter Cronkite had quit counting, if you had cut the amount of time television spent on the hostages, by whatever you want to do, a third, a half, I don't think it would have shortened the crisis.

Mr. **Friendly**. If President Carter had come out of the Rose Garden earlier, the situation might not have escalated as high as it did, or don't you believe that?

Mr. **Powell**. No, I think the networks were—as I said earlier, that's the network's old "The devil made me buy that dress" excuse. If only the Government hadn't done such and such, we wouldn't have made such fools of ourselves over this story.

It just doesn't wash. The networks and the news media were going to make—that was going to be a powerful, big story, it didn't matter what the President did.

If he'd taken off his clothes and walked down Pennsylvania Avenue, or he could have hid in a gopher hole, and it would not have affected the amount of time television spent on that story one iota.

Mr. **Feighan**. The panelists, I might caution, are now engaging in political analysis, which is the exclusive domain of members of this committee.

Mr. **Powell**. I beg your pardon, sir.

Mr. **Feighan**. Mr. Lantos.

250TH ANNIVERSARY OF A FREE PRESS

Mr. **Lantos**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I find much of the testimony this morning extremely disturbing. I'd like to make some observations and then ask one question. First, let me say that being a history buff, I introduced legislation earlier this year to commemorate the 250th anniversary of the free press in the United States, namely, the *Zenger* case.

Mr. **Friendly**. We're celebrating that next week.

Mr. **Lantos**. We are celebrating it next week. The House passed it unanimously, and the Senate passed it unanimously, I think we need to set aside an issue that Mr. Bagdikian raised. No one is more committed to freedom of press than members of this committee.

No one is talking about legislation; no one is talking about regulation. So let's set aside that bugaboo. Second, I really must say that although I might embarrass you, Mr. Friendly, you and Ed Murrow have contributed more to responsible free press in this Nation than any two people in this century, and we are all deeply in your debt.

Mr. **Friendly**. You're half right. [Laughter.]

EXCESSES IN THE MEDIA'S COVERAGE

Mr. **Lantos**. You said, which was one of the most perceptive observations of this morning, that the press was too big for its britches. I could not agree with you more, and I suspect this is your rephrasing of Ed Murrow's old statement that when your voice carries from one end of the bar to the other end of the bar, now it carries from one end of the country to the other end of the country, but your wisdom hasn't increased.

We now have to escalate it and say your voice carries from one end of the world to the other end of the world, but there is no greater degree of perception and depth and intelligence and responsibility when it was only from one end of the bar to the other.

I found Mr. Powell's statement, that the worst thing that came out of this is the damage to the press, a mind-bogglingly narcissistic statement. There are other elements here and other players than the press, for instance, the national interest.

So we are not talking about legislation. We surely are not talking about rigid rules, regulations, mandatory or otherwise, but I think that Mr. Friendly sort of put the issue on page 1 of his testimony, and I'm quoting you:

> It is the television spotlight that is the real ransom the terrorists demand and get, and they got it, and they got it because of what I can only describe as an incredibly irresponsible orgy of mindless competitiveness.

I mean, one doesn't have to be a genius to recognize that pool coverage would have provided the American people all that would have been necessary and probably more. I really regret the fact that none of you gentlemen answered Chairman Hamilton's question with respect to Delta Force.

In your testimony, Mr. Friendly, you say, and this is one of the many enormously perceptive things you say, "The press is in the human interest business, and the Government is in the national interest business."

Mr. **Friendly**. Let me correct that and say that I stole that line from Bill Safire, and I should have quoted it.

Mr. **Lantos**. I'd be delighted to pay tribute to Bill Safire and you.

Mr. **Friendly**. We're not only in the public interest business, we're in the public—we in the media are in the public anguish business, and you know, Congressman, I better say this before I forget to say it, and I hope it's reported, if it is at all, in context.

The President in the national interest, Commander in Chief, may one day have a hostage situation when he says "We are going to have to stand firm and not kowtow." And the news media, and it may jeopardize the hostages.

Thirty-nine men have been lost before in the service of this country. These are not soldiers, but it may well be some day that a President will have to say "I'm going to take the consequences." The news media makes it almost impossible——

Mr. **Lantos**. Precisely. That's my——

Mr. **Friendly** [continuing]. For him to do that, because the game is being played, "Get the hostages out," and that's 1,000 to 1 against what's in the national interest. It may someday be that we have to sacrifice the men.

I identify with those hostages, I know how tragic it was, but someday we may have to do that, and the President's going to have to be free to do that without having to worry about being scorched in the news media.

THE IMPACT OF MEDIA COVERAGE ON THE PRESIDENT'S ABILITY TO CONDUCT FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. **Lantos.** You made my point for me. What I am suggesting to you, that focusing on individual tragedies, interviewing the families of people in anguish, in horror, in nightmare, completely debilitates national policymakers from making rational decisions in the national interest.

And the fact that we have not yet heard this morning the most shocking things to come out of this whole episode, and my judgment of what is most shocking is very different from yours, Mr. Powell, is that the public opinion polls indicated that a very large proportion of the American people were ready to yield to terrorists.

I believe they were ready to yield largely because of the media, because the perspective was lacking and the individual nightmare was on the screen. There is no way to conduct foreign policy for 237 million people by focusing on the tragedy of an individual whose husband or wife or child is a hostage.

MEDIA SELF-REGULATION

Now I have one question. Each of you, and correct me if I'm wrong, is pleading for self-regulation. This, I think, is the most arrogant of all observations of this morning.

There is no entity in our society, from the Congress, to business, to education, to labor, to any profession, which can arrogate to itself the right to discuss its proper behavior in public.

I was puzzled, Mr. Friendly, when you said you hoped this is the last hearing of this kind that you will be invited to. I hope it isn't. I simply find it incomprehensible that on the basis of this very shabby record, after Iran, now Beirut, the media should really think that it and it alone has the right to discuss publicly, seriously, how it can improve its performance.

I mean, there is no group in our society that has that privilege. The medical profession would like to have it. They said "Let us do our animal experiments, because we know what's good for the progress of medical science." But those of us who are interested in animal welfare say "We want you to do all you can, but we want some people who are not physicians to look in on how the experiments are conducted on animals, because maybe unnecessary pain and injury is inflicted on them."

Every single group has to open itself up to public scrutiny, and to say that the press, the media, are somehow so precious that they alone can deal with this issue I find absurd. I would be grateful if each of you would comment.

Mr. **Bagdikian.** Congressman, if I may, I agree that we in the media are much too arrogant. But I must say, the first amendment is an arrogant statement. It says that Congress shall not abridge freedom of the press, nor of the people.

Mr. **Lantos.** That is not the issue.

Mr. BAGDIKIAN. Well, I think it is, if I may, Mr. Congressman, that if we talk of anything other than self-regulation, certainly with the printed press, which is directly covered by the first amendment I see no other way except the way we have for each individual in our society, to be affected by the criticisms of his or her peers in the society. I think that is proper and necessary. But if we have anything other than self-regulation, who is to regulate?

Mr. LANTOS. But we are not proposing regulation. We are proposing exposure of issues, and the general discussion of those issues in hearings such as this.

Mr. BAGDIKIAN. Well, I would have no argument with that whatsoever, sir.

Mr. FRIENDLY. Nor would I, sir, and I'm glad that Dean Bagdikian read the first amendment to you. I won't do that. I am concerned that we have to worry more about those who loves the first amendment too much, and use it as an excuse for shoddy journalism, than from those who may be out to limit it.

The reason that I said I hope you never have to invite me here again is my way of trying to say to my colleagues, with the freest press in the world, to understand that if we don't professionalize ourselves, if we don't exert these standards, you or somebody like you or the courts are going to come and do it for us.

There's a 1931 decision that you probably know as much about as I do, called *Near* v. *Minnesota.* There was no real prior restraint law in this country until a shoddy newspaper, the Saturday Press, in Minnesota, was closed down and the Supreme Court said "You cannot limit them, and the only way you can have a prior restraint," and this was in the dictum, "is troopships sailing in time of war," Charles Evans Hughes.

We are coming very close to a time when war and terrorism are going to be equated to troopships sailing in time of war. My polemic about "I hope you never have to invite me here again" is based on the fact that I hope the news media understand the message that you're sending them on behalf of the American people, that the performance does not answer the challenge, that we have to do better, and that if we don't do better you or the Supreme Court or a court of appeals is going to enforce a law that muddies the first amendment, and that would be the worst tragedy of all.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Powell?

Mr. POWELL. Well, I think it's pretty much——

PRESSURES ON THE PRESIDENT CREATED BY THE MEDIA

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Powell, if you could respond, I would be particularly interested if you would focus some of your commentary on the statements that Mr. Friendly had offered with respect to the pressure that the media brings on the President or other policymakers toward action or inaction.

Mr. POWELL. It certainly does happen, but I must say I think it goes with the turf. I don't know how one goes about covering or providing information on any issue without, if it has any effect, the potential for generating political pressure.

With regard to the particular situation under discussion here, I must confess that my view of what I was seeing on television and reading on the op-ed pages of the papers was almost the exact opposite. One of the things that I saw was an array of commentators and former Government officials, in no position to be held accountable for the consequences of the actions that they—I'll say we—recommended, trotting out to advise the President on just how many bombs he ought to drop and how many people he ought to kill and how fast he ought to get it done.

I mean, I was—it seemed to me that there was in this situation an ample opportunity for those who thought the President was being too cautious, those who thought that the time had come when we ought to set aside concerns about the lives of the hostages, to make their case.

I heard it over and over and over again. I was inclined and moved on occasion to think that perhaps what we needed to do was recruit this array of commentators and former public officials, and we could in the next hostage situation, swap these people for the hostages, and that would no doubt solve the problem very shortly, since we could expect them in captivity to urge the same swift, tough action that they urged from the relative safety of the television studios.

But you know, it is certainly true that seeing a grieving hostage relative on television produces human emotions. I'm not sure the answer is to say "Well, in that case, for fear that the American people will let our emotions run away with us, as we do on occasion, we ought to ban that woman from the air."

Now, I would certainly take the point and agree with the point that we saw perhaps too many, in the sense of a news story here, and that we didn't need to see interviews with the second cousin of a guy that used to date the hostage's sister when they were in high school, that we could have gotten—but all of that to me is part of the democratic process, including the emotions.

MEDIA COVERAGE OF DELTA FORCE

Mr. Lantos. How about the Delta Force issue?

Mr. Powell. Well, you all, I would think, are in a better position to judge that than we are on the outside. My reaction at the time, or right after it, was that it probably should not have been reported, to go back to my arrogant and narcissistic statement earlier, not because I thought it did damage to our national interest, but because it looked so horrible that most Americans would think it did.

From my understanding of that, and again, you people have better access to this sort of information than we do, but my understanding at the time was that, first of all, this information was made available to the fourth estate by people in the Pentagon who presumably were in a position to know.

Secondly, it seems clear from observation that the terrorists themselves were dealing with, from the very first hour, the real possibility that we would make some sort of rescue attempt and were already responding to that threat.

And finally, I would guess at least from previous experiences in this area that our military planners had to assume that, in terms of their own planning and actions, that this particular deployment was or would be quickly known to the people holding the hostages, and so we had to make—in a sense we had to make our plans based upon an assumption that the people in Beirut knew, certainly the people in Damascus and the people in Jerusalem and elsewhere knew, where that Delta Force was.

Mr. **Friendly**. I don't have any problem saying to you, Congressman, that troopships sailing in time of war, and that's what Delta was——

Mr. **Lantos**. Sure.

Mr. **Friendly** [continuing]. Attributed to a nameless network X, newspaper X has learned, is unacceptable journalism. I think the New York Times, which gets a lot of blame for not reporting the Cuban missile—the Bay of Pigs story ahead of time, did the right thing.

And nobody asked them not to do it. That's a facade. That didn't happen. The New York Times was never asked by President Kennedy. The New York Times decided that by themselves. I've done a lot of research on it. Similarly, on that first Sunday night of the hostage situation, a network—no point in naming it—said "And now we have observed," or words to that effect, "unidentified objects coming from the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Lebanon."

It never happened. If it was happening, it shouldn't have been reported. It's not our job to do that, and although some of my hardheaded colleagues may think less of me, I'm willing to say—I usually ask that question at seminars, "Would you report that? Would you report the Iranian rescue thing?" I think the Iranian rescue thing was a mistake. I think it did irreparable damage, but I would not have reported it. I have decided in my 70th year that I am, alas, a citizen first and a journalist second.

Mr. **Lantos**. I'm delighted to hear you say that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. **Feighan**. Mr. Dornan.

Mr. **Bagdikian**. If I may, sir. I was a correspondent in this city for many years, and it seemed to me that there were three kinds of secrets in this city. One was a genuine secret that truly endangered the national security. My experience is that this almost never escaped the persons responsible for that secrecy. It is rare.

Then there is the kind of secret that is known to all interested parties including foreign embassies inside the third taxi zone—not known in Peoria, but fully known in the city, and it is not truly a secret to the interested parties hostile and otherwise. And that frequently does get reported.

And then there is the kind of secret which is deliberately disclosed by responsible people in the Government for serious strategic reasons, or what they perceive to be serious strategic reasons. I have been in the position as have many journalists of being told this by the highest officers of this Government, and then denounced by these officers the next day because they had to, for diplomatic reasons.

I do not know, sir, about Delta Force—which category of secret that dealt in. But I think that it is necessary to recognize that many of the things that are reported in the media are deliberately disclosed by responsible officers for responsible reasons, and journalists risk denunciation for that.

Journalists frequently report things that are not secret but are confidential and unimportant, and I think that they are guilty of that. I do not know about Delta Force. I suspect, however, that it was the kind of thing that was strategically useful to the negotiations in this case, but I do not know that for a fact.

Mr. **Feighan**. Thank you. Mr. Dornan.

Mr. **Dornan**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I find this discussion one of the most important that we have engaged in, in this 99th Congress. And I appreciate it when it becomes a four-way discussion with whatever Congressman is addressing questions or making observations to you three gentlemen.

When Mr. Lantos speaks—and he is generally described as a liberal Democrat—this conservative Republican listens, and I would like to pick up on some of the observations that he made. First, Mr. Friendly, I intend to quote you.

Mr. **Lantos**. I am a moderate Democrat, I am a very moderate Democrat.

EXCESSES IN MEDIA COVERAGE

Mr. **Dornan**. I cannot account for the San Francisco press, Tom.

First of all, I would like to quote you, Mr. Friendly, on television, radio, or whenever I can on a statement you made. And because sometimes in journalism you take and put in parentheses a word to clarify something that was said in the statement or a pronoun, I would like to rephrase it, and see if you will sign off on it. You said, "You cannot shoot your way onto our air."

Could we change "you" to "terrorists," change "cannot" to "must not be allowed to shoot their way onto our" and change "air" to "television." In other words, if I quote you thusly, "Terrorists must not be allowed to shoot their way onto our television airways," would it be correct?

Mr. **Friendly**. I said that, and I meant it.

Mr. **Dornan**. That is the way I would like to quote it then, sir. Now I think that one of the problems that we have is this fine line between news analysis and editorializing. And you reached all the way back to the Bay of Pigs. Let me reach back to a more recent and agonizing period, the Vietnam war.

At the end of our involvement, the climax of our involvement, the 18 days of B-52 bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong, under the on-the-air stewardship of a distinguished journalist, Mr. Cronkite, CBS began to run color footage of burned B-52 crew members filmed in Hanoi by the equivalent of their Josef Goebbels—whoever ran their propaganda ministry.

CBS ran it on the air without so much as a videograph at the bottom saying, "This is film supplied by the Communist government of Hanoi."

Mr. **Friendly**. Are you sure of that?

Mr. **Dornan**. Yes. I was very active in the POW movement, I was stunned to see Air Force officers, some of them burned, being paraded in front of color cameras. This had followed Mr. Cronkite's statement on the air a few months or a year before that he personally would no longer use the words "enemy troops," "Red troops," or "Communist troops." That he henceforth would only refer to them as "North Vietnamese troops."

Now how would the network—other than a videograph which is a form, I believe, of not editorializing but news analysis—how would they properly put into historical context any terrorist situation today without running the risk of editorializing, or, for a specific example being pro-Israel, of using the examples of the country or the people who have suffered most under terrorism, to stop terrorists from shooting their way onto our airways.

How can the news media act with or without the help of congressional discussion and frankly, gentlemen, we are not going to pass any bills. If a bill is already submitted, I am not aware of it. It will never get a committee hearing.

Mr. **Friendly**. Your concern will be a signal.

Mr. **Dornan**. Yes. We just want to engage in a dialog with you. Because the people are dead wrong who say that Congressmen should comment only on things that can be translated into legislation. I had a town hall meeting 2 nights ago, and I do not think that 1 minute of the 2 hours was spent on anything that I could make into legislation.

BALANCE BETWEEN ANALYZING AND EDITORIALIZING

It is the frustration of the American people, and each one of us represents a little more than half a million people, trying to inject their voices into the national dialog on sensitive subjects like terrorism.

Now, have you, in all of your years of superb news analysis, figured out a way to engage in analysis editorializing in that precious 24 minutes left after taking the commercial time on the evening news?

Mr. **Friendly**. It is 22 minutes. And by the way, during the hostage——

Mr. **Dornan**. Excuse me, what was it when you left the network, was it 24.5?

Mr. **Friendly**. It was a little bit more than that. And it is shrinking, and it will always shrink. And there was a day, though, when pieces could be 4 and 5 minutes on the nightly news. Today the average is about about 1 minute and 45 seconds. And that is a terrible problem.

But ironically, during the hostage situation, as much as 17 and 18 minutes of the time was spent on that one story at the same time that deficit spending, nuclear arms control, South Africa, and a whole series of other problems were as important, and perhaps even more important.

Television has a habit of emphasizing one story to the distraction or detraction of everything else. But analysis. Part of the problem is that partisans think that the news analysis, which really just putting it into context, is editorializing.

When Murrow said that Senator McCarthy said X, Y, and Z, and X, Y, and Z are palpatably not true and he could prove that, that was news analysis.

Mr. **Dornan**. And he was accused of editorializing?

Mr. **Friendly**. A little bit, and he could take that, and history has been very good to him. In the case that you describe, if your report is accurate that they showed film, and in those days it probably was film, made in North Vietnam and not identified as being made by the enemy or the North Vietnamese, that was unconscionable.

We are in the consumer business, just like everybody else. What we have to make sure is that if we are selling asbestos that they know that asbestos may cause lung cancer. In the news business, we have to say we are holding up the lens. This is what you see, and this is what you cannot see. And it is our job to tell you that, even if you take some criticism for it.

Somebody mentioned business and the doctor. They are all in trouble. And that is because American business says free enterprise must remain free, and they got the Sherman Antitrust Act. The doctors, the chemical business, the lawyers have all said we are independent, even the judges. And now they are all getting restrictions that they cannot live with.

Of one thing that I am sure. That if you start to hack away, and I do not suggest for a minute that you are, at the first amendment, it is going to go as it has gone in England where they really do not have freedom of the press. It is a half free press.

We cannot stand resolutely by and say we will not listen, we will not change, we have the first amendment. Justice Potter Stewart said it better than anybody. He said that there is a great difference between what we have the right to do under the first amendment and the right thing to do.

And the right thing to do is to get it straight, to get if first if we can, but to get it straight, and to be sure to put it into perspective, which means to say in Vietnam that "this film came from enemy sources."

Mr. **Dornan**. Mr. Chairman, could I ask the other two panelists to comment on this difficult problem that requires some guts in the news media of balancing between editorializing and news analysis?

Mr. **Feighan**. If you could comment as briefly as possible.

Mr. **Bagdikian**. I agree with Fred Friendly. I think that what is given as context and background, documentable background, is frequently seen by partisans as unwelcome information, and therefore called editorializing, Where it is sheer opinion of the journalist, then it should be labeled if it should be printed at all.

Congressman, I agree with you that some of the most useful information for this society has come from reports of the committees of the House and Senate. I have no doubt about that. And I see nothing improper when this committee or any other does a serious study and issue a report.

As far as shooting, let me say something about hostages shooting their way into the news.

Mr. **Dornan**. Terrorists.

Mr. **Bagdikian**. I am sorry, terrorists. They have shot their way into American policy and into the homes of the American public, and I do not see a way of keeping that out of the news. What I think should happen is that insignificant or senationalist treatment should stay out of the news. But I think that once these crises occur, there is no way of keeping it out of the news.

MEDIA COVERAGE OF DELTA FORCE

Mr. DORNAN. If I could just relate your response to the example of the Delta Force. Suppose, that piece of film, and I was shocked when I saw it, a news analysis came on and said:

> What you are looking at is film of the secret Delta Force at a secret base on Cyprus, and we have calculated the capacity and the speed of the H-53 helicopter, and it probably can get to Algiers in time. And be aware, ladies and gentlemen, that the terrorists' accomplices in the United States are watching this report. They will be on the phone satellite hook-up instantly to Algiers to tell their accomplices there how to thwart the Delta Force.

Would that be news analysis, letting the whole world know how ugly and rotten it is for them to broadcast a ship sailing in a terrorist war?

Mr. POWELL. Well, as I say, I cannot speak with certain knowledge as to what damage that report did if any, or what reasons those people in the Pentagon who put it out had for putting it out. I have my suspicion, as I have made clear. I think that one might have presented that sort of analysis to place it in context.

One might also have suggested amongst other things, since we do not know for sure, that perhaps we do not know why this information was given to us, but perhaps administration officials consider it to be useful as a negotiating ploy. We do not know whether the enemy already has this information, but we suspect that they probably do, and that sort of thing.

I agree with you completely on the fact that that should not have been aired in my view. What I am not sure about and what I have my doubts about is whether or not it in fact caused us problems in our planning and that sort of thing as far as a possible rescue operation was concerned.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you. Mr. Smith.

MEDIA COVERAGE OF TWA HOSTAGES' FAMILY MEMBERS

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank all of the panelists for being here today. I know that it is very difficult for anybody to find the right answer, because there is no right answer that you are going to find. Obviously, reasonable men are going to differ over reasonable circumstances on the application of the first amendment.

I tend to view the application of the first amendment as far as the news media is concerned hopefully on their belief that it is on a need to know basis. And that everything that falls within the need to know without commercial overtones should be the protected part, the part that they should seek to dramatize, or broadcast, or to editorialize, or to allow people to view, et cetera.

But let me give you something that I think maybe will give you a little food for thought. While all three of you are sitting here today, we have television cameras at each one of your homes. And your families are being interviewed right now, your wife, your mothers, fathers, your children. Because it is important that they know and the rest of the world knows that you are being grilled by Congress.

And they want to know why you are being grilled by Congress. So they are going to ask your wives, and your children, and your parents why is your husband in Congress, why are your sons and fathers in Congress, right now being grilled.

What did they eat for breakfast, are they prepared for this grilling? Did they wear the right clothes? Have they been in congressional hearings before? Do you anticipate that they will go again? Do you think that this is the only hearing that they will attend? Do they belong to any organizations today or ever which might have led to the reason that they were asked to appear before Congress?

That is exactly what happened in the hostage crisis. Obviously, this is a hypothetical.

Would it not disturb you, Mr. Powell, if your wife or your children were subjected to that kind of claptrap?

Mr. POWELL. It did disturb me, actually.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. That is correct. I call this the "we are on a roll" syndrome. We have got a good thing. Everybody wants to have a piece of it. We manufactured a state of mind, a desire for more information in the minds of the American public. There is always downtime, because the terrorists are not cooperating. They are not putting our people on television enough to fill up 24 hours a day. They are not issuing enough news releases. Mr. Berri is not having enough press conferences. What do we do?

Let us go talk, as you said, to the second cousin of the man who used to date the wife of a hostage. That is the part that is really a disgrace. Because we are never going to be able to get a complete resolution of the first amendment, your right to disseminate the news, the obligation of the American public to be shielded to some degree from news, the right of the government to not suppress, I do not want to use that word because it has difficult connotations, but to make sure that certain news which is sensitive really does not come out for the protection of national interest and individuals.

But this unbelievable desire, because I think of commercialization, to get the most trivial banal nonsense aired on television, where did they go, what did they do, how old were they when they first took their toilet training. It is unbelievable, and it sickens most Americans, although they watch it and they eat it up.

And there is this interesting dilemma, this dichotomy, of saying to themselves while they are watching it, this is ridiculous, and then they sit there and watch it some more.

How do we get a handle on this "we are on a roll" syndrome, find me more meat to put into the grinder, because we have got to get it out on television?

Mr. FRIENDLY. Mr. Smith, you are talking about the professionalization of an instrument of communications. Let me take it down.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. By the way, excuse me. I do not limit that only to the radio or TV.

Mr. FRIENDLY. I understand that.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. You know, there are interviews in the newspapers with all of these people, too. It just lags behind the immediacy of the radio and television.

Mr. FRIENDLY. The point that you are really talking about is hostage fishing, is going to the home of a hostage or to a family of a little boy who has died in an accident, and saying what is it like seeing your son destroyed in a hostage situation or in an airplane accident, how does it feel to go to the funeral.

That is unacceptabie behavior. And if enough people such as you talk about it enough, the broadcaster will understand, as I think that he is beginning to understand, that it is counterproductive. There was a great moment during the hostage situation where they went to notify the man from Maryland whose son had been brutally killed, and the chaplains and the other officers go to his front door, knock on the door, and then there was no scene inside, and then you saw him coming out.

I am told that the chaplain and the family decided that they did not want anybody there, but I am also told that the chaplain had a tough time that day. He should not have had that tough time.

Journalists ought to be drilled in the fact that the most obscene question that you can ask somebody is how does it feel to see your dear one killed, maimed, or held hostage. It is yellow journalism. It stinks, if I could use that terrible word in this hallowed hall.

We should not do it. And the way not to do it is in Mr. Bagdikian's school at Berkeley and at ours at Columbia, and he is absolutely right that it is the people in the 40's, the 50's, and the 60's, the gatekeepers who have to learn this, we have to grill it into them that that is unprofessional and unacceptable.

There is no way to defend that. It is yellow journalism, electronic or otherwise.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. How do you do that in the age of commercialization?

Mr. FRIENDLY. You do it by doing what we are trying to do today, by writing what Time magazine, or Newsweek magazine, or the Washington Post, or the New York Times did, by making your speeches, and by raising the level of consciousness.

And one thing that I would like to say when you talked about the Delta Force, Jody. We really do not know how that happened. President Kennedy used to say that the ship of state is the only vessel that leaks from the top. If that did leak purposefully from the Pentagon, you ought to find out about that.

I think that this dialog is incomplete without having, and you cannot do it in one morning, without having people from the FBI, from the CIA, from the Pentagon. In this dialog, we need to hear from them what went right, what went wrong, what helped, and what hurt. And they have got to come out of their caves. They have got to lay it on the line.

You have authority over them. You cannot let them hide in the Pentagon, or the Rose Garden, or anyplace else. They play a big role in this. The vacuum that they create makes it necessary for the news media sometimes to encroach on their rights.

PUBLIC SCRUTINY OF THE PRESS

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I know that the time is up. But I would like to ask Mr. Powell a short followup question, because of something that he said before that followed up to what Mr. Lantos talked about, the view that the crisis ultimately hurt the fourth estate more than it hurt anyone else.

Mr. Powell, do you believe that public scrutiny of the press is a violation of the first amendment?

Mr. POWELL. Absolutely not. I spent my whole opening statement saying in fact that that was exactly what I recommended, and I thought that it was the one single way that we could do more good or accomplish more good than any other.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. If that is the case, then how do you think that the press was hurt by this whole incident if in fact public scrutiny is what the press engages in to keep the Government, and the body politic, and the public on an even keel, why should not public scrutiny of the media be the same and have the same ultimate process impact of keeping the media on an even keel?

Mr. POWELL. I obviously did not make myself very clear. The reason that journalism was hurt was because journalism did, as I said, some excessive, sensational, tacky things. And that sort of behavior tends to undermine public support for journalism. I was not defending what journalists did. The point that I was trying to make was that one of the best reasons for journalists to be concerned about what has happened in 1980 and 1985 is that that sort of behavior damages journalism.

And it was not as I think was implied because I do not care about the national interest, but because, in my judgment which is the best that I can give, the behavior of the press in both of those situations, did more damage to the press than it did to the national interest or to other institutions.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Do you agree with Mr. Friendly that if this were to continue on the same basis, if another crisis erupted and another similar type of coverage, that eventually they would be the ones like the lawyers, and doctors, and others would be the cause for having brought the house down on their own heads?

Mr. POWELL. My greatest fear, and I do not want to be misunderstood here, is not that the fourth estate is going to bring our Government down or to destroy it.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Not the Government.

Mr. POWELL. Or our society. But that we will if we are not careful destroy ourselves. I think that there are certainly groups in this society who do not believe in open debate and discussion anyway. And what I fear, and they come up on both the extreme right and the extreme left, and what I fear is that one of these days that those folks are going to come at the constitutional and legal protections that are necessary for journalism to function.

And when that happens, those of us in journalism are going to turn and look to the American people for support, and it is not going to be there, because we will have driven it away by our self-righteousness and our unwillingness to point the finger at the rotten apples in our own barrels.

I am for that, but I just want to make sure that it was understood what I thought could be accomplished. And also, frankly, what in real terms we were dealing with here. Not that the problems were not serious, but the problems did not go across the board at least in my judgment in these two instances.

RESTRAINT IN MEDIA COVERAGE

Mr. **Smith** of Florida. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not have any more questions. But I would just like to leave a question hanging in the air. Because at some future time, we are going to come back to this, as I understand it. I would just like the gentlemen on the panel and perhaps others who are going to be here this afternoon if they are here yet to think about how you are going to have any kind of attempt to clean this up when nobody wants to take the first step, and you have continuing commercialization.

Who is going to be the one to move out first, who is going to be the one to declare that they see that something is wrong, and they need to make it right?

Mr. **Friendly**. Well, is that not what we are doing?

Mr. **Smith** of Florida. Where is that going to happen?

Mr. **Feighan**. Mr. Friendly, we have to move on, for one reason to accommodate the flight schedules that some of you have. Thank you. Mr. Luken.

GUIDELINES FOR MEDIA COVERAGE

Mr. **Luken**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to participate and I do want to because Mr. Friendly has taken up on one suggestion that I made, and that is really the focus of my comments, and I think should be the focus of our attention here.

Mr. Friendly, you said that you would not accept the idea of the networks adopting guidelines or self-regulation. I want to say that I would retreat from the idea of self-regulation. I think that that is an inappropriate description. But I do not want to give up so easily on guidelines.

I think you have made a good case for guidelines, and I want to pursue that a little bit. One thing that you mentioned, that others have, is we are going to have more hostages.

Mr. **Friendly**. That is certain.

Mr. **Luken**. As I said in my colloquy with Mr. Lantos, I would like to confine this to the hostages. I think it is important enough just to talk about future hostage situations in the control of the terrorists. You have said it, Mr. Wallace of NBC News has said it. He says too much coverage can only encourage the fanatics. If I can take a few Americans, then I can get worldwide exposure for my grievance.

This is a particular a unique problem. Now, let us just take the pool coverage question that you brought up, that you have discussed, as others have. You have lamented the fact that we did not have pool coverage at one particular time. How in the world are we ever going to get pool coverage if we do not have some prior agreement between the networks on the subject? They are not amongst the networks. We are not going to get pool coverage, as we found out, there is plenty of statements to that effect, we are not going to get pool coverage in the middle of the crisis because the spirit of competition, as you have also pointed out, is too strong; is that not right?

Mr. **Friendly**. Well, Congressman, pool coverage has a place.

Mr. **Luken**. I use that as an illustration.

Mr. **Friendly**. But I sit twice a year with the Secretary of Defense, as do other journalists, on the whole business of helping to advise him on what to do on another preemptive strike or a Greneda situation. It is a very difficult situation.

I think if we ever do something like that, it is possible to have 8 or 10 or 12 people representing 500 news organizations and all reporting. William Lawrence of the New York Times went almost to Hiroshima, not quite, covering the development of the atomic bomb and reported it for every newspaper, not only his New York Times.

I think a hostage situation makes pool coverage very difficult because the minaturization of equipment, look at the cameras that you see in front of you right now.

Mr. **Luken**. The point is you did say that in certain cases pool coverage makes——

Mr. **Friendly**. I did say that, but I never said that about a hostage situation because you are going to have 500 people there. You are going to have people there from local stations; you are going to have people there from Japan; you are going to have people there from Paris, from all over the world, and to control that situation is horrendous, almost impossible.

Now, I am, but pooling those things which are the equivalent of troopship sailing in time of war. I do not see how you control 500 people with a pool. I think the answer is guidelines within an organization, but guidelines often go out the window under crisis. What you need are professional, serious journalists running these organizations, aware of the problem, learning from their mistakes, having guidelines within each organization.

Mr. **Luken**. You mean guidelines within each organization where each one knows that the other one has their own set of work. Now, you pointed this out.

What about the subject of the troopships?

Mr. **Friendly**. Right.

Mr. **Luken**. All right, everybody knows that CBS and NBC and ABC are not going to report troop ship movements. That is an understood; that is a given, is it not?

Mr. **Friendly**. I do not know that it is.

Mr. **Luken**. Oh, I think it is.

Mr. **Friendly**. I think they might say in a—we run a lot of seminars. If you ask that question, the answer is it is not always so clear.

Mr. **Luken**. But NBC does not know what ABC will do in the next hostage-taking situation, and CBS does not know what NBC will do in the next hostage-taking situation. And why do we not, since you have suggested that they meet and they talk and they get the things stirred up, and I think Mr. Powell suggested the same thing, that the best way to handle this is to not let the dust settle. But, baloney, dust always settles. Eventually people get tired of talking about it. The only way we can memorialize it and carry it on to the next situation so, in your words, we will have learned something from it is to adopt some kind—if it is not a code, it is not guidelines—some kind of a consensus, something that should be adopted which would govern the situation—not govern, but which would at least influence the situations where we put hostages on the air unedited, live; where we put hostages on the air—

you have just suggested something—in the control of terrorists, that those proper notification, that proper notice be given and so on. Why cannot we come up with this? NBC is doing it within their organization. Why would it not be more so much more effective if they all tried to do it and then they could police each other? Police only in the sense that they could remind the world when violations occur.

Mr. **Friendly**. Mr. Luken, I am going to try to be brief; you will like that.

Mr. **Luken**. No, I will not. I have just about exhausted my questions.

DISADVANTAGES OF GUIDELINES

Mr. **Friendly**. And I am not going to say anything that you will like. I think the trouble with guidelines is that they will not apply to a situation which is the bizarreness of hostages. You could design a million situations and they will always be wrong. They will not fit, they will not work, and they will be resisted and they will be broken. You cannot enforce them.

The other problem is, and I learned this in States which tried to have fair trial, free press, first amendment, sixth amendment guidelines, in the *Nebraska Press Association* case, landmark case, went to the Supreme Court. In the seriousness of that matter, the Court took the guidelines and tried to give them a force of law. And I think that is what will happen, and I think that is what we have to resist. That is where you and I break. I do not want guidelines between the journalism entities because I think in a crisis some judge, someone someplace will say they have the force of law. I do not think they will work.

I think you can have those ideas and implement them by serious men and women who understand their responsibilities.

Mr. **Luken**. I think Mr. Bagdikian would like to comment.

Mr. **Bagdikian**. Yes, if I may speak to that, sir.

I agree with Fred Friendly in that, and let me give an example. There was in years past a Reardon Commission composed of lawyers, judges and journalists to look at what was then frequent violation of the rights of defendants in criminal trials and in criminal justice generally. It, I think, had a powerful effect by raising these issues in a clear way and forcing journalism to look at what was valid information for the public and what was merely sensationalism falling into some of the same kinds of traps that occurred during the last hostage situation. I think that is the proper way to proceed. Not because change is clear and orderly; because it is not. But I think that a forum in which responsible journalists, and journalist executives who reward and punish—will agree on principles or be reminded of principles that we already know.

Mr. **Luken**. Is that not what I am suggesting? I thought I was.

Mr. **Bagdikian**. Well, I have heard about rejecting self-regulation. Self-regulation is when you ennunciate principles, you repeat what good journalism is, you bring in the opinions of various members of our society like legislators, members of the public. In that kind of forum, with careful analysis of what was right and what was wrong, you make clear and clear to the public, what is journalistically, socially justified and what is mere frantic sensationalism. I think those are effective methods, but they are not immediately effective and they are not possible to implement in a simple way in essentially a sensational episodes like terrorism.

Mr. **Luken**. Well, we can agree they cannot be implemented with a force of law.

Mr. **Bagdikian**. No, but I think there can be principles.

Mr. **Luken**. And I think I disagree with Mr. Friendly that anybody would attempt to do so in any national issue such as this. I have seen the first amendment trampled on a local basis frequently. It is more often in the breach than in the observer. But in a national notorious situation such as this, I do not think that is going to happen. The first amendment is going to stand supreme.

Perhaps Mr. Powell may want to comment.

Mr. **Powell**. Just to endorse the comment on the difficulty of coming up with some specific rules and guidelines, and that will have more than a marginal, marginally positive impact on the thing. I do, however, see nothing wrong with them, and perhaps something good to be gained from the people up top, the big mules if you will in the networks and elsewhere, sitting down and having some serious discussions in an informal fashion about the problems that journalism faces and what they might do to deal with them.

My only concern about that is that I would not like to have that happen at the expense of once a situation develops having the networks and newspapers do what I hope they will do more of, which is beat up on each other about lapses in coverage.

Mr. **Luken**. Well, the pencil press will beat up on them anyway as they did in the last situation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to participate, and thanks to the panel.

CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN OVER MEDIA COVERAGE

Gentlemen, if I may just by way of conclusion observe that I think you have noticed this morning that there is some considerable diversity of opinion on our congressional panel, but that there is clearly a great deal of congressional concern and public concern about the way that the media has conducted itself during the most recent crisis that this country faced in Beirut. That, in fact, while at times the media, the American media may have reached great heights of journalism, that all too often there were instances where that journalism was excessive, irresponsible, sensationalistic, tasteless to mention only some of the characterizations that have been offered here this morning.

It is my judgment, and I think the judgment of the members of this committee, that at the very least that a public media has an obligation to go through a retrospective to be reflective in public forums, and that is the purpose of the set of hearings that we are holding today. That they have an obligation to do that under the harsh lights of a congressional discussion, to do it in the context of an American Bar Association meeting in London, to do it within their own professional journalistic organizations.

I, for my own part, would hope that members of the media would begin to view, as they must in the future when they most certainly be faced with covering similar and other types of terrorist activities, must recognize that they are dealing with a new kind of warfare, a symbolic warfare, in many instances an all too real kind of warfare, and that they must give the coverage of that incident in the context of warfare and apply the guiding principles that would be appropriate in that context, and I would hope, and we will hear more specifically this afternoon from individuals much more directly involved in those operations, that in that context they would view themselves first as patriots, as Americans, and second as reporters and as journalists. I think that that would be the most important principle that they could adopt.

I think we could not have begun the hearings with a more articulate, a more insightful group of individuals than we have had here this morning in these three gentlemen, and I am deeply appreciative on behalf of the committee and the entire Congress. Thank you very much for your participation. Thank you.

Mr. **Friendly**. We thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p.m., Tuesday, July 30, 1985.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. **Feighan**. The subcommittee will come to order.

Good afternoon, ladies and gentleman.

We heard this morning from three distinguished experts on the media: Mr. Ben Bagdikian of the Berkeley School of Journalism; Mr. Fred Friendly of the Columbia School of Journalism; and Mr. Jody Powell, currently a syndicated columnist and formerly White House Press Secretary under President Carter.

The committee had an opportunity to begin its discussion of the media's role in covering terrorist incidents, and I believe many important issues were raised at that session; and, in fact, they bear repeating.

Most notably the panelists concurred that press coverage of the most recent incident in Beirut was unprofessional at times in its zeal. All three panelists agreed that the blanket coverage was at times unnecessary and the suggestion was offered that pooled coverage by the networks would have sufficed, if, in fact, it would not have been better.

I think there was also agreement that public scrutiny of the networks and print media's conduct was a healthy thing, indeed a necessary thing, especially in light of the unlikely nature of any legislation being offered to curtail in any way the breadth of the media's right to report the news as they see fit.

We meet this afternoon to continue this discussion, and are privileged to have with us three people who are uniquely qualified—four people, excuse me—who are uniquely qualified to shed some light on how the media affects hostages and terrorists during a crisis.

Mr. Bruce Laingen was a hostage in the Tehran crisis in 1980.

Mr. Jerry Levin is both a newsman associated with Cable Network News, and a former hostage from Lebanon.

Ms. Peggy Say is the sister of Terry Anderson, who is one of the remaining hostages still held in Beirut.

Ms. Say, I would just like to express for myself, and for every member of this subcommittee our continued concern for your brother and our hopes that he will be returned safely to his family very soon.

Ms. SAY. Thank you.

Mr. FEIGHAN. The committee will be happy to hear opening statements. I would like to indicate also that we have with us Mrs. Kelly Cullens, who is the wife of a TWA hostage in Beirut, and we very much appreciate your presence before the subcommittee this afternoon.

If panelists can begin with their opening statements, I would ask in the interest of time that you might paraphrase whenever possible so that we can move expeditiously to questions from members of the panel.

We have several other committees in progress this afternoon, including conference committees for bills that are pending before the Senate and the House, and that is detaining a number of members of our committee, but they will be joining us periodically as we proceed this afternoon.

So, Mr. Laingen, if we can begin with your testimony, then followed in sequence by Mr. Levin, and Ms. Say, and Mrs. Cullens, if you would like to offer some comment at that time, it would be most welcomed, and after receiving all of their testimony, we will then proceed with questions from members of the subcommittee.

Mr. Laingen.

STATEMENT OF HON. BRUCE L. LAINGEN, FORMER HOSTAGE HELD IN IRAN

Mr. LAINGEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have no formal statement, but I have some brief preliminary oral remarks that I would like to make, and be prepared to answer questions later.

I am an FSO, a Foreign Service officer, a practicing diplomat, and my comments obviously should be seen in that context. I don't speak for the Department of State. I speak personally, although I think I represent a good many of the views of my colleagues held in Tehran.

I am also a Foreign Service officer with experience with only one case of terrorism, a rather unique kind of state-terrorism. I make that point, because I don't plan to have another one, and I don't profess to be an expert.

Thank you very much.

I proceed, Mr. Chairman, from the premise that those in the profession of journalism, the media, are our partners in the practice of diplomacy, which is something I take the opportunity with every new Foreign Service officer class coming into our profession these days to emphasize—partners, hopefully, in a relationship of trust that has to be built up over time, in the sense that the Foreign Service depends on the media to build what is essential in policy, and particularly in policy execution, and that is an informed public opinion. Without it, policies will inevitably fail in the kind of free and open democratic society that we are.

I proceed, Mr. Chairman, as well, from the premise that terrorism is wrong—on every count, politically, morally, legally—and that it cannot be justified or rationalized away, however important it is that we understand better as well why such acts of terrorism take place.

With that as premise, I would venture the following very general observations regarding the media's role in a terrorist-hostage situation. The media will be there. Certainly, in incidents as large and as dramatic as the TWA and Tehran crises, and the terrorists, generally speaking, will seek the media. Those are givens.

Terrorism is theater. Everyone says that, and it is true, public theater; and its practitioners want to command and to hold centerstage.

The challenge, it seems to me, facing the media—obvious, perhaps, but nonetheless worth restating, is that of striking a balance, striking a balance between the people's demand to know their right to know, their need to know, including as well responding to the natural concerns, the painful concerns of families of victims, an area where surely in the case of the TWA tragedy in Beirut, the media more than met its obligations.

Striking a balance between all of that on the one hand, and on the other, avoiding giving terrorists undue public platforms and channels otherwise not available to them, and in such dimension as to produce a crescendo of public focus and demands on government, and governments on both sides, authorities on both sides, that risk limiting the flexibility in policy essential to sorting out interests, both human and political.

And I thought Mr. Friendly this morning in his prepared statement put it very well, with respect to the clash, the inevitable clash facing government between the human interests involved and national political interests involved.

Avoiding in particular, as we try to strike that balance, to draw that line, involvement that makes the media part of the process of discussions, negotiations.

The media's task is to report, to convey information, to the fullest possible extent possible—not to take initiatives, it seems to me, with terrorists, or in the case of state-terrorism, with officials purporting to represent authority.

This is not to say that the media should not report approaches to them. Of course, they should, and must, in its obligation to provide information.

But avoiding initiatives, actions that can make the media, not only diplomatic couriers of sorts, but virtual parties in the negotiating process.

We don't need that. The task is complicated enough, it seems to me, without that.

A classic example, it seems to me, was the case in Tehran. If there ever was any flexibility on the part of the Ayatollah Khomeini, it may have been in the opening days; I doubt that there ever was very much.

But within hours of the seizure, senior American media personalities were en route to sit at the feet of the ayatollah, to ask him questions, and to cause him, in response, to put positions into public print.

And when the ayatollah, as we all know, speaks in Tehran, everything is in concrete, reducing perhaps whatever flexibility there was at that time.

To generalize, it seems to me, experience would suggest less direct involvement with the principals, a little less media speculation on the tactics of possible negotiations or discussion. And there is a semantic issue there that needs to be kept in mind. Of course, there will be negotiations, whether we call them talks or discussions or whatever.

A little less repetitive broadcasting of terrorists' demands, certainly less, preferably none, of public media speculation and reporting on the movement of military forces that may be involved.

A little more, to reduce it all to one word perhaps, self-imposed restraint, a little less eagerness. Achieving that kind of balance, drawing that kind of line, we all know will never be easy in the free and open society we are and want to remain.

And doing so, drawing that line, striking that balance is not the task of Government to impose. It rests on the sense of responsibility and discussion of the media themselves.

And like everything else in the scourge, the threat of terrorism today, that will remain a learning experience. That is what terrorism regrettably is, unless we want to totally cop out from a particular area or range of interests in this continuing learning experience, no answers are easy. But it is to the great credit, Mr. Chairman, of this committee and of others seeking to learn from that experience in Tehran and in Beirut and currently in the context of the continuing tragedy of the seven Americans, the four Frenchmen and one British official who are still held that your hearing is held today and that we continue that effort at public learning.

Thank you very much.

Mr. **Feighan**. Thank you very much.

Mr. Jerry Levin.

STATEMENT OF JERRY LEVIN, FORMER HOSTAGE HELD IN LEBANON

Mr. **Levin**. Mr. Chairman, I am in complete agreement with what Ambassador Laingen has said, so it's with a great deal of relief I can say that I will be able to speak within the allotted time, because he's given the last half of my talk, so there's no point in my repeating that.

It's a privilege and a relief to be here talking to you today when you consider the possible alternative. I might still be a hostage, and my wife, Sis, might still be suffering from the governmental and press inattention that afflicted for too many months most of the families of the seven Americans still being held hostage.

They've been called the Forgotten Seven. In truth, I, my wife, and most of the families involved feel they've been the Ignored Seven. Six of them are probably still alive. The fate of the seventh is unsure. Most of the hostages, I believe, were and still are being held by terrorists who want to exchange them for 17 Arabs, most of them Shi'ite Moslems convicted by a Kuwaiti court in the December 1983 bombings of the United States and French Embassies there.

My wife, Sis, and I could never feel completely free from the horror of our experience as long as any of them are being held hostage. So we continue to work with most of the families trying to help them keep the story of their men's plight and the reason for it before the public.

While the United States and Kuwait have been standing firm against the terrorists' demand that the prisoners in Kuwait be freed, the terrorists have been relentless in upping the ante. But the administration has refused to be drawn into making even remotely comprehensive public statements about the growing crisis until the middle of last May, 17 months after it began.

At that time, the captors released pictures of six of the hostages to an Arabic newspaper in Beirut, along with their first public statement of what they wanted. Until then, their demands had only been communicated privately to the hostage families and the U.S. Government.

But the Government did not tell the public through the press what it knew. The families in frustration made the contents of their messages available to the public through the press. But the Government never apparently felt compelled to offer detailed public corroboration of the basic facts of the captivity.

So the impact of the families' revelations were fleeting. That to me is a shocking fact. I can tell you that it is hard for the families of the other hostages to comprehend. I know, because there is an informal network of hostage families and friends.

The network did not exist until Sis broke with the Government, press and family advisers and went public 7 hard months after my capture. She found a home on Today, Good Morning America, CBS Morning News, USA Today, the New York Times, the Detroit Free Press, and the Birmingham News.

That was about it. But once hearing, seeing or reading Sis' appeals, the families quickly made contact and found that they had more than hostages in common. For one thing, they had been discouraged by the Government from contacting each other.

The families had also been advised by the Government not to seek each other out and not to speak out, and it failed to even give periodic updates on the situation to hostage families.

In other words, it didn't even provide simple hand-holding, something that was done weekly during the Iranian hostage crisis, and was done again during the flight 847 crisis. But until recently, most of Congress had been equally inattentive.

Most of the families suffered rebuff and rejection. Peggy Say, the sister of hostage Terry Anderson, has stories of frustration to tell. The relatives of Father Martin Jenco had to organize a congressional blitz of their own to get attention.

Sis' Senator, Howell Heflin, a long-time friend of the family—indeed, his son is a member of her late father's and her brother's law firm, in Birmingham, AL—and he would not, and has not to this day, returned her phone calls.

Yet the doors were wide open to the families of the hijack victims. Fortunately, because of the hijack crisis, the other families have been able to ride piggyback, as it were, on the coattails of the attention that crisis gained to a position of heightened visibility and concern.

But what an agonizing way to achieve it. Why was there such little attention? I think in part because the Government was successful in persuading many editors and Members of Congress that attention might get us killed, but the press rushed in undeterred to cover the TWA flight 847 story and the Iranian hostages' story, and the Government rushed to comply with the press' need for information, and Congressmen began to speak out, and all the hijacked hostages are freed.

It makes the hostage families, the seven hostage families, think that quantity is a deciding factor in the degree of executive, legislation and press concern if any, as to whether or not those entities will devote much attention publicly to this kind of story. Seven Americans, in the same kind of peril as the 39 on flight 847, apparently weren't enough to qualify.

How many hostages does it take to make a crisis that the press and Government will discuss? What is the magic number? Ten hostages? 20? Certainly for a long, long time, not seven.

I think the administration should have been pressed to state the basic facts of our captivity when it knew them for sure for the first time. That was in early July of last year. Releasing the basic facts of our captivity could not have harmed us.

It is hardly known that the captors delivered their demands to the State Department nearly 1 year ago, but the administration chose not to make them public and never has. The fact that the captors wanted to exchange me and the two other Americans they had rounded up by then for the 17 prisoners in Kuwait was communicated in videotaped messages our captors wrote and required us to make on July 5, 1984.

Our message clearly stated that our lives and freedom depended upon the lives and freedom of the prisoners in Kuwait, but the administration did not share with the public the basic facts of our captivity.

Now, this is a point that I want to emphasize so that I hope I'm not misunderstood—reporting only the facts of our captivity, and the terrorists' demand, would not have been giving in to terrorism, as some advocates of quiet diplomacy and the administration's "tall in the saddle" stance would have you believe.

It would have simply been the act of defining the problem for the public, which has a legitimate and crucial need to be informed. So in this situation we had a citizenry that did not have enough information to inform its elected representatives and the administration as to its feelings in the matter.

Sis and I and many other well-intentioned loyal Americans think that news coverage, publicity, if you will, is protection. It is what has helped to get us out of spots created by carelessly monitored administrations before.

I'm sure it will again, but the administration's public emphasis has been to focus entirely on terrorism. Now, terrorism is a vital issue which certainly needs to be addressed, but the administration seems to want us to believe that terrorism is the sole problem, but it is not.

Terrorism is the symptom, not the disease, and if the administration insists on simply treating the symptom, the disease won't be cured. As far as my own treatment was concerned, it improved a bit late last year, and I think publicity had something to do with it.

At the time it got better, I wondered why. When I reached freedom, I found that it improved when Sis was in Damascus last November speaking publicly about the need for peaceful, unthreatening dialog and negotiations that might help change some of the hostility between people in the Middle East and their American counterparts at all levels of the societies.

She explained that a truthful reporter was more valuable on the outside than in. A worried woman's lonely trip into the capital of what is conventionally considered a nation of hostile people—I'm not talking about the government now—was happily not ignored.

Her story and what she was saying were carried in the Arab and American press. Her message reached President Assad's ears. He responded with a message to Sis through his Foreign Minister that Syria would work for my release.

Her message of peace and genuine friendship also reached my captors' ears. How do I know? They told me on Christmas Eve, and that was just about the first and last time they were ever that open with me about anything going on in the world.

At this time we think that the key message insofar as the seven hostages are concerned is no longer simply that they need to be remembered. They finally are. What needs to be totally understood is why they are being held, and what it would take to get them free.

I believe that the captors will accept nothing less than the return of the prisoners in Kuwait. Now that the administration has proven that it can get around the problem of officially saving face while unofficially doing what it says publicly it can't do, I think the public, not to mention the families, ought to be asking why the same benevolent sleight of hand should not be applied in this situation.

Arranging a reciprocal release, despite what some people have already said, will not be the cause of an increase in terrorism. Terrorism is going to continue to escalate in all likelihood, whether or not the prisoners in Kuwait are released, simply because the momentum of our mistakes in the Middle East will, I think, carry on well past the point where we begin to reverse it.

And of course at this point there are not any signs, in my opinion, to make us think that a reversal is in progress. I recognize that this is a highly controversial point of view, but it is one that should be widely discussed. However, since so few people have been aware of what the stakes are, they have been mute in the matter in a way they were not in the hijack crisis when they knew what the captors wanted.

I think the judgments that went into the decision not to publish in the case of the seven need to be examined as thoroughly as the exhaustive examinations of the decisions to publish, publish and publish the facts, the surrounding facts and the facts surrounding the surrounding facts of the hijack crisis.

And I think the judgments surrounding the administration's refusal to discuss this crisis publicly as thoroughly as it did in the earlier ones needs to be examined and evaluated also.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. **Feighan**. Thank you, Mr. Levin.

[Mr. Levin's prepared statement follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF JERRY LEVIN, CNN CORRESPONDENT AND FORMER HOSTAGE HELD IN LEBANON

It is a privelege and a relief to be here talking to you today, when you consider the possible alternative. I might still be a hostage; and my wife, Sis, might still be suffering from the governmental and press inattention afflicting most of the families of the seven Americans still being held hostage--presumbably in Lebanon--during most of their loved ones captivity.

I was a prisoner for eleven and a half lonely months, before I was reasonably certain that if I waited for a deal to be made, I might have to wait a much longer time; but it took me those lonely months to build up enough information about my situation plus the necessary nerve to decide to definately go over the hill if the opportunity ever presented itself.

My wife, Sis, when she went public last fall, after being submissively silent for six months, said, "I wish this was someone else talking." Even though she felt it was necessary, doing so worried her more than anything she had ever done before. Going public with the facts of my captivity and the captivity of the two other Americans who had been taken hostage in Lebanon up to that time was an awesome even frightening step because she proposed to do what had been strongly resisted and advised against by almost everyone she knew: the State Department, many colleagues in the press, and members of our family. But she was equally worried by what she perceived as the Administration's and a considerable portion of the press's failure to devote much attention to what had been until then an almost untouchable topic. She was against silence on the issue, because being submissively silent for six months had not worked. We were still hostages. In all likelihood more would be taken. She was right. More than a year and a half later, the number of hostages in the group of which I was possibly the first has risen, we believe, to seven Americans, two Frenchman, and one Kuwaiti. Sis and I can never feel completely freed from the horror of our experience as long as anyone is held hostage. So we continue to work with most of the families trying to help them keep the story of their men's plight, and the reason for it, before the public.

It took no more than fifteen seconds to kidnap me. In that time the world disappeared. Except for the insides of lonely dreary rooms, I saw next to nothing for eleven and a half months.

During lonely hours chained to the wall or radiator in four different houses, I would wonder what was happening in Beirut, Lebanon, America, the world. My captors, whom I was never allowed to see, rarely if ever told me anything about the outside. Since I had to be blindfolded whenever they came into my room, my only contact with the rest of humanity was infrequent disembodied voices. My solitary confinement was truly solitary.

So besides being starved for company, I was starved for information, for news. When I reached freedom, much of what I learned had happened was astonishing to me. But it was old hat to people who tried to catch me up: Indira Ghandi assassinated; President Reagan's losing only Minnesota and the District of Columbia to Walter Mondale in the Presidential election; Walter Mondale's running mate a woman; my hometown Detroit Tigers the World Series champion. Incredible.

But there was one series of events few people could speak of because they simply did not know much about it. I'm talking about the seven men taken hostage after I was. They've been called the "Forgotten Seven." In truth, I, my wife, and most of the families involved feel they've been the ignored seven. Six of them are probably still alive. The fate of the seventh is unsure. Most of the hostages, I believe, were and still are being held by the same terrorist group. This group, a Shiite Moslem fundamentalist organization with ties to Iran and at least countenanced by the Syrian occupiers of Lebanon, is called the Hazballah, the Party of God. The Hazballah wants to establish a republic based on Shiite Islamic law in Lebanon just like the one in Iran. The Shiite government of Iran has, as you know, been at war with the autocratic secular government of Iraq for four years. Egypt's former President Anwar Sadat was assassinated by fundamentalist extremists trying to establish Islamic law there. The government of President Mubarak continues to be troubled by that movement. Saudi Arabia, a monarchy, whose legal code is based on Sunni Islamic law,is wary of the Shiite fundamentalists because they favor a theocracy ruled by religious leaders.

The Hazballah, the largest of the militant Shiite fundamentalist groups in Lebanaon is the same group that hijacked TWA flight 847 in June. In the case of the seven Americans and two Frenchman, the Hazballah wants to exchange them for seventeen Arabs, most of them Shiite Moslems convicted by a Kuwait court in the December 1983 bombings of the United States and French embassies there. Five people were killed and eighty six wounded in those explosions. Three of the convicted terrorists are Lebanese. Two of them have been sentenced to death, and they are reportedly relatives of some of the terrorists who took me and the others captive.

While the United States and Kuwait have been standing firm against the terrorists' demand that the prisoners in Kuwait be freed, the Hazballah has been relentlessly upping the ante. Mine may or may not have been the first kidnapping related to the prisoners in Kuwait. Some people, and I am one of them, believe that Hussein Farash, the Saudi Arabian Consul, in Beirut who was kidnapped the middle of January of last year, was actually the first. He was released in late May this year, reportedly in very bad physical shape. His release came right after a rare visit by Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister to Iran, its adversary in the Persian Gulf. The juxtaposition of events is too obvious to be written off as simply coincidental, especally since Iran has been trying to steer a more moderate course in its relations with some of the Arab nations it has been hostile too since the revolution.

After the Saudi Consul was kidnapped, I was taken in early March. By mid May, two more Americans had been kidnapped. In early Decmeber one more; in January another; one American and two Frenchmen in march; two Americans in May; and, in mid July Kuwait's Embassy Press Attache in Beirut.

But the horrifying facts of our captivity, unlike the telling of the ordeal of the hostages on flight 847, were not widely known or frequently reported. Except in hostage home towns, there was little if any follow-up to keep our story alive. So people forgot quickly, if they ever knew.

The Administration refused to be drawn into making even remotely comprehensive public statements about the growing crisis until the middle of last May, seventeen months after it began. At that time the captors released pictures of six of the hostages to an Arabic newspaper in Beirut along with their first public statement of what they wanted. Until then, their demands had only been communicated privately to the hostage families and the United States Government; but the government did not tell the public through the press what it knew. The families in frustration made the contents of their messages available to the public through the press. But the government never felt compelled to offer public corroboration. So the impact of the family's revelations was fleeting.

Then when the captors went public in May with the pictures of the hostages and their statements of demand, press pressure, virtually ron-existent until that time, forced the government to finally publicly admit that several Americans were being held hostage ih Lebanon for the same reason and that the government's policy in regards to the captors' demand was to stand firm and not negotiate.

After that newsbreak, Sis and I and the other hostage families hoped that maybe the tide of public interest was turning and that coverage would increase. But it did not. Even the fact that two more Americans were taken hostage after the flurry of coverage in mid-May, and it seemed clear that the terrorists would keep pulling Americans or others off the streets of Beirut for as long as it took to get what they wanted, coverage of the situation still dwindled away. The crisis was hardly mentioned again, until it became a side bar to the Flight 847 story.

That to me is a shocking fact. I can tell you it is hard for the families of the other hostages to comprehend. We know, because there is an informal network of hostage families and friends. The network not did exist until Sis broke with the government, press and family adisors and went public seven hard months after my capture. She found a home on Today, Good Morning America, CBS Morning News, USA TODAY, The New York Times, The Detoit Free Press, and the Birmingham News. That was about "it"; but once hearing, seeing or reading Sis's appeals, the families quickly made contact and found that they had more than hostages in common. For one thing, they had been discouraged by the government from contacting each other. The families had also been advised by the government not to speak out. And it failed to even give periodic updates on the situation to hostage families. In other words, it didn't even provide simple hand holding, something that was done weekly during the Iranian hostage crisis and was done again during the Flight 847 crisis. The State Department's own manual on "Hostage Negotiation," published February 1984, a month before I was kidnapped, says "a family liason function is vitally important. The families of those who are victims of terrorists incidents need a great deal of support and assistance during the crisis. They need most of all to be kept informed of what is happening and what is being done to ensure the safety of their loved one." That was not the case with the families of the seven remaining American hostages or with Sis when I was one. It is almost as if the manual had been written on the wind.

To be fair, the State Department has given the liason it appointed to service the families caught up in the hijacking crisis to the families of the seven remaining hostages. Better late than never? Hardly--because she is hardly a gift, certainly not what the manual calls for. She does not inform them as to what's happening and what is being done to ensure the safety of their loved ones. A glaring example of the insensitivity the families have been subjected to is, while the President and Secretary of State Shultz were publicly linking the release of the seven to the release of the thirty nine, the liason was warning Peggy Say, sister of hostage Terry Anderson, not to do the same thing. Doing so, she was warned, might hamstring efforts to free the thirty nine. If the President's and the Secretary of State's linkage was not damaging to the release effort, why should a similar linkage by Peggy Say, whose audience compared to the President and Secreatry of States audience was miniscule, have been characterized as potentially damaging while President Reagan's and Secretary Shultz's were not.

As far as being able to speak to the President, both the wife and son of the Reverend Benjamin Weir, and Mrs. Anderson have been rebuffed up to this day in their attempts to see him. He is too busy to see you, they have been repeatedly told. You can imagine their--at the very least--confusion when they saw the extensive television coverage of the President's meeting with some of the families of the Flight 847 hijacking, just a few days after it took place. In light of the government's rush to be accessibile to those families and the press's rush to cover the meetings, the families of the seven were even more baffled and frustrated than before by the government's and the press's arms length stance.

But until recently most of Congress had been equally inattentive. Most of the families suffered rebuff and rejection. Peggy Say has horror stories to tell. The relatives of Father Jenco had to organize a congressional blitz of their own to get attention. Sis's Senator, Howell Heflin, a long time friend of the family, indeed his son is a member of her late father's and brother's law firm in Birmingham, Alabama, would not and has not to this day returned her phone calls. Not one member of the Alabama congressional delegation, her home state, ever contacted her. Yet the doors were wide open to the families of the hijack victims. Fortunately because of the hijack crisis the other families have been able to ride piggy back as it were, on the coattails of the attention that crisis gained, to a position of heightened visibility and concern; but what a terrible way to have achieved it.

Why was there such little attention? I think in part because the government was successful in persuading many editors that press attention might get us killed. But the press rushed in undeterred to cover the Flight 847 story and the Iranian hostages story, and the government rushed to comply with the press's need for information. It makes the hostage families think that quantity is a deciding factor in the degree of government concern, if any, as to whether or not the government will talk and the press will devote much attention to this kind of story. Seven Americans, in the same kind of peril as the thirty nine on Flight 847 apparently weren't enough to qualify for extensive coverage. How many hostages does it take to make a crisis that the press and government will discuss? What is the magic number? Ten hostages? Twenty? Certainly not seven.

The only answer the few people in government--and only at the middle level, not the highest--would give to Sis and the other families was oblique. Quiet diplomacy they said and still say is the best way to operate in crises such as this. But that answer has begged the question: how many hostages does it take to make a crisis? The families have not been asking the Government to tell them the details of all the behind the scenes work it has--or has not--been doing. They just want it to be as forthcoming with them and the public as it was in the Iranian hostage crisis and the hijack crisis. Why has it been just the families of the seven who were by and large allowed to fall between the cracks by the government and the press?

As for the government persuading many editors that coverage might endanger us, get us killed, I did not think that proposition was true when I was in chains, I do not think it is true now. Sharing the basic facts of our captivity would not have been a hindrance, but sitting on them was. Permitting the Administration to work in a vacumn I think has been a contributing factor to the length of this crisis.

Another reason for the press's lack of energy, lack of will for covering the plight of the seven could be the one given by a CBS news producer last May. As her crew packed up after interviewing us, we discussed the problem. She said, "The answer is simple: no pictures." Perhaps she's right. If the seven had been crowded into a lear Jet on a Middle East runway, maybe that would have gotten press attention.

There's no question that CNN in its anguish was persuaded by the government that coverage might endanger us. CNN is a young company that had never had an employee kidnapped and held hostage before. So it deferred to what it trusted was the voice of experience. And the voice said, be silent. So it did not press the government for statments. Many journalists, longtime colleagues inside CNN and out, told Sis that the story was not being covered more thoroughly or frequently because they did not want me and the others endangered. That sounds O.K.; but that logic, in my opinion, led the press to a crucial fork in the journalistic road. And it took a wrong turn.

I think the government should have been pressed to state the basic facts of our captivity when it knew them for sure for the first time. That was in early July of last year. Releasing the basic facts of our captivity could not have harmed us. It is hardly known that the captors delivered their demands to the State Department nearly a year ago. But the Administration chose not to make them public and never has.' The fact that the captors wanted to exchange me and the two other Americans they had rounded up by then for the seventeen prisoners in Kuwait was communicated in videotaped messages our captors wrote and required us to make on the 5th of July. Our messages clearly stated that our lives and freedom depended upon the lives and freedom of the prisoners in Kuwait. But the Administration did not share with the public the basic facts of our captivity. It is possible and I think probable that lack of coverage, lack of publicity, permitted the Administration to not share the facts of the growing crisis, and what it was or was not doing to solve it, with the public. This lack of awareness, I believe has prolonged it. Awareness fostered by press coverage is, I believe, what helped push the hijack crisis to a comparatively short solution.

Reporting only the facts of our captivity and the terrorists' demands would not have been giving in to terrorism, as advocates of quiet diplomacy and the Administration's tall in the saddle stance would have you believe. It would have simply been the act of defining the problem for the public which has a legitimate and crucial need to be informed. In my confinement, I expected that Americans informed by the press would be taking a tough hard look at what appeared to be United States diplomatic failures in the Middle East, because it seemed to me that the kidnappings and assassinations there had been a symptom of them. Kidnapping is a heck of a way to get America's attention. But it was shocking to me to find out that by and large the taking of seven Americans, all for the same purpose, had not, and still has not. The government is not giving into terrorism or endangering its citizen hostages when it forthrightly defines the problem for the people. It is simply letting them know what they are up against.

So in this situation, we had a citizenry that did not have enough information to inform its elected representatives and the Administration as to its feelings in the matter. Sis and I and many other well intentioned loyal Americans think that news coverage--publicity, if you will--is protection. It is what has helped get us out of spots created by carelessly monitored Administrations before. I'm sure it will again. But the Administration's public emphasis has been to focus entirely on terrorism. Now terrorism is an issue which certainly needs to be addressed. But the Administration seems to want us to believe that Terrorism is the sole problem. But it is not. Terrorism is a symptom, not the disease. And if the Administration insists on simply treating the sympton, the disease won't be cured.

When I reached a Syrian Army patrol during my flight to freedom on February 14th of this year, I was treated gently and with kindness. The soldiers flushed me from under a truck where I had been hiding in fear and terror. Until I saw their red berets, I did not know whether the men who found me were soldiers or pursuing kidnappers. Two hours before, around midnight, I had taken advantage of my captors carelessness, slipped my chain, tied three blankets together, climbed through the second floor window of my room onto a balcony, tied the blankets to the railing, climbed down the blankets, and made my way down the mountain--where my prison house was located--as fast as I could. I figure I had only gone about two kilometers in that two hours. That was far enough, although I did not know that at the time. As I went down the mountain, dogs started barking. After two hours it seemed like a hundred dogs were barking. And when I reached a main road, it was not surprising that army patrols who were manning two check points were aroused. When I heard them coming, I paniced and hid under the truck. But they quickly discovered me. Very soon flashlights were shining in on me and someone was yelling the Arab equivelent of "come out with your hands up!" As soon as they saw me, a very wild-eyed, shoeless, bearded man wearing a jump suit with another one tied around his neck, they relaxed, and--as I said--treated me kindly.

The soldiers caught on quickly as to who I was: an American newsman fleeing from kidnappers. Later other equally friendly Syrian superiors said to me, "You can't tell Americans that we have treated you well and helped you to reach freedom."

They really did not believe me when I said that I could. They believed that our press operates under a ministry of information thumb just as it does in so many nations of the world, including their's.

Now I think it is safe to assume that the Syrians motives were more complex than simple altruism. But the facts are the facts. They were of help in my case. And they were of help in the case of the thirty nine. And it doesn't help, I think, to look a gift horse in the mouth.

A couple of months ago, one of Dan Rather's CBS Evening News crews came by to get our reaction to a story in the Washington Post that claimed U.S. C.I.A. agents had trained Lebanese counter terrorists. The Lebanese reportedly taking matters into their own hands, set off a bomb that killed scores of people, but the man they supposedly were after was not harmed.

We were asked if we thought publishing a story like that might endanger the seven American hostages. Our answer was, "No." The truth that we report can't hurt the hostages. But the government's actions which stories like that are about could.

As far as my own treatment was concerned, it improved a bit late last year. And I think publicity had something to do with it. At the time it got better, I wondered, why. When I reached freedom, I found that it improved when Sis was in Damascus last November speaking publicly about the need for peaceful unthreatening dialogue and negotiation that might help tame some of the hostility between people in the Middle East and their American counterparts at all levels of society. A worried woman's lonely trip into the capital of what is conventionally considered a nation of hostile people could not be ignored. Her story and what she was saying were carried in the Arab and American press. Her message reached President Assad's ears. He responded with a message to Sis through his foreign minister that Syria would work for the release of the hostages. Her message of peace and genuine friendship also reached my captors ears. How do I know? They told me on Christmas eve. That was just about the first and last time they were ever that open with me about anything going on in the world.

It really would be much easier for Sis and me to simply hide away and just peck away at the book we are writing about our joint oddyssey from terror. But I think we must join a group of former Iranian and hijack hostages as well as the families of those who are being held hostage in exchange for the prisoners in Kuwait who have been saying respectively for years, months, and now weeks, to the astonishment of most Americans, you don't know what's been happening. You have not been told the whole story. And--we the hostage families--haven't been told it either.

At this time, we think that the key message, in so far as the seven hostages are concerned, is no longer simply that they need to be remembered. They are. What needs to be clearly understood is why they are being held, and what it will take to get them freed. I believe that the captors will accept nothing less than the return of the prisoners in Kuwait. Now that the Administration has proven that it can get around the problem of officially saving face while unofficially doing what it says publicly it can't do, I think the public, not to mention the families, ought to be asking why the same sleight of hand hasn't been applied in this situation.

Arranging a reciprocal release, despite what some people have already said, will not be the cause of an increase in terrorism. Terrorism is going to continue to escalate, in all likelihood, whether or not the prisoners in Kuwait are released, simply because the momentum of our mistakes in the Middle East will, I think, carry on well past the point where we may begin to reverse it. And, of course, at this point there are not any signs to make us think that a reversal is in progress. I recognize that this is a highly controversial point of view; but it is one that should be widely discussed. However, since so few people have been aware what the stakes are, they have been mute in the matter in a way they were not in the hijack crisis when they knew what the captors wanted.

It seems to me that the Administration was responding to measured public opinion in favor of doing whatever was necessary to free the hijacked hostages. I think it would respond similarly again, if the public would insist. But people apparently are not expressing themselves in meaningful numbers. I think, that is because they do not fully understand that the demands are essentially the same as in the hijacking crisis--lives for lives, freedom for freedom. Those of us with some kind of access to the public, will, I hope keep pushing this point.

Why should the press have held back from telling the story of seven Americans who lives had been hanging in the balance and not held back when it came to telling the story of the thirty nine Americans caught in the same predicament? I think the judgements that went into the decisions not to publish in the case of the seven need to be examined as thoroughly as the exhaustive examinations of the decisions to publish, publish, publish, and publish the facts, the surrounding facts, and the facts surrounding the surrounding facts of the hijack crisis. And I think the judgements surrounding the Administration's refusal to discuss this crisis as thoroughly as it did the earlier one needs to be examined and evaluated.

Press attention, as I am sure you know, has often been blamed for the length of the Iranian hostage crisis. Well, the ordeal of some of the seven in Lebanon has been going on longer without it. I think silence about the basic facts is what is prolonging it, because it has prevented the forming of informed public opinion which then could be brought to bear on the issue to motivate the Administration to do what surely needs to be done to get the seven freed--arrange a release. I don't believe the Administtation would have maneuvered behind the scenes on behalf of some kind of exchange for the thirty nine hostages if the eyes of the world hadn't been on it. And since the lives of fellow citizens were at stake, I say, good thing.

You'll notice that I have almost--not quite--but almost avoided the current argument over what some people describe as the press's excesses during the hijack crisis. (Margaret Thatcher, Ed Meese, Henry Kissinger and some men and women in the street notwithstanding, I'd rather take my chances with a little pushing and shoving at a news conference staged by my captors than have no coverage at all. I would have given anything to have had that kind of contact. as manipulative as it was. with my wife and family; and I know that most of the other families would have settled for that kind of visual assurance that their loved ones were relatively okay.) Instead I concentrated today on my concern with the alliance between the press and the Administration which resulted in I believe a dearth of coverage of the "ignored seven's" lengthening ordeal. That inattention I think has been far more dangerous and damaging than any of so-called excesses of the press were to the hijack crisis.

Perhaps, just perhaps, world attention is what made the Iranian hostage crisis as short as it was, and what caused the hijacking crisis to be wrapped up in less than three weeks.

My boss, Ted Turner, believes that newsmen are like missionaries: missionaries of the truth. I think so too. But once again journalists faced with the problem of living up to the great challenge of their profession, did not. Not only did they not report all the truth, they did not show much energy in gathering it. This should not continue because silence--certainly government induced silence--has not helped end the captive's and the captive's families long and agonizing ordeal.

Ms. Say.

STATEMENT OF PEGGY SAY, SISTER OF TERRY ANDERSON, ONE OF THE REMAINING HOSTAGES IN LEBANON

Ms. SAY. Jerry said he was relieved and pleased to be here. I wish I could say the same. There are at least 1,000 other places I would rather be. But I am sure that there are a lot of places Terry would rather be also.

I asked to speak to you today, and I cannot come from the direction of Mr Laingen or Mr. Levin, they are Middle Eastern, I will not say experts, but they have knowledge of the Middle East. I do not; it has been a handicap to me. I can—what I think is important in any discussion of the role of the media in crisis situations is what the media comes to mean to the families.

I am hoping that once that is understood that the State Department will take steps to fulfill the role, the gap that the media steps in to fill with the families. They become very important to us. At times, maybe an importance that should not be there.

I know when I received the telephone call at 4 in the morning from Associated Press that Terry had been kidnapped, I was in a state of shock. Everbody goes through it; it is not happening to you. Immediately the media was there. It was a chance to talk about what was happening, and a friendliness and feeling that somebody was there to reach out and touch. There was nobody else there for us.

Unfortunately, the families, at least my family released some things to the media that probably should not have been released about Terry that could have endangered his life. We received no guidelines from the State Department or anybody on how to deal with this situation.

When Jerry said that when we received the letters that the families made them available to the media. I did not. I was still following the guidelines of the State Department to pursue quiet diplomacy. Right up until the TWA hijacking, I continued to do that. I believed what I was being told, that they were doing all that they could.

With the media involvement in the TWA hijacking, I began to see what total involvement meant. That was a very traumatic experience for me and for I would imagine six other families. I was called the second day into the hijacking and told do not even ask for Terry or the other six to be linked with these people because we are not going to do it. We are not going to ask for them.

My immediate reaction was panic, and to run then to the media and say do you people realize what is happening, they are holding 47 American hostages and they are not even going to ask for the seven back. The direct media attention and pressure that followed that, I directly attribute the change of heart of the administration to request the return of the seven was due to that entirely. It was certainly not something that they had intended to do. They made that very clear to us by saying do not ask; we are not asking.

To watch the opposite of quiet diplomacy bring 39 men home in 17 days and to be left behind and again be told quiet diplomacy is the answer. We cannot, seven families, at least the families that were here today, we can no longer believe that. We have seven men, the longest of which has been held 500 days.

I think the swift resolution of the TWA hostage problem was directly connected with the media pressure on the administration, with the openness to the American public. All of the public became involved. They pressured for the release of 39 Americans. What seven families listened to after that was the crisis is over, folks.

I am sorry, the crisis is not over for me, nor Terry, nor a lot of other people involved in this.

With today's meeting, we are hoping that the State Department will understand our frustration and our turning to the media as Jerry mentioned, handholding. Nobody holds our hand but the media. They are at least interested sporadically, and what is happening to the seven, or if we hear a rumor and we call the State Department, and they tell us we cannot confirm that, we can go to the media. They can confirm it for us. That may not be the way that things should be, but it is the way that they are and I think we really need to work on that. We need to have somebody there for us besides the media so that we do not get involved in situations that we should not be involved in.

When you are like I was, contemplating going to the Middle East and meeting with President Assad, the realism of that is frightening to me. I am not an ambassador, I am not trained to do those things, but my feeling is if nobody will do it, then I must do it because I want Terry home, and we want seven other people home.

The State Department encouraging me to do that, and, of course, the media constantly asking are you going to the Middle East, which tells me well, I should go to the Middle East, but I am telling myself I do not want to do that. I do not want to be United States Ambassador to Iran, or to Syria, or to Lebanon. I want to be home in New York and know that the people that should be doing those jobs are out there doing them.

I am hopeful that out of today's discussions that there will be some changes for us; that the media will not have to be our nanny. Somebody from the State Department should be working with us and for us so days like this do not have to happen.

Thank you.

Mr. **Feighan**. It is a powerful message, Ms. Say, and I am hopeful, as well, that it will be heard.

Ms. Cullins, would you care to offer some introductory remarks?

STATEMENT OF MRS. KELLY CULLINS, WIFE OF FORMER TWA HOSTAGE

Ms. **Cullins**. I was not prepared to be here today, so I just jotted down a couple of ideas and reflections over the TWA hostage crisis that might be of issue today, and I am glad for the opportunity to be able to talk to you.

When your Government isolates you as a family victim of terrorism, when they do not give you timely and accurate information for whatever reasons, it leaves a vacuum that does get filled by someone else. In this country, it ends up being the media.

They were handholding us. We had various people who called from various networks and said we can help you out this way. They gave us information. They even made arrangements for us to fly to Germany. Our Government did not do those kinds of things.

I do not believe that that's a good role for the media to be in. I think that is an issue this Government has to reevaluate.

Within that, the media provided a framework for people to understand in the TWA situation, I think quite clearly, what was happening and why it was happening. It was terrifying to see my husband on television, but it allowed me to know that he was alive, and it allowed him the opportunity to show his family that he was alive. On a personal issue, I was very grateful for that. At the same time at that press conference, I was appalled by the behavior of the media and what I perceived to be a real threat to his personal life, and I think they have to assess their behavior in that situation, and I do not hear anybody addressing that. I do not hear any international organization of media, whomever, saying we have to change our behavior in that kind of a crisis.

When I talk and think about media actually, I have to admit that I am thinking about television, and that is because it is a visual media that most Americans refer to when they want the news. There was a soap opera mentality, I believe, with a lot of the coverage of the TWA event. I would have preferred it to have been a more challenging coverage of what are the issues, what are foreign governments perceiving this issue, what could we as American do instead of providing the hype and sometimes inflammatory language that I think increase the sense for retaliation in this country.

The problem that I find with the seven hostages in Lebanon is that they are not a visual theatre. They do not exist on TV. Therefore, television has opted not to go aggressively after what has happened to them. And that is a serious issue I think for this country. If the TV is the major medium that you are dealing with, if you have issues that are not suitable for television, this population is not going to understand anything of what is going on on those issues.

That is all I have to say.

DOES THE MEDIA PREY UPON, AND EXPLOIT HOSTAGES' FAMILY MEMBER?

Mr. **FEIGHAN.** Thank you very much. I want to thank all the panelists for sharing their very personal feelings about some very difficult experiences in their lives. I would indicate to members of the committee that because we are under a time constraint, that we will fairly strictly enforce the 5-minute rule. And hopefully under that rule, we will have an opportunity for a second round of questioning, if members feel that that would be helpful.

If I could, I would like to begin with a question directed to all of the panelists, and ask you to respond as you think most appropriate. There has been, I think, a lot of discussion about what is perceived to be the general public perception that the families of those individuals who are held hostage are very much preyed upon by the media, that in fact their grief is exploited by the media.

We have a very unique panel in front of us today with two individuals who have actually been hostages, and two family members, but with different circumstances. And I would like to hear from you from those different vantage points what your assessment is not of how the international media, or the American network media, or the media on location at the event of a terrorist of hostage incident behaves, but how their counterparts in this country in dealing with those families conduct themselves. And that would include network and both print media as well as local media.

Is there a significant element of preying upon the families, of exploiting them, or is in fact the attention that those families receive helpful in some way, helpful in a very real sense in allowing them to understand the nature of the problem that one of their family members is in, helpful in the simple understanding that somebody is watching their plight if it is not the U.S. Government as some of the family members here have suggested?

If you could address that question from the perspective and the experience that you have had either as a hostage or as a family member formerly involved in a situation, or currently as the case may be, and beginning with Mr. Laingen.

Mr. LAINGEN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I find that it is very difficult to make any generalizations in terms of answers to that question. Human beings are different, individual families are different. None of them and none of us is prepared, shall we put it that way, adequately in advance suddenly to become public media personalities—which most families run the risk of becoming or tend to become, because of the focus and the interest of the press.

Some families want it. In my experience in the Tehran crisis, some families reacted to it much differently from others. Some rather relished becoming, to put it frankly, media personalities.

I think in time that most if not all of them saw some advantage in it in the sense of a capacity to communicate, to learn a little bit more than what they otherwise would have known.

But again, I guess that if I would conclude with one single generalization, it would be to the effect that having seen what I think were some excesses in the case of the TWA 847 focus on the part of the press into the private lives of families, that it is an area that requires a little more learning on the part of the press, a greater degree of discretion, a little more sense of dignity and restraint in seeking our and pressing on the families in their time of crisis.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you.

Mr. LEVIN. I think there are probably times when we are more aggressive than we might be if we took into greater consideration tact. However, I hope that I have conveyed that in the case of the seven we have an almost historically unique situation, in that the families of the seven hostages and the eight, if you consider and include Sis, they felt a crying need for greater press attention, the kind of press attention that would have persuaded the Government to be more forthright, and candid, and comprehensive in discussing publicly the basic facts of their captivity.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you.

Ms. SAY. I think that in your question taking the part of being exploitive, I have had times when there were things asked of me to do publicly, like I was asked if certain networks could film me watching the TWA hostages come home. I considered that very tacky, and my emotions are private.

I think that each family member or each family has to make a determination. My bottom line is anything that will not serve the purpose of helping to bring Terry home is exploitive to me. This is not a lot of fun, at least for me.

I have thought about it, and I am very grateful to the media for the turnaround during the TWA hijacking, in that going from do not ask to caving in under the pressure, and almost bringing the seven out. That gratitude will end for me the day that Terry comes home, because I feel that I have fulfilled my part of the bargain. I have made myself available, and there is a goal here.

Publicity for the sake of publicity is not high on my list of priorities. The day that Terry comes home, they can turn the cameras off and unplug the telephones, and I will be very happy to retire from public life.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Ms. Cullins.

Ms. CULLINS. Yes, I think that we were preyed on as families during the TWA hostage crisis. You have those families who have not received enough attention, and those families who were barraged. Not only was it that all of a sudden we were thrown into the public light, but we had no training for it.

Luckily, for my family, we had somebody who works for a television network, so we were able to get some quick training in terms of how to keep people at bay. And we were able to do that as a family after while. Other families must have gone through literally hell with people out on their doorsteps.

Being in Vermont, we also have a small community, so you can keep people at bay a little bit easier. I also think that bringing the televisions into living rooms is exploitive. That is the media wants to find out how people feel and what their reactions are, they should do that outside of people's public domain.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Ackerman.

IS THERE AN ADDITIONAL ROLE FOR THE MEDIA TO PLAY IN HOSTAGE SITUATIONS

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The people who take hostages, when they commit such an act actually invite and bring the media into play as an actor or participant in whatever you want to describe the process as.

Should it be our expectations on our side to expect the media to be more than just a reporting agency mirror reflecting the events that take place, or should we actually expect the media to play an additional role for the release presumably of the hostages?

Ms. SAY. That is a difficult question, and it is one of the things that we faced as families, I know that I faced. When I received the letter from Terry asking us to pressure the administration and to pressure the Government, I did keep it quiet, but I was torn about that. Because I was told by the State Department that if you make this public, you are giving them what they want. They want publicity.

And I could understand the State Department making that statement to me. But at the same time, they are holding my brother's life in their hands. They are asking me to do something, and I want to do my darndest to give them what they want. And I do not know which decision is the right one.

At that time, I was putting everything into the hands of the State Department, and I had to believe that that was the right course. I have to question that now. The letters being as graphic as they were when somebody is saying we are going to be hanged if you do not do this, that impact maybe on the public would have brought about an awareness far before today's occurrence.

Mr. Levin. I do not think that we should expect the press to play an additional role beyond what their traditional role has been, which is to report the story. But I think that we can be expected to continue to perfect our role in such a way that by the comprehensiveness of what we report, the truthfulness of what we report, the accuracy of what we report, that we are always part of a solution, and not part of the problem.

Beyond that, I do not think that it would be healthy in our particular society to go any further. I think that where the press does go further is in countries that have forms of governments that are very much different than ours, and where the press is dictated to and told what to do, and they become part of the government's solution, not necessarily the people's.

Mr. Laingen. A good journalist, Mr. Ackerman, has spoken, and I would simply agree with him. Obviously, that is what we expect of the press. That they in such a situation enhance on what should be their reputation, their record, their profession, to keep the public as widely, as profoundly, as broadly informed as possible. But they should not be part of the problem; they should not be actors in terms of negotiations or resolution of the issue.

If they have information that contributes to that, that is what we look to them for. With respect to the terrorists themselves, as I indicated in my remarks, and as everybody else has said, terrorism as a general rule is theater. It seeks center stage—terrorists do. They want the publicity. Certainly they did in Tehran. They did it dramatically so in the case of the TWA aircraft in Beirut.

Jerry can speak to this better than I can, but there is a slightly different approach, I think, on the part of whomever these criminals are who are holding the seven in Beirut, and I use the term criminals advisedly. They do not seem to want as much publicity, at least in the sense that we find it so difficult, frankly, to know as much as we should know about them.

MEDIA BEHAVIOR DURING THE IRANIAN HOSTAGE SITUATION

Mr. Ackerman. If I could ask a followup question to that, Ambassador Laingen. In your remarks before, you said that during the Iranian crisis newspeople flocked to Tehran and sat at the knee of the ayatollah, and asked questions which elicited answers from him that then were interpreted as if they were set in concrete. I took that as being somewhat critical of the role of the news media from your statement.

If they should not have done that, who should be quarterbacking and calling the signals, should there be a Government agency that says we suggest that you do not ask the ayatollah questions in that instance, or should there be a voluntary organization within the media itself that prescribes guidelines as to how to deal with these questions?

It is a very competitive business. And if one person gets an exclusive of the ayatollah's writings in concrete, surely everybody else will be there.

Should there be some kind of voluntary guidelines?

Mr. **Laingen**. You are raising a big issue, Mr. Ackerman. I do not know if I have any answers better than anybody else. I made that comment with respect to the ayatollah critically, and I reaffirm my criticism of the press at that time in that particular context.

The Tehran situation differed a lot from TWA 847, of course, because the press eventually was told to leave Iran, and it was not that actively engaged.

ESTABLISHING GUIDELINES FOR COVERAGE

In terms of setting guidelines, I remain very ambivalent. The press is what it is in our country: free, open, determinedly free. And I would be loathe to see the Government try to lay down very firm guidelines. If there is counsel that we can offer, if there is learning that can be achieved through such hearings as this and otherwise in the aftermath of these crises, then the Government ought to be counseling, if you will, with the press and the press counseling with Government to see what we may have learned in each crisis, what guidelines might be useful in another situation.

I must say, and I am reminded to say in that respect, that every terrorist situation is different—different in geography, different in the circumstances, different in the interests involved, the human and national interests involved, different in numbers. All that complicates the learning process.

Mr. **Ackerman**. Thank you.

Ms. **Cullins**. I would like to see the press to continue in its role only in telling the story, as Mr. Levin said, to tell it as accurately and completely though as possible, but not to become involved in negotiations, be that talking by satellite to one of the terrorists or what have you, and not to be involved in the circus arena of the event. And I am afraid that the only way that that could happen is if the press themselves come up with their own self-regulating guidelines, and I would really pressure for that to happen. I would not like the Government to regulate them.

Mr. **Ackerman**. How would you have the press self-regulate them?

Ms. **Say**. I have no idea. I am not involved in the press.

Mr. **Levin**. I must say that I get very uneasy when I hear such terms as guidelines from the Government, or regulation. I think that in our particular society, democracy with a small d, that we are going to have to leave it to the press, to use and develop good judgment in regard to the situations.

I like the words that Bruce used. I do not think that there is anything that would be dangerous in the two institutions, the Government and the press, getting together, airing their problems, and making suggestions. But when we get down to guidelines which the press is supposed to accept, then we get into limitations imposed from an institution that it is our job to be watching and monitoring.

I do not see how we can do that job very effectively if we are accepting its guidelines. I think that we have to develop them ourselves. I recall an incident from the past that symbolizes what I am talking about.

President Kennedy, after the Bay of Pigs, and after counseling the New York Times not to publish what it knew about it, afterwards said, "I am sorry it did not publish what it did not know."

Mr. **Feighan**. Thank you. Before I recognize the next questioner, let me acknowledge the presence on our panel of the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Congressman Dante Fascell, who more so than any member of the Congress has been aggressive in establishing forums in our committee for discussion of terrorism and what our appropriate response is concluding with the hearing last week where we had Secretary of State George Shultz responding to many of these very questions, and we appreciate the chairman joining us this afternoon. Mr. Hamilton.

USE OF PUBLICITY TO FREE THE REMAINING HOSTAGES IN LEBANON

Mr. **Hamilton**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I want to say that all of us on this side of the table deeply appreciate your willingness to come as witnesses. I suspect that that is not an easy task for you. And we are anxious to know your views and how you feel. I would like to focus on the question of why you, or at least some of you, think that publicity is helpful in getting back the remaining seven hostages.

We have had a mixed record in that respect. We had enormous publicity with regard to the TWA hostages, and we got them out. We had almost no publicity, as I recall, with regard to David Dodge, and we got him out. So the question is why do you think, in the situation that the seven hostages confront, that publicity would be helpful.

Now Mr. Laingen, you said that you do not represent the views of the Department, and I am sure that that is correct, and we appreciate the fact that you speak personally. But it does strike me that it is the policy of the Government today not to create publicity with regard to the seven hostages, and to proceed, in one of the favorite phrases of your profession, through quiet diplomacy.

So I would like for all of you or some of you, whoever would like to comment on the question of why, in this instance, publicity helps, or if you feel the other way, why it does not help?

Mr. **Laingen**. Mr. Chairman, I did not myself advocate greater publicity in this situation to resolve this issue. I expressed the opinion that the press and media have a role to play to convey information as broadly as possible about issues of this magnitude and of this much human consequence. I think that the press can also play a useful role in reaching out to families.

I found, for example, at those two press conferences in Beirut in the TWA hijacking, however much I regretted the "circus quality" of some of them, and I guess that I should let Ms. Cullins speak to that as she may not feel that way, that they got some reassurance from all that.

I liked incidentally a point that Ms. Cullins made. There was a "soap opera" quality at times in that crisis in Beirut, in the TWA aircraft situation, that I thought was rather demeaning to the press on occasion. What we do need and what certainly we need in the context of a crisis like that and in the aftermath of it, is deeper analysis, deeper understanding, so that we learn from these crises, and we learn in particular why these people have these hangups and behave the way that they do.

You know that I am a veteran of many years of diplomacy. And as a general rule other things being equal, I am inclined to believe that quiet diplomacy usually works more effectively than confrontational approaches. On the other hand, and, as I suggested, every situation differs, a good deal of publicity and public information certainly sometimes contributes to better understanding of a problem, and possibly in its resolution.

In the Tehran crisis, I do not think that there was much of a lesson that we learned from that, frankly. Because I think that that crisis had a certain course to run in the context of their own body politic. And until that was run, that crisis was going to go on. When they had put in place the structure of Government responsive to their felt needs with the support of domestic media, not so much dependent on ours, they were prepared to begin to talk.

Also by that time, of course, the policies of the Carter administration in terms of sanctions—economic, political, and diplomatic isolation—were beginning to work, and were beginning to hurt, and that contributed to its resolution.

So I cannot say that I have any particular lesson to draw from that experience. Other things being equal, I think that I would still be prepared to say that quiet diplomacy usually works more effectively, depending on those varied circumstances.

Mr. **Levin**. I think that in the case of the seven, publicity what there has been of it has not hurt and will not hurt. We know that in the case of two of the men who are being held hostage, their particular crisis has run longer with relatively little publicity, compared it to the Iranian crisis. There is a school of thought that says that maybe the Iranian hostage crisis might have been longer without the world's attention riveted and focused on it.

There is another ingredient that needs to be taken into consideration here. In the case of the seven hostages as opposed to the case of the Iranian crisis and the hijacking crisis, that there was one group that was written out, because of the relative lack of publicity, and that was the American people.

I do not think that the public knowing those basic facts can in any way harm those hostages. And I think that the Government has to learn that this is the way that they have to operate. It should be more trusting of the people in terms of what they tell them related to their citizens being in extreme situations.

I am not saying tell us everything that is happening behind closed doors. I am not saying tell us all of the details of our quiet diplomacy. Nobody is saying that there should not be quiet diplomacy. But what we are saying is that there was a point at which it could have, and should have talked to the American people about the basic facts of the captivity. That over a period of time several Americans were taken captive, and all for the same purpose.

Ms. **Say**. Again speaking from the angle of simply Terry's sister who wants him home very badly, I do not know whether it is valid or not valid as far as policy goes. I have to rely on logic. And when I am presented with the case of 53 Tehran hostages having been brought home with all of the media attention, and 39 TWA hostages being brought home in 17 days, and I am looking at 7 men being held as long as 500 days, and then given the example of David Dodge as an exercise in quiet diplomacy and how it works, we are talking 1 man here.

You know, I do not know that publicity will work for the seven. If I had any idea, I can promise you that if it would do any harm that I would never ever advocate it. My brother's life is involved here, and I would never do anything to endanger that. I do not know that it will work. I do know what is not working, and that is quiet diplomacy.

Ms. **Cullins**. I believe that what would work would be a greater awareness of what the issues and the facts are. I think that the public's right to know has not been met with the situation of the seven remaining hostages in Lebanon. As for what happens after that, the resolution of the problem because of publicity, I have no idea. But I think that the American public has been slighted by not being aware of the facts in the situation, and therefore not being able to have their own opinions and make their own action.

Mr. **Fascell**. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. **Feighan**. Mr. Chairman.

U.S. POLICY OF QUIET DIPLOMACY

Mr. **Fascell**. Thank you. I just want to say that I agree with Ms. Say and Mr. Levin, and I want to inject a slightly different reflection on this. Quiet diplomacy is fine; however, there is really no such thing as quiet diplomacy today. It's all public diplomacy, and I thoroughly agree with the fact that the American people have a right to know what's going on.

The problem, as I see it, is that there are two variables here over which we don't have control. Quiet diplomacy might work in the government-to-government case where you are dealing with a recognized authority and there are other interests to be balanced off in the discussion.

But there are two variables here. First, what is the media interest in the event? You can't manufacture news, and you can't manufacture public interest.

Public interest is a measurement that comes about by virtue of the media's interest or lack of interest. We have no control over that as a government, and so it's a function of the process. The other variable depends on the motives of the terrorist. Quiet diplomacy assumes that the terrorist wants a world stage in order to affect world public opinion or to make a political statement or to achieve some other political objective. Therefore, it might be useful to deny the terrorist that center stage.

But what about the terrorist that doesn't want center stage, and adopts the policy that it doesn't make any difference what the media says or doesn't say. You have a different problem. Whether that leaves us only with quiet diplomacy or not, I don't know. It is certainly easier where you have a responsible government or semiresponsible government to deal with, but where you have no government, you have an entirely different situation.

So, you have the terrorists who decide whether or not they want media, and you have got the media who determine whether or not there is going to be any interest.

So, it is almost moot to try to debate whether or not quiet diplomacy or public diplomacy is going to work.

Mr. LAINGEN. Well, in defense of quiet diplomacy, which I think still prevails among practicing diplomats, you are right, of course. There is both public and private diplomacy, and they encroach upon each other. I think quiet diplomacy still is there and is useful, and is essential, depending on the circumstances.

Certainly, in Tehran, in the resolution of that crisis, I think you could say that the ultimate resolution of it involving the West Germans, in the first instance, and then the Algerians, depended very heavily on the kind of "quiet" contacts that were established, that eventually became very public, and eventually saw the resolution of that crisis.

As you say, Tehran is a very different ballgame. We had a "government," much as we may disagree with the policies of that government. It was there to deal with. Today, in Beirut, you have something else. But, again, there, quiet diplomacy, it seems to me, is an important instrument in dealing quietly with the Syrians, with the Saudis, and with the French, who also were actively engaged in this problem, having four, I think, now, if I am right, Jerry, nationals of their own held hostage.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, Bruce, I can't argue with that too much except to say this. I wonder what would happen if—what is this, 500 and how many days?

Ms. SAY. 500 days for Roy and——

Mr. FASCELL. If every night for 500 nights you had a 30-second squib on national television that might be picked up around the whole world where it was pointed out that this was the 501st or the 502d or the 503d day, and the drums kept beating, I don't know what the response would be; I don't know what the ultimate resolution would be.

But there is a difference, and that is a function of the media, and we have no control over that.

Mr. LAINGEN. Yes, I agree with that. I don't disagree with that, and I am not saying that we shouldn't have that kind of publicity. Indeed, I understand deeply the concern of my colleagues around this table——

Mr. FASCELL. I don't—I wouldn't go for——

Mr. LAINGEN [continuing]. The feeling about the need——

MEDIA ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Mr. FASCELL. Regulation. I think that would be self-defeating in a democratic society. But it might be useful, for example, to explore the possibility of some kind of media advisory committee that would meet continuously during a crisis to decide how to treat the matter. I am suggesting some sort of crisis management within the media. The objective would be to see if they could agree on some kind of pool arrangement; if they could decide themselves what the outer limits were.

That might be useful, but there is no way the Government can get into that kind of discussion.

Mr. **Feighan**. Thank you.

I have asked the remaining members of our panel to be as brief as they can because we are moving quickly into another panel, which is ready to testify at this point.

I would like to recognize Mr. Levine.

CONDITIONS FOR THE RELEASE OF THE BEIRUT HOSTAGES

Mr. **Levine**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to join my colleagues in thanking the witnesses at this panel table for your willingness and courage in testifying here today.

I want to make one brief comment, referring to the relatives of the two hostages, and say that at least, speaking for myself, I think that you have been compelling and persuasive in terms of the number of your suggestions, and I think that all of us have benefited from this testimony.

I would like to follow up briefly, particularly with Mr. Levin, in terms of a couple of the comments I understood you to make, and I would like you to let me know whether I understood them accurately, and, if so, I would like to explore them with you.

It sounded to me, Mr. Levin, that you were saying that in order to obtain the release of the seven remaining hostages the demands are for the release of the Kuwaiti prisoners, and that essentially we should find a way of meeting those demands.

Is that an accurate summation of your suggestion?

Mr. **Levin**. Well, in the absence of any other hopeful solutions, it looks at this point, that is probably what it is going to take to free them. I hope I am wrong.

And that is one of the reasons why we, the hostage families, are so anxious for the public to know what the stakes are. For the public to think about that, debate it amongst themselves, to contact you, and discuss it with you and their opinions.

But, indeed, it does boil down to that's what it is going to take. We know behind the scenes that our Government is capable of saying one thing, to save face, and quite capable of doing another, to rescue Americans in peril.

And if that's what it takes, do it.

Mr. **Levine**. If I might, let me explore two aspects of that with you.

In terms of the issue that you define as principle versus the issue that you have defined as lives, those who have, in many instances in the past, argued for the opposite result have essentially made the point that you are jeopardizing more lives by doing something that may be perceived as acquiescing to terror.

And I would be interested in your reaction to that assertion, which obviously is the other side of the coin in terms of the argument that you advance.

Mr. **Levin**. That certainly is a powerful argument, and there is a great deal of logic to it. However, in this situation, where we are dealing with a long-standing and growing hatred of Americans in the Middle East, the problem of terrorism is going to be with us, I believe, whether these 17 are released or not.

I think probably all of you have heard experts say that probably for the next 20 years terrorism is going to rise. So, I don't think you can hang an increase in terrorism on the fact, if it becomes a fact, that the 17 in Kuwait are released, I don't like the idea of 17 convicted criminals who have been responsible for the deaths of American people going free.

But there is something else that I think needs to be thought of, that if the 17 aren't freed that somewhere down the line, 1 month, 2 months, 3 months, maybe a year, more Americans will be kidnaped; and if the 17 still aren't freed, there will be another act of terrorism. And God help us, it may be the execution of those Americans.

SYRIAN ROLE IN THE LEBANESE HOSTAGE SITUATION

Mr. LEVINE. Seeing that my time has elapsed, let me just conclude with one additional question that your being here provides I think a unique opportunity to ask.

There has been so much speculation by people about the Syrian role both in your release and in your apprehension, I would be interested in your perception of the Syrian role with regard to your becoming a hostage in the first place, and your being released in the second place.

Mr. LEVIN. I don't know if there was a Syrian role in my becoming a hostage. I must say, my initial judgment to that would be no; I believe it came from other areas. I believe it was the Hizbullah. It must have been another power persuasive in the rounding up of these Americans, perhaps Iran.

At the time that I escaped, I thought I had done it myself. However, I think that it is plausible that my captors may have cooperated in my escape. I just wish they had told me, and then I wouldn't have had to have been so frightened.

However, I think very definitely because of the consciousness raising in Syria that my wife accomplished in the month of November, and which my captors acknowledged, there is no question in my mind that when I reached the Syrian Army patrol, and my release was facilitated within 24 hours, because of what she did in Syria.

And since my captors were well aware of what my wife had been doing in Syria, it is possible they may have been talked into cooperating with my escape, by the Syrians.

And let me say this: I hope that is the case, because that could be some kind of tangible hope for the others. But if that is the case, then we are not responding properly.

So, once again, whether we like it or not, it may boil down to the simple issue that the American people have to think about and convey their feelings on the subject to their Congressman and the administration if it boils down to that as to whether or not we should push for the 17 being released.

Mr. LEVINE. Thank you.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. Laingen. Mr. Chairman, may I interject at this point to comment on tactics of substance dealing with——

Mr. Feighan. Very briefly if you could because we have a vote pending.

KUWAITI VIEWS ON THE LEBANON HOSTAGE SITUATION

Mr. Laingen [continuing]. As I say, in elaboration of what Jerry has just said—and I am sure that he would agree—that there is the principle involved that we have espoused so strongly about not making concessions to terrorists.

There is also the Kuwaiti side of the coin. The Government of Kuwait has some very strong views on this subject.

Now, these gentlemen that are held there—I take back that word—these individuals that are held there, are held subject to Kuwaiti law, and we obviously have to be understanding of that in any discussions we have with them.

Mr. Feighan. Thank you.

Mr. Gilman.

WHAT IS THE PROPER CONDUCT OF THE MEDIA IN TERRORIST SITUATIONS

Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome the families of hostages. We had an opportunity to be with them earlier today, and we particularly welcome Bruce Laingen back before us.

I had the opportunity of greeting Mr. Laingen when he was first released, and to many of us at work on that episode, it is still fresh in our minds.

We met this morning with a group of academic specialists in journalism, and spent a great deal of time examining this issue, and I was particularly impressed with the remarks of Fred Friendly, who is professor at Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, Murrow Professor Emeritus, and who made some very important observations.

I think the panelists agreed that some introspection is needed in the media with regard to how this should be handled, and that there should be some serious attention given to it.

Professor Friendly said,

> Terrorism is a new war, a species of guerrilla warfare whose battlefield is the television screen and the front page. It is more frightening and grotesque than anything except the threat of nuclear war because no pact can control this theater of terror. And I have come to urge my colleagues in the news media to re-examine their methods. For them to do nothing is almost to dare you in Congress on behalf of all the people to fill the void, and that would be an intrusion on our hallowed and unique First Amendment rights.

I am looking forward to meeting with our next panel to get into that issue, but it was an especially severe contrast today. On the one hand, we have the group of hostages who are saying—the hostage families who are here with us today, saying not enough publicity, not enough attention has been given; and on the other hand, we have the recent TWA hostage situation where too much publicity had been given at one time, and that it was not handled in a proper manner.

So, we are sort of caught betwixt and between in trying to decide what is proper, and I am inclined to believe that the industry, the print and television media, do have a responsibility to come up with some new guidelines and some new approaches.

U.S. POLICY FOR DEALING WITH HOSTAGE SITUATIONS AND TERRORISTS

I would like to ask just, Mr. Laingen—I think you have touched on it already—do you agree that we should be making direct exchanges knowing our position in the past of not bowing to the threats of terrorists?

Should we be making an exchange with regard to the Lebanon Seven, or the Kuwaiti prisoners?

Mr. **Laingen**. Let me just say that I also want to salute Mr. Friendly. I thought his presentation, particularly his prepared statement, was extremely good.

I would like to salute him as well because he has agreed to be a member of the Board of Visitors of the National Defense University. We need that contribution from the media side in narrowing the regrettable credibility gap that exists between the media and the military, which I think you would agree exists, regrettably after Vietnam, and to some extent after Grenada.

You also made the point that we are engaged in warfare. It is that. And we are not yet prepared either intellectually or institutionally, I think, adequately to respond to it.

I am not prepared to sit here, no, to say that we should make a direct exchange between those 17 held in Kuwait and the 7 in Lebanon, plus the 4, plus the 2, because there are Frenchmen and Britishers. There have been Jordanians, and at least one Saudi held.

In saying that, I am not—what I would say is that we obviously continue to—I hesitate to use that word—negotiate, but that is the term that is involved, discussions, talks, contacts, probes—among all parties involved in this situation.

Eventually, of course, the fact of the holding by the Israelis of the 757 prisoners certainly was involved somewhere in the background of the resolution of that crisis.

The 17 are clearly involved in this situation, although I am not prepared to sit here and say if they are exchanged, all of the 7 would be released.

We don't know that much about the specific demands of each and every one of those groups. As I understand it, from the Department of State, there are some elements in the more radical community, in that Shi'ite Islamic community in Lebanon that want a larger goal. That is the removal of the United States in terms of our presence or influence completely; to extend Khomeinism from Iran, if you will, to Lebanon as well, routing us out, lock, stock and barrel.

We cannot concede to that, and we must be very mindful, it seems to me in focusing on this question of the 7—of the 17—of the principle that Jerry has spoken of; the concerns of the Government of Kuwait, and what that would accomplish if that kind of exchange were even to be considered.

Mr. **Gilman**. Thank you, and I regret that our time has run out, Mr. Chairman. I hope that we can come back.

Mr. **Feighan**. Indeed, we will. We are obligated to go to the Floor for a vote, and I would like to thank the four panelists who have just testified, and tell them how valuable I believe their testimony has been for this committee. I hope in some way it is one event that is part of many that will lead to a very quick return of your brother, Terry Anderson, and that the expertise, in a sense, that family members and hostages who have testified before us, will contribute in some very meaningful way to ensuring that in the future, if we are faced, as we unfortunately, most certainly will be with similar circumstances, that we can conduct our affairs from both a governmental perspective and a media perspective in a more constructive fashion and one that is likely to lead to a quicker and thorough resolution of those conflicts.

Again, thank you very much for your very valuable testimony.

Ms. **Say**. Thank you for having us.

Mr. **Levin**. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 3:23 p.m., the committee was in recess.]

Mr. **Feighan**. The subcommittee will come to order.

I would like to express my very deep regret to the panelists who are with us at this session this afternoon for the excessive delay.

As you are aware, we had two or three successive votes on the floor. That is compounded now by the possibility that, in fact, the Foreign Aid Bill, the conference report, may be coming up momentarily so that may detain some other members of the committee, although there are several who are on their way.

We will begin, however, at this point, while we are awaiting other members to join us.

Let me formally welcome all the members of this panel, and thank you for your time and your participation.

The Beirut hostage crisis, I think, dramatized the extent to which media coverage affects diplomatic actions and creates or enhances the mood in the United States toward a crisis situation.

While the media watched the hijackers in Beirut we increasingly watched the media. In the end, the media did more than cover breaking news. In fact, it was making news. Electronic media in particular was a highly visible participant, willingly or otherwise in the hostage crisis.

The networks more than any other branch of the media have been taking considerable criticism over the past several weeks.

In fact, criticism of the television coverage has become a story in itself.

Since the release of the hostages, international commentary has focused, not just on the threat of terrorism but on the media's role in terrorists situations.

Prime Minister Thatcher suggested recently that the press adopt a voluntary code of conduct for its coverage of such events.

Attorney General Edwin Meese concurred in her opinion, and further suggested that principles governing news media behavior might be helpful.

The chief counsel for the Department of State endorsed Mr. Meese's statement, and then proceeded to say that the media extravaganza gave irresponsibility and tastelessness new meaning.

The Justice Department, as we are aware, subpoenaed the networks' material covering the crisis; and last week Secretary of

State George Shultz testifying before this committee stated that, while he recognized and agreed that some press restraint could be exercised, the contribution of a free press was fundamental to a full democracy.

It seems to me that nowhere does the debate or analysis seem more intense, however, than within the industry itself. It is our intention that this hearing will present you with a forum for continuing this discussion, to discuss the creation and the coverage of news, particularly news that relies on your attention for its own sustenance.

Regrettably, this is the nature of terrorism and terrorist goals.

I hope you may use this opportunity to respond to some of the charges that have been made against the networks' sense of propriety, but more important, I look forward to hearing from the executive offices, how a network sets its priorities in a crisis situation, and how the news crews and anchors play out the roles that are assigned to them.

I am very pleased this afternoon to welcome Mr. Larry Grossman, president of NBC News; Mr. Robert Siegenthaler, vice president of ABC News; Mr. Ed Turner, executive vice president of the Cable News Network; and Mr. Jack Smith, vice president and Washington bureau chief for CBS News.

We would proceed with summary statements of each of the panelists, beginning with Mr. Grossman, and then in successive order, and we will ask then for questions from members of the subcommittee panel, after each panelist has been able to present his testimony. Mr. Grossman, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF LARRY GROSSMAN, PRESIDENT, NBC NEWS

Mr. GROSSMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the introductory remarks.

I do not have a formal opening statement, but I would like to submit for the record of this committee, the review that NBC News undertook immediately after the end of the Beirut crisis coverage, of our own principles and guidelines and standards, in view of the sensitivity of the issues that were raised, and to which you referred.

And a comprehensive review was undertaken. We have sent out to the entire NBC News staff these guidelines and standards and answers to many of the questions that have been discussed here before the committee, as a guide for the next such crisis, for our coverage in the next such crisis.

And I would submit those guidelines for the record.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, just one aspect of your introduction gave me some pause, and I think it is important that the record show, when you refer to the subpoena that the networks received from the Justice Department of the network coverage. Now, that subpoena was clearly framed in terms not of the quality or character and nature of the coverage but to help the Justice Department in determining the identity of the hijackers, the murderers and the kidnappers, and for that specific purpose; and I think it is very important that the record be clear that the Justice Department is not engaging in any search or analysis or evaluation of news coverage in that crisis, insofar as we know.

Thank you.

Mr. **Feighan**. Thank you, Mr. Grossman, and I think that is an important understanding surrounding the subpoena.

[The NBC guidelines and related material follow:]

NBC Memorandum

To NBC News Staff

Date July 24, 1985

From Larry Grossman

Subject

Television news finds itself in a challenging and difficult situation with the proliferation around the world of terrorist attacks, hijacks and hostage crises.

Network news coverage of the recent TWA Hijacking/Hostage story has been criticized and defended by viewers, government officials and a wide range of critics and commentators in print and on-the-air. In view of the importance and sensitivity of the issues, we have reexamined our own practices and guidelines in light of NBC News' own experience in covering that recent long-running crisis.

For future guidance in reporting and broadcasting such stories, we have set down the most frequently asked questions and have tried to address the major comments we have received from many of you as well as from others.

Larry Grossman

1. Q. Should NBC News give extensive coverage to hostage stories?

A. We are in the busines of covering news of interest and importance. We cannot subscribe to stipulations or recommendations that we ignore the hostages or their families -- or even the hostage-takers -- on the assumption that if we keep them off television and radio, the crisis situation will go away. Our first journalistic obligation, always, is to our viewers and listeners. All America wanted and needed regular and trustworthy news reports on their fellow citizens held in Beirut, and NBC News answered this public need throughout the crisis on both our radio and television networks.

2. Q. What restraints, if any, should NBC News apply to its coverage of critical events such as the recent TWA Hostage story?

A. Taste and judgment are the most reliable barometers of sound journalistic practice. There are times when restraints should be imposed voluntarily on coverage at the scenes of events, as well as back at the broadcast centers. During the TWA hostage crisis, NBC News on at least three occasions withheld sensitive information from its news programs. Thus, on Tuesday, July 2, on NBC Nightly News, Navy technician Claude Whitmoyer of Severn, MD., a returned hostage, thanked the media for keeping his high-security military clearance secret during this ordeal abroad. And in a letter to NBC News dated July 1, 1985, the United States Navy expressed appreciation for the "sensitivity and restraint exercised by the National Broadcasting Company during the recent hostage crisis." The letter continued, "...faced with the dilemma of possibly endangering hostages by reporting all you knew, your organization ignored the competitive pressures and acted responsibly."

BEST

3. Q. Was NBC News "used" covering the extended TWA Hostage story?

A. There is no doubt that television has become a primary means of communications for terrorists, for hostages and for the families of hostages. At times, television has also become one of the means by which the diplomatic parties involved exchange their positions and messages. One columnist has called television news "the international nervous system". We cannot ignore this modern communications function -- even though we did not ask for it -- and still operate as effective and honest broadcast journalists.

4. Q. What can NBC News do to avoid becoming "part of the story"?

A. Cover only what is happening. Make no effort to change or dramatize what is happening. Make no effort to influence participants or observers to do or refrain from doing anything.

Do not become involved as a participant in any way.

Include nothing in a broadcast report which might give an erroneous impression of what actually took place.

5. Q. How should NBC News personnel conduct themselves when covering a continuing terrorist/hostage story, or an otherwise tense or dangerous situation?

A. The visibility of equipment and personnel at the scene of a disturbance should be minimized to the fullest extent consistent with adequate coverage. To this end, NBC News employees will try to:

Travel to the scene in an unmarked car.

Avoid conspicuous locations for cameras, lights, microphones and other equipment.

Limit the use of lights.

Maintain a low profile.

Avoid debates with participants or observers.

Be prudent in reactions to comments or abuse.

Be as accurate and objective as possible.

If despite these efforts, NBC News employees are convinced that their activities could exacerbate a dangerous situation, they will discontinue those activities promptly.

A civil disturbance will not be broadcast on a live basis except in very special circumstances, and then only with the prior approval of the President or Executive Vice President of NBC News.

NBC News personnel may leave an area which they perceive to be hazardous to their well-being. (The potential loss of a story is of secondary importance to the health and safety of the personnel.)

Each employee at the scene of a disturbance has the options to:

Continue the coverage.

Move to another location where in the judgment of the employee continued coverage will not be so hazardous.

Discontinue the coverage and leave the scene.

6. Q. How can we keep such a major running story in proper perspective?

   A. a) We must frequently remind our audience of prevailing conditions: hostages are obviously under stress; armed terrorists may be playing to the cameras or modifying their behavior because cameras are present. There should be regular references on-the-air by our reporters providing context and perspective as well as super-imposed visual information.

   b) We should cite past experiences when relevant: Example: "The Stockholm syndrome", that psychological reaction whereby captives may feel empathy for their captors or sympathize with the political positions of those holding them captive.

   c) When security conditions permit, full explanations of the personal backgrounds and possible motivations of both the hostages and their captors are often useful in providing complete reporting.

   d) Include on-the-air reports of related news elements of the unfolding story, developments perhaps occurring elsewhere that those being interviewed may well be unaware of in their isolation.

7. Q. How should we handle hostage and terrorist interviews?

A. First, it is far preferable to tape and edit all interviews for air that emerge from terrorist/hostage situations. However, recognizing there may be urgent circumstances requiring live transmissions, special care must be exercised in broadcasting them. In live situations, our correspondents on-the-air should frequently remind our audiences of the background, circumstances and context of such special live television news transmissions on NBC.

We also have to be vigilant to avoid soliciting special messages to the negotiating authorities. We should refrain from asking questions in interviews with hostages or members of their families about negotiating positions, or questions that could endanger the hostages, or questions based on hearsay or unproved allegations.

8. Q. Can we buy news materials?

A. NBC News can purchase relevant diaries or photographic materials that fall within the category of memoirs.

In all cases these editorial purchases must be cleared at the top level of the News Division, and the facts must be revealed on-the-air so that our viewers and listeners can know the circumstances and judge these program elements appropriately. (It should be noted that at no time during the TWA Hostage crisis did NBC News purchase anything from the hostage captors or from any of the parties involved.)

9. Q. Should NBC News pay travel and living expenses of hostage families who wish to be reunited overseas with their freed family members?

A. We cen pay such expenses, as is our general practice for interview programs, but we cannot intrude on their personal reunions and privacy. We should be sensitive to their needs and concerns. We cannot impose our own captivity on the families, making it impossible for other media representatives to interview them on scene. However, we can reasonably ask that these families, as guests of NBC News, be mindful of our own programming needs. NBC News management, in all such cases, must be notified in advance of any such arrangements.

10. Q. How frequently should we take air with hostage updates?

A. Editorial judgment must determine when NBC News will interrupt for regular program schedule. Such interruptions should be done rarely and only for the most important news developments. We should not go on the air just to be competitive. We must be mindful of our regularly-scheduled news programs and Digests when these can satisfactorily serve the update function and responsibility. We should avoid airing unedited tape and live crisis pictures unless there are extraordinarily compelling and urgent reasons for doing so. And in that case it is essential that our correspondents fully explain each situation as it is being broadcast.

11. Q. What is the NBC News position on network pools and overall pooling in hostage situations?

A. NBC News is opposed to pooling access to news or to news materials. Competition is essential to a free and open press. There may be situations where pools are to be considered reluctantly, on a case-by-case basis, and then only in crisis news coverage circumstances.

12. Q. **Attorney General Edwin Meese, at a news conference prior to his address to the American Bar Association convention in London on July 17, proposed that U. S. news organizations voluntarily delay, by common agreement, "some reporting of terrorist incidents." What is NBC News' reaction to that proposal?**

A. **NBC News is opposed to any government-imposed or government-proposed before-the-fact agreements with other news organizations for automatic reportorial restraints or delays. NBC News intends to continue to follow its own journalistic standards and practices, and we expect that other free and independent news organizations will do likewise -- each unilaterally and each responsibly.**

13. Q. Does the intense network news competition to be first and to attract audiences unduly influence or degrade responsible news judgments?

A. Generally speaking, competition in news, as in most areas, results in a better service to the nation's viewers and listeners. No single news source is better than a multiplicity of news services. However, in no case should pure competititve pressures diminish responsible journalistic practices. And to be sure that standard applies, NBC News will refrain from issuing press releases and publicizing competitive claims about ratings, scoops, special programs, etc., during major crises.

SUMMARY

Professionalism and common sense provide the best guidelines to avoid undue risks, dangers and the exploitation of news reporting. There must be a delicate balance of our obligation to keep the public informed, our obligation to avoid being used, and our obligation not to exacerbate or sensationalize the situation.

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Mr. **Feighan**. Mr. Siegenthaler.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT R. SIEGENTHALER, VICE PRESIDENT, NEWS PRACTICES, ABC NEWS

Mr. **Siegenthaler**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am privileged to be here.

I am vice president for news practices. I have a short statement.

One of my responsibilities in that job is to ensure that our news gathering and reporting activities conform to the ABC News written policy guidelines, the most recent volume of which is dated spring of 1982.

And these guidelines contain specific sections on coverage of terrorism.

A copy of the relevant pages I can submit for the record.[1]

To briefly paraphrase one portion—section II-9, it calls upon ABC News personnel "to do nothing to jeopardize the lives of hostages, to not interfere with efforts to secure their safe release, and to guard against efforts by terrorists to use us as a propaganda platform."

Further, our guidelines state that "no incident shall be broadcast live except in the most compelling circumstances, and then only with the approval of the president of ABC News or a designated vice president. [This policy does not prohibit live reports by correspondents who are on the scene.]"

In the TWA hostage crisis these ground rules were followed by ABC News personnel. In all instances we tried to put the story in perspective reminding the American public, for example, that the hostage interviews took place with the captors nearby.

ABC denied terrorists uncontrolled access.

All interviews and statements from Beirut telecast by ABC, with one exception, were pretaped and edited by us. The one exception was the live telephone interview on "Good Morning America."

In the future, the ABC News guidelines will also apply to that division of the company, not just to ABC News.

We believe that ABC News coverage was accurate, fair, and responsible, and that it met our obligations as journalists and our duties as good citizens.

We also believe that it is important that news organizations be attentive to criticism and participate in the ongoing debate concerning news coverage of the TWA hostage crisis. Lessons learned in postmortems can guide us in future situations.

To that end, 3 weeks ago, ABC News scheduled a special "Viewpoint" program for tonight, July 30, coincidentally, which will devote 90 minutes to examining media coverage in the hostage crisis. We expect vocal critics of television's role to appear.

And as part of our continuing internal process of self-examination, we will evaluate this criticism that we hear tonight, and the criticism that we may hear today, to see if any changes are indicated in our guidelines.

And in that spirit, Mr. Chairman, I will be glad to answer any questions when my time is due.

[Mr. Siegenthaler's prepared statement follows:]

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[1] See appendix 1.

Prepared Statement of Robert R. Siegenthaler, Vice President for News Practices, ABC News

I'm Robert Siegenthaler, Vice President, News Practices for ABC News. One of my responsibilities is to ensure that our news gathering and reporting activities conform to ABC News written policy guidelines - the most recent volume of which is dated Spring 1982.

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As part of our continuing internal process of self-examination, we will evaluate this criticism to see if any changes are indicated in our guidelines.

And in that spirit, Mr. Chairman, I'll be glad to answer any questions the sub-committe may have.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Siegenthaler.
Mr. Smith.

STATEMENT OF JACK SMITH, VICE PRESIDENT AND WASHINGTON BUREAU CHIEF, CBS NEWS

Mr. JACK SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My name is Jack Smith. I am vice president and Washington bureau chief for CBS News, and I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee today on behalf of CBS News to discuss the subject of news coverage of terrorist acts.

I recognize that many important questions have been raised concerning the press' role in covering the recent hijacking of TWA Flight 847, and I hope that I can provide some insights today into how we at CBS News approach these issues.

Put most simply, what we try to do at CBS News is to bring to the American public reliable information about the events and issues that shape their lives.

Ultimately, decisions as to what is newsworthy and important must be based on our own good faith, journalistic judgment.

No matter how abhorrent or despicable, terrorist activities such as the recent hijacking of TWA 847 are clearly events of enormous magnitude and public interest about which we must strive to present the fullest and most accurate coverage we can.

To do otherwise would be to shirk our duties as journalists and to breach the trust placed in us every day by millions of viewers and listeners.

We believe that our coverage of the hijacking and captivity of the American hostages was responsible, objective, and dependable; and we believe that this was true, not only of CBS News but of the other major American news organizations as well both broadcast and print.

Of course, coverage of complex and emotional events such as these poses special problems and dilemmas for journalists.

No one feels more acutely than journalists themselves the difficulties inherent in gathering and reporting information, when human lives may hang in the balance. We are deeply aware of the need to avoid coverage which sensationalizes events or relies on rumor or speculation.

We also feel keenly an obligation not to present reports that might jeopardize the safety of the hostages. And we wrestle with very difficult questions concerning the scope and manner of our coverage of the terrorist position, balancing on the one hand the news importance of terrorist demands against the need to avoid allowing them to exploit or manipulate us.

These are important questions. Over the years they have received the most serious consideration by the management of CBS News, resulting in a set of internal policies and standards which, along with our practical experience guide us in trying to provide responsible coverage of terrorist activities.

From the moment it began, our coverage of the hijacking and captivity of the passengers of TWA Flight 847 received minute-by-minute supervision by the most senior members of CBS News management. At every step of the way, during each day of the crisis, officials of CBS News met to evaluate the manner and extent of our coverage.

We strove to broadcast only the most accurate and reliable information. We tried carefully to place the unfolding events in a proper context and to provide political and social perspective by presenting the expert views of scholars and former Government officials.

We attempted to inform the public about the positions and demands of the hijackers and their backers without, in our judgment, granting those groups an excessive propaganda platform.

And we sought to remain sensitive throughout to valid concerns of national security and to the safety of the hostages themselves.

Some have criticized the press for presenting too much information to the American public during the hostage crisis. We respectfully disagree.

We believe that our coverage played a constructive role in ensuring the well-being of the hostages and perhaps in facilitating their release.

Moreover, we believe that the information we presented to our audience was accurate and important.

In charting our news coverage, we proceed from a basic respect for our audience. We believe that if the information we present is objective and accurate, and if we properly and fairly frame its context and place it in perspective, the audience will sort through the messages and reach valid independent conclusions.

We believe that our viewers and listeners are fully capable of sifting through bombast, threats and negotiating stances to reach an understanding of the underlying issues and situations.

If we adopted any other approach, if our viewers thought that we withheld information from them because we feared its effect on them, we would quickly lose our credibility. Anger, rumor, and speculation would control the public perception of all events.

We understand that there may be legitimate differences of opinion, as to some of the journalistic judgments, our journalistic judgments, and where receptive to constructive criticism of our coverage.

It may be that there are areas in which that coverage may be improved, and certainly we are interested in hearing and learning from our critics.

Having said that, however, I want to emphasize that decisions regarding the proper way in which to cover the criminal acts of terrorists must ultimately fall to the individual judgment of each news organization. We feel strongly that the journalistic decisions that must be made in reporting such events are not conducive to oversight, either by Government regulation or industry compact.

To the contrary, we are convinced the public is best served and can be most confident in the news coverage it receives if each news organization is left free to cover the events and issues, as its own judgment dictates.

Thank you for this opportunity to present the views of CBS News on these important issues.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you, Mr. Smith.

Mr. Turner.

[Mr. Smith's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JACK SMITH, VICE PRESIDENT AND WASHINGTON BUREAU CHIEF, CBS NEWS

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Of course, coverage of complex and emotional events such as these poses special problems and dilemmas for journalists. No one feels more acutely than journalists themselves the difficulties inherent in gathering and reporting information when human lives may hang in the balance. We are deeply aware of the need to avoid coverage which sensationalizes events or relies on rumor or speculation. We also feel keenly an obligation not to present reports that might jeopardize the safety of the hostages. And we wrestle with very difficult questions concerning the scope and manner of our coverage of the terrorists' position -- balancing on the one hand the news importance of the terrorists' demands against the need to avoid allowing them to exploit or manipulate us.

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Having said that, however, I want to emphasize that decisions regarding the proper ways in which to cover the criminal acts of terrorists must ultimately fall to the individual judgment of each news organization. We feel strongly that the journalistic decisions that must be made in reporting such events are not conducive to oversight either by government regulation or industry compact. To the contrary, we are convinced that the public is best served, and can be most confident in the news coverage it receives, if each news organization is left free to cover the events and issues as its own judgment dictates.

Thank you for this opportunity to present the views of CBS News on these important issues.

STATEMENT OF ED TURNER, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT OF CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members. My name is Ed Turner. I am executive vice president of CNN, Cable News Network. And I am responsible for day-to-day editorial management of CNN.

CNN is different in kind but not in substance from the three broadcast networks. We telecast 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, as do our sister services, CNN Headlines and CNN Radio News.

These differences acknowledged, the professional concerns of television and print journalists are the same: to be the first to discover and disclose a story; to present the facts in a cogent and timely fashion; to be balanced, fair, honest, and objective in our presentation.

The issue presented in this hearing, the media's role in international diplomacy and terrorist crises, must be seen in the broadest light. It may well be that various religious sects or political organizations in the Middle East attempted to capitalize on media coverage of the recent hostage crisis for the purpose of disseminating their propaganda. It may even be that the TWA jet was initially hijacked to catalyze this whole process. If this is so, it may be that the coverage the media gives to such events may reinforce such reprehensible and antisocial behavior.

It is understandable then that those responsible for protecting U.S. citizens abroad and for formulating and executing U.S. foreign policy should desire to reduce such misuse of the media. We are sensitive to the legitimacy of these concerns. At CNN, we will never knowingly report material we believe will jeopardize our national security. We will listen carefully to the background briefs of appropriate Government agencies and take their views and concerns into account in our reporting.

At the same time, we are innately suspicious of the imposition of news guidelines, however well-meaning in concept. First, the inevitable purpose, if not the effect, of such guidelines is to restrict the dissemination of information to the public. The objective is conceptually inconsistent with the long-established first amendment principle upon which our system of Government is based.

Second, we are concerned that any set of guidelines must initially be so broad in scope as to be meaningless in specific situations. With a national media consisting of hundreds of television stations, thousands of radio stations, thousands of newspapers and magazines, and numerous networks and wire services servicing these outlets, how can guidelines be enforced? With every good intent, the broadcast news networks could subscribe to guidelines and then watch a story be developed by competitive news outlets.

Because editorial judgment is inherently subjective, different editors within the television news organizations reasonably may take different viewpoints as to the applicability of guidelines in particular situations.

In the story which brings us here today, one must inquire: Who was injured? The hostages? No, not because of the cameras. The one great tragedy happened away from the media.

The U.S. Government? We do not know the answer to what did not happen. We know that Government agencies involved used all the networks as important and immediate sources of information. We do know that negotiations of the kind that occurred between the U.S. Government, Israel, representatives of the Moslem sects, et cetera, are held at many different levels, from public posturing to private negotiations.

Was the U.S. public harmed? At CNN we believe that too much information is better than too little. If we are correct in believing in informed self-government, there never can be too much information or too much understanding. We have an innate trust in the judgment and wisdom of the viewer—and in the ability to discriminate—if the network is responsible in reporting the facts. The viewer is smart, tough sophisticated and should be permitted to make informed judgments on his own.

Were the hostage families injured by our coverage? They had a running visual account on the status of their loved ones.

Finally, what of the hijackers, the Amal militia, or Nabih Berri. As reprehensible as their actions may have been, Americans now know a great deal more about their philosophy, concerns, and programs than before, including their direct use of terrorism. Far from condoning or encouraging such behavior, media coverage is just as likely to unify American public opinion against them.

Today, the combination of electronic telecommunications and the multiplicity of news gathering organizations in the world provides the public almost instantaneous access to information from diverse sources. These organizations, some are free, some not so free, some purely propagandistic. They will rush to air, rush to print, rush to judgment with or without CNN and the other U.S. news organizations.

At a time when issues and events are getting more complex, not less, it seems to CNN that the need for information, education and understanding is enhanced, not reduced. It is a poor time to impose artificial, unwise, and unworkable restrictions to the free flow of news to the American public. A mute news machine, afterall, will not serve the public's need to know.

Thank you for permitting me to enter this statement.

[Mr. Turner's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ED TURNER, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT OF CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. (CNN)

GOOD AFTERNOON MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE. MY NAME IS ED TURNER, AND I AM EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT OF CABLE NEWS NETWORK (CNN). I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DAY-TO-DAY EDITORIAL MANAGEMENT OF CNN.

AS YOU MAY KNOW CNN IS A NETWORK NEWS SERVICE CURRENTLY AVAILABLE ON 8,083 CABLE SYSTEMS AND SERVING APPROXIMATELY 34 MILLION CABLE TELEVISION HOUSEHOLDS ACROSS THE NATION.

CNN IS DIFFERENT IN KIND BUT NOT IN SUBSTANCE FROM THE THREE BROADCAST NETWORKS. A BROADCAST NETWORK TYPICALLY TRANSMITS A RELATIVELY LIMITED NUMBER OF HOURS PER DAY OF NEWS. INDEED, A NETWORK EVENING NEWSCAST CONTAINS 22 1/2 MINUTES OF NEWS.

CNN TELECASTS 24 HOURS A DAY, SEVEN DAYS A WEEK, AS DO OUR SISTER SERVICES, CNN HEADLINE NEWS AND CNN RADIO NEWS. THEREFORE WE HAVE A GREATER NEED AND OPPORTUNITY TO USE MATERIAL ON A MAJOR BREAKING STORY.

THESE DIFFERENCES ACKNOWLEDGED, THE PROFESSIONAL CONCERNS OF TELEVISION AND PRINT JOURNALISTS ARE THE SAME: TO BE FIRST TO DISCOVER AND DISCLOSE A STORY; TO PRESENT THE FACTS IN A COGENT AND TIMELY FASHION TO THE PUBLIC; AND TO BE BALANCED, FAIR, HONEST, AND OBJECTIVE IN OUR REPORTING. AFTER ALL, THE MEDIA DO NOT EXIST TO SERVE THEMSELVES; THEY SERVE THE INFORMATION NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC.

AS A PROFESSIONAL JOURNALIST FOR OVER THIRTY YEARS, I AM EXTREMELY SENSITIVE, NOT ONLY TO THE BENEFITS OF THE MEDIA'S POWER TO INFORM, BUT TO THE FACT THAT MEDIA PROCESSES MAY BE MANIPULATED BY OTHERS. WE NEED ONLY RECALL THE CIVIL RIGHTS AND ANTI-VIETNAM WAR MOVEMENTS OF PAST DECADES TO APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT THE MEDIA, IN PURSUIT OF ITS LEGITIMATE FUNCTIONS, MAY BE MANIPULATED BY GROUPS WITH PRIVATE AGENDAS.

THE ISSUE PRESENTED IN THIS HEARING, THE MEDIA'S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY AND TERRORIST CRISES, MUST BE SEEN IN THIS BROADER LIGHT. IT MAY WELL BE THAT VARIOUS RELIGIOUS SECTS OR POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ATTEMPTED TO CAPITALIZE ON MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE RECENT HOSTAGE CRISIS FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISSEMINATING THEIR PROPAGANDA. IT MAY EVEN BE THAT THE TWA JET WAS INITIALLY HIGHJACKED TO CATALYZE THIS WHOLE PROCESS. IF THIS IS SO, IT MAY BE THAT THE COVERAGE THE MEDIA GIVES TO SUCH EVENTS MAY REINFORCE SUCH REPREHENSIBLE AND ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR.

IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE, ACCORDINGLY, THAT THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTING U.S. CITIZENS ABROAD AND FOR FORMULATING AND EXECUTING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY SHOULD DESIRE TO REDUCE SUCH MISUSE OF THE MEDIA. WE ARE SENSITIVE TO THE LEGITIMACY OF THESE CONCERNS. AT CNN, WE WILL NEVER KNOWINGLY REPORT MATERIAL WE BELIEVE WILL JEOPARDIZE OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. WE WILL LISTEN CAREFULLY TO THE BACKGROUND BRIEFS BY APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND TAKE THEIR VIEWS AND CONCERNS INTO

ACCOUNT IN OUR REPORTING.

WE ARE INNATELY SUSPICIOUS, AT THE SAME TIME, OF THE IMPOSITION OF "NEWS GUIDELINES", HOWEVER WELL-MEANING IN CONCEPT. FIRST, THE INEVITABLE PURPOSE, IF NOT THE EFFECT, OF SUCH GUIDELINES IS TO RESTRICT THE DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC. THIS OBJECTIVE IS CONCEPTUALLY INCONSISTENT WITH THE LONG-ESTABLISHED FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLE, UPON WHICH OUR SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IS BASED, WHICH HOLDS THAT THE WIDEST POSSIBLE DISSEMINATION OF NEWS AND INFORMATON FROM DIVERSE AND ANTAGONISTIC SOURCES IS ESSENTIAL TO THE WELFARE OF THE PUBLIC.

SECOND, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT ANY SET OF GUIDELINES MUST INITIALLY BE SO BROAD IN SCOPE AS TO BE MEANINGLESS IN SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. WITH A NATIONAL MEDIA CONSISTING OF HUNDREDS OF TELEVISION STATIONS, THOUSANDS OF RADIO STATIONS, THOUSANDS OF NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES, AND NUMEROUS NETWORKS AND WIRE SERVICES SERVING THESE OUTLETS, HOW CAN GUIDELINES BE ENFORCED? WITH EVERY GOOD INTENT, THE BROADCAST NEWS NETWORKS COULD SUBSCRIBE TO GUIDELINES AND THEN WATCH A STORY BE DEVELOPED BY COMPETITIVE NEWS OUTLETS. IN THAT EDITORIAL JUDGMENT IS INHERENTLY SUBJECTIVE, DIFFERENT EDITORS WITHIN THE TELEVISION NEWS ORGANIZATIONS REASONABLY MAY TAKE DIFFERENT VIEWS AS TO THE APPLICABILITY OF GUIDELINES IN PARTICULAR SITUATIONS.

IN THE STORY WHICH BRINGS US HERE TODAY, ONE MUST INQUIRE: WHO WAS INJURED? THE HOSTAGES? NO, NOT BECAUSE OF THE CAMERAS. THE ONE TRAGEDY HAPPENED AWAY FROM THE MEDIA.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT? WE DO NOT KNOW THE ANSWER TO WHAT DID NOT HAPPEN. WE DO KNOW THAT THE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES INVOLVED USED ALL THE NETWORKS AS IMPORTANT AND IMMEDIATE SOURCES OF INFORMATION. WE DO KNOW THAT NEGOTIATIONS OF THE KIND THAT OCCURRED BETWEEN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, ISRAEL, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MOSLEM SECTS, ETC. ARE HELD AT MANY DIFFERENT LEVELS -- FROM PUBLIC POSTURING TO PRIVATE NEGOTIATIONS.

WAS THE U.S. PUBLIC HARMED? AT CNN WE BELIEVE THAT TOO MUCH INFORMATION IS BETTER THAN TOO LITTLE. IF WE ARE CORRECT IN BELIEVING IN INFORMED SELF-GOVERNMENT, THERE NEVER CAN BE "TOO MUCH INFORMATION" OR "TOO MUCH UNDERSTANDING". WE HAVE AN INNATE TRUST IN THE JUDGMENT AND WISDOM OF THE VIEWER -- AND IN HIS ABILITY TO DISCRIMINATE -- IF THE NETWORK IS RESPONSIBLE IN REPORTING THE FACTS. THE VIEWER IS SMART, TOUGH, SOPHISTICATED AND SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO MAKE INFORMED JUDGMENTS ON HIS OWN.

WERE THE HOSTAGE FAMILIES INJURED BY OUR COVERAGE? THEY HAD A RUNNING VISUAL ACCOUNT OF THE STATUS OF THEIR LOVED ONES.

FINALLY, WHAT OF THE HIJACKERS, THE AMAL MILITIA OR NABBI BERRI? AS REPREHENSIBLE AS THEIR ACTIONS MAY HAVE BEEN, AMERICANS NOW KNOW A GREAT DEAL MORE ABOUT THE PHILOSOPHY, CONCERNS, AND PROGRAMS OF THESE INTERESTS -- INCLUDING THEIR DIRECT USE OF TERRORISM -- THAN BEFORE. FAR FROM CONDONING OR ENCOURAGING SUCH BEHAVIOR, MEDIA COVERAGE IS JUST AS LIKELY TO UNIFY AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST SUCH TACTICS. THUS, TO

THE EXTENT SUCH GROUPS ARE MOTIVATED IN THEIR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES BY MEDIA COVERAGE OR PROPAGANDA DISSEMINATION OBJECTIVES, SUCH ACTIONS MAY IN FACT BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. FURTHERMORE, THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ILLUMINATION OF WORLD-WIDE MEDIA ATTENTION -- COMBINED WITH WORLD-WIDE DISAPPROVAL AND ABHORANCE FOR THE TACTICS OF TERRORISM -- WILL INDUCE SUCH GROUPS TO ACT IN A CIVIL FASHION.

TODAY, THE COMBINATION OF ELECTRONIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE MULTIPLICITY OF NEWS GATHERING ORGANIZATIONS IN THE WORLD PROVIDES THE PUBLIC ALMOST INSTANTANEOUS ACCESS TO INFORMATION FROM DIVERSE SOURCES. THESE ORGANIZATIONS ARE "FREE", AND NOT SO FREE, AND PROPAGANDISTIC ALIKE. THEY WILL RUSH TO AIR, TO PRINT, TO JUDGMENT WITH OR WITHOUT CNN AND OTHER U.S. NEWS ORGANIZATIONS.

AT A TIME WHEN ISSUES AND EVENTS ARE GETTING MORE COMPLEX, NOT LESS, IT SEEMS TO CNN THAT THE NEED FOR INFORMATION, EDUCATION AND UNDERSTANDING IS ENHANCED, NOT REDUCED. IT IS A POOR TIME TO IMPOSE ARTIFICIAL, UNWISE AND UNWORKABLE RESTRICTIONS TO THE FREE FLOW OF NEWS TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. A MUTE NEWS MACHINE, AFTERALL, WILL NOT SERVE THE PUBLIC'S NEED TO KNOW.

Mr. **Feighan**. Thank you, Mr. Turner.

If I might begin the questioning with a comment that I find it candidly disappointing that none of the panelists have used the opportunity, at least in the opening statements but perhaps will choose to do so in response to questions, to identify those areas where they felt that perhaps the coverage that was presented by your individual networks was insufficient or was not up to the standards that you would expect of network coverage.

We have been in this hearing all day today, as you are aware, and we have heard a great deal of opinion, some very harsh criticism of the conduct of network coverage of the Beirut situation that, as I indicated, ranged from the observation of counsel in the State Department that was describing the coverage as a media extravaganza that gave irresponsibility and tastelessness a new meaning.

Fred Friendly, a gentleman with whom I know you are familiar and whose observations I am sure you have respect for, referred to the trafficking, in characterizing the nature of the coverage as the trafficking on the body of hostages, a fairly harsh assessment, I would say. But he detailed in some specificity exactly why he felt that there were certain shortcomings.

In summary, there has been a great deal of observation made from representatives of your industry to suggest that the coverage of the Beirut situation was at times tasteless, irresponsible, excessive, sensationalistic. And I would like to find out from you if you think that those characterizations apply appropriately at any point during the coverage of the 17 days or the days following the Beirut crisis.

I think that specifically I would ask that you give us your assessment of the reporting of movement of the Delta Force and whether or not that was responsible journalism or whether it bordered on jeopardizing national security interests. If you would comment specifically on whether or not you feel that the treatment, the coverage of families of those held hostage was responsible, was conducive to giving a full airing of all of the circumstances and all of the critical core elements of coverage of the hostage situation. Whether or not you feel that granting direct and unedited access to interviews for the captors, for the terrorists, was a very difficult, clearly was a difficult judgment call, but whether or not that was constructive reporting and coverage of the incidents.

Those are just some that come to mind. Perhaps as individuals who have been reviewing these circumstances for several days, now almost 2 months, since the conclusion of that crisis, you may be able to identify others that you feel were low points in coverage.

I would have to acknowledge that certainly some have given their assessment that there have been, that there certainly were high points of very valuable journalism during the course of that experience. But clearly, there were some shortcomings or your very offices would not be undergoing the review that you have indicated you have been under over the past several weeks.

I would appreciate it if you could respond to those concerns.

AVAILABLE

Mr. GROSSMAN. I am eager to respond to that, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the question that you have raised and the opportunity to offer that response.

Clearly, at NBC News, any time there is a major crisis involving complicated reporting and logistics we undertake a thoroughgoing review, both operationally and in terms of our performance journalistically, our standards and practices. And in this case, as the record has shown, and as we have been happy to submit to you, we have responded with a set of guidelines, most of which, I might say, are not changes from the guidelines that NBC News has had and has made public in the past.

I will tell you that I, myself, reviewed all of the videotapes of all of NBC News coverage and, indeed, read the transcripts of every network interrupt and special having to do with the NBC News coverage of the Beirut crisis.

I came away from that thoroughgoing review convinced and very proud of what we had done, convinced that it exhibited great journalistic integrity and intelligence. We provided background and perspective wherever we could. There was intelligent editing. And there was clear-cut information provided to the American people.

I have heard the charges to which you refer. I find it very hard to pick out of those any specifics, apart from general characterizations, both by the counsel of the State Department, if that is who it was, and by Fred Friendly, for whom I have great respect. But I would say that at NBC News, at least, in terms of the journalistic performance on the air, there is virtually nothing that I would want to take back or do significantly differently. Things could have been smoother and we could have known a lot more in the beginning than we did about the background and circumstances of the various factions of the Shiites and so on, but I think that in the sense of our network coverage, the performance, in circumstances of great difficulty, was extraordinary.

And I might say that we were very pleased to receive from the U.S. Navy—and I would like to address the specifics that you went through—a letter of commendation for our restraint and sensitivity in the way we handled matters involving security and for the coverage overall.

MEDIA REPORTING OF DELTA FORCE

You asked about the reporting of the Delta Force and whether that violated security. Those reports came from the Defense Department itself. The nature of the reports was such that I think actually, ironically, it provided very little news. Everybody knows that there is a Delta Force. And the purpose and reason for the Delta Force and history of it is to be dispatched to places of trouble.

We did not identify how many were in that force. We did not identify specifically where that force went, or even in general circumstances. And the answer is no, I do not think there were any security problems—and as I say, certainly in view of the source of the information provided—in the television coverage.

MEDIA COVERAGE OF HOSTAGES' FAMILY MEMBERS

Insofar as the treatment of the families was concerned, there too, I personally, as part of my obligation at NBC News, went to Frankfurt to talk to the families of the hostages involved. We were very concerned with the sensitive issues on that score. I found them warm and welcoming and grateful for the opportunity to talk out, determined to be responsible and responsive, and very pleased at the opportunity to address the American people.

To suggest that these people did so unwillingly or were in some way drafted into doing so or did so, talked without their knowledge, I think is just totally inaccurate.

MEDIA INTERVIEW WITH THE HOSTAGES

Insofar as the treatment of the hostages, certainly there are excesses in the coverage. And I think that is what everybody remembers. We could have spent 2 months instead of 17 days in the most responsible coverage on television, but the scene that everybody focuses on is that terrible, unfortunate, that zoo that was the initial hostage interview, caused, I might say by the way, when you look at the footage, by the enormous outpouring of international still photographers. Ironically, the television cameras were more or less mounted on platforms out of sight. But it was largely as a result of the inexperience and the poor staging, if you will, as it was amply reported on the air, by the Amal. And it did look like a zoo. And it gave a very bad impression of all of television journalism.

But none of the networks can be pinned, I might say, with the responsibility for that kind of coverage.

And insofar as unedited interviews were concerned, at NBC News at least, there were no television unedited interviews. In fact, there was no capacity to come out of Beirut with live television.

There were live interviews on phones with our anchormen. But they are very professional and used to that. And those were very informative and I think important interviews in informing the American people.

Now, that all sounds as if I am, I think, giving us a clean bill of health when perhaps we should have had more introspection and done things better. And I am hardly an impartial judge. And I certainly admit that. But I will tell you that after my own review, the findings that I have described I hold with a good deal and very deep conviction. And I have no doubt that any responsible review on a comparable basis of all of the reporting, not just by NBC News, but by and large, I think, by the other networks as well, but I can speak only for ours, would come to the same conclusion.

Mr. **Siegenthaler**. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me say that we do not claim to have perfection in our camp. But we are also proud of our coverage. We thought that we discharged our duties as good journalists, did that well, as well as good citizens. We got the story fast, first, and most importantly, accurately.

As to the specifics that you raised, the families, our dealings with the families indicate that they were buoyed, if anything, by our presence. That we kept them in touch with their hostage loved ones. Some even expressed the idea that we were their insurance policy so that the—I think you may have heard that earlier today—that the story did not fade.

ABC REPORTING ON DELTA FORCE

As to the specific about the Delta Force, ABC News' reporting on the Delta Force was in the early days of the hijacking to the effect that the United States possesses such a team. I do not believe that we reported on its movement.

In any case, those stories do originate from the Department of Defense who were aware that we were working on such a story and did not ask us, in the national interest, to make any changes in the stories that we were contemplating.

We did withhold the information that we possessed that there were military people in captivity who had military credentials. We also withheld information that one of the hostages had a National Security Agency clearance.

So we do feel that we behaved in a responsible way in the matter of the Delta Force.

As to the unedited access, the only instance that involved us, I mentioned in my opening remarks, on "Good Morning, America", and we have taken steps as part of our post mortem, as part of our self-criticism, to draw the ABC News guidelines over the entertainment division that does that information morning program.

Thank you.

CBS COVERAGE OF THE HIJACKING

Mr. **JACK SMITH**. Mr. Chairman, we at CBS News believe that our coverage was professional, was responsible, and was accurate throughout the TWA 847 hijacking. We felt that we covered the story thoroughly providing the American people with a running account of occurrences from the time that it began until the time that the hostages were released.

With respect to many of the criticisms that have been made against coverage of the story, so frequently they are made without specific citing of where this coverage failed. Mr. Grossman referred to the situation at the news conference when the hostages first appeared, and that was indeed a rough and tumble event.

The CBS news personnel that were there were working in extremely crowded conditions. These were gunmen who were holding that news conference. It was one news event which was extraordinary in and of itself. And I think that a good deal of criticism focused on that particular episode.

With respect to several of the specific instances which you have asked us to comment on. First of all, the Delta team movements, CBS News did discover and did have the information on the movement of the Delta team early on in the story, but we did refrain from reporting it until it had generally been reported and circulated by several other major news organizations.

With regard to the families, the families who spoke to us and the families that we interviewed did so willingly. Those that did not wish to speak with us and did not wish to be interviewed by us, we refrained from interviewing. We respected their wishes not to participate in the news flow of the story.

We had the feeling throughout in talking with the families when we would interview them that they found a beneficial effect not only from talking with us so that they could express their views to the American people, but also in that the television networks by their coverage of the story were providing a flow of information on the condition and the status of the hostages and the negotiations themselves.

With regard to the point of direct and unedited transmission of interviews, again by and large all of those interviews were taken to a point of transmission where they were reviewed by reporters or producers as they were being transmitted, and were again reviewed and edited by CBS News personnel before they were put on the air.

There was an instance of one case, if I can recall, where there was a phone interview that was broadcast live. But by and large, virtually all of the interviews were looked at, screened, edited, and produced before they were broadcast.

Mr. **Feighan**. Thank you, Mr. Smith.

Mr. Turner, could I ask you to hold your commentary on this particular issue for now. We are going to ask another member of the panel to pose this question, and we can come back to this in a little bit if it is agreeable to you. Mr. Dornan.

EXCESSES IN COVERAGE OF THE TWA HOSTAGE CRISIS

Mr. **Dornan**. Gentlemen, thank you for coming, and I will repeat what I mentioned to the earlier panels, that I know of no bill or legislation that is being proposed. I know of no government official, appointed or elected, who is writing guidelines. I know of no one who wants to put any particular pressure on the newspapers of this country, or on the radio or television stations, or its ownership to come up with something. We are interested in a dialogue and an analysis very similar to what I guess will take place on Viewpoint tonight, which I will be watching avidly.

I have no suggestions myself except to say that as a private citizen in addition to being a Congressman, I share the feeling of unease that seems to be out there across America. Congressman Smith, mentioned this morning, and I see that he is back, maybe he can repeat his comment that Americans will watch this in fascination, and while they are watching it, they are saying that this is too much, this is disgusting, what is going on here.

Now, suppose that the cameras had been around as radio was around when the pilot made those extremely hurtful statements that they were going to kill one of the passengers. Suppose they did kill one of the passengers, and it was replayed on the television stations again, and again, and again like the President's assassination, and other attempted assassinations, and other moments in media history.

It seems that I have seen or heard that piece in my mind's eye a hundred times already. I know that we will hear it a lot more, and it will probably be played on Viewpoint tonight.

Suppose a few days later instead of just slapping the pilots in the face and waving that big pistol around in front of them, suppose they decided to get more attention and started killing people throwing the bodies out of the door.

AVAILABLE

What would the media approach be? I do not know what I would do. I do not have the faintest idea of what you are going to say, but if we could start with Mr. Grossman.

With the world watching, via satellites, cable television, say live CNN with its ability, has already covered the incident almost nonstop as it built to this moment of attention. And then the terrorists announce that they are expecting the President of the United States, Prime Minister Thatcher, and President Mitterrand of France, to do such and such, and we are going to start killing a passenger every 5 minutes and throwing them out this door.

And you hear one of the terrorists say, "Let us wait until all of the cameras are here, ask for a head count." They want the three American networks, BBC, and Agence France. When they see that they have a full retinue of world press, then they will start killing people and tossing them out.

So taking this extreme example: Is this the point where we start analyzing whether the cameras sit there and dutifully grind away recording this horror? Or do you shut the cameras off at that point?

Is it up to each individual station owner? Is someone going to step forward and say maybe we should come up, even privately, with loose guidelines, because it seems to me that the possibilities for manipulating the news media of the free world, electronic and print, are limitless, if killers and terrorists really apply their imagination on how to whip us around.

Could you comment, Mr. Grossman, on that horrible a situation?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Dornan, you pose a very difficult question in the abstract, if you will, and it is obviously a sensitive one. But the way that it was posed, if I may say so, suggests that we do not address those questions of when should the camera roll, what should we cover, what even if we have covered it should we show on the air until we reach the most extreme position, namely people are getting killed.

I can assure you that at every level at NBC News, and having enough experience I know with the other organizations as well, those questions are asked every day of the week about every news event that we appear at. They are not all quite as dramatic, thank heavens, as the Beirut crisis coverage, but there are mine disasters, and there are crimes committed, and there are weather disasters in which the same kinds of judgments, the same kinds of editorial restraint, the same kinds of standards and guidelines must be applied.

And to sit here now and set forward other than what we have tried to do at NBC News with our guidelines and our standards with specific certainty to say when we are going to air and when we will not really depends on the circumstance, the importance of the news event, on whether we think that we have been able to give the information to the American public.

We are very conscious of the sensitivity of people seeing blood and gore on television. Sometimes it is unavoidable. But those editorial judgments do not await a terrible crisis, whether it is one person being killed or even one person being injured or 35. It goes on all of the time.

Mr. **Dornan**. May I modify my example to remove the gore. Mine disasters and weather disasters are not programmed to be projected worldwide through mass media, particularly with sight, sound, and color on television. Suppose they were to say "we are going to kill these people behind this curtain, and we will throw the dead body out the other side. We will limit the scene, but we are going to call off their names."

So they take the first one, Robert Stethem. He is a military man, he is a big guy who thinks he is tough, we think that he is just a pig. This is what we understand that the stewardess tells us that they say. And you hear the shot, and then his body is put out the other side of the curtain.

So it is not gore that I am talking about. It is building the tension through killing or beating. Even if you just hear the sound, and see a curtain moving.

Is it not better to discuss the worse scenario, and work your way back from that before you are trapped into one of these incidents? Then it is up to the taste and judgment of the camera crew in the field where they are all looking at one another wondering, who is going to divert the camera lens, as most of us as human beings often avert our eyes when we see someone in great pain over a loved one.

I never dreamed that I would see on network television something that you might have seen only on Saturday Night Live a few years ago, when someone really comes out and says, "how does it feel" to a person in deep pain. And finally, I saw that in this crisis, and I mercifully cannot remember which network. But to ask "how does it feel" with a microphone in front of a hostage family member?

I just think that you have to come up with some discussion. I know that it will probably come up on Viewpoint. But I think that Mr. Friendly said something this morning that I found rather sad. He went to a seminar this week, and he said where is unimportant. And he said that he did not hear a single person in broadcast journalism come out with even the slightest criticism. Am I correct, Mr. Chairman, or words to that effect.

He said there was no criticism. That everybody was acting like everything that ABC, CBS, and NBC, and CNN did was absolutely perfect. And it just could not have gone that well when you have the feeling in the Congress and out through America that something was wrong here.

Mr. **Grossman**. Well, Mr. Dornan, I am not sure that the people share that feeling. Because there has been a lot of discussion afterward, but very few, and in fact I have heard none insofar as our coverage was concerned, specifics. And I think that it is a distasteful episode, and some of the distaste rubs off on those who are the messengers to be sure.

Mr. **Dornan**. I agree.

NBC COVERAGE GUIDELINES

Mr. **Grossman**. But as I said to the chairman, I believe that you were out of the room, that I think in reviewing, and I reviewed every transcript and every video tape, that it was a very professional job. I think that the major criticism that I would have the major change that we made in our own guidelines by the way had nothing to do with the journalism in reporting the occasion, but it had to do with the publicity releases, the announcements of scoops, the effort to get credit for the journalism, which I think undermined the quality journalism that all of the networks provided. And for that, we are guilty.

Mr. Dornan. Did your entertainment and news programs infringe at all on what you were trying to do in the news department, the "Today" show and so forth?

Mr. Grossman. No; at NBC News, the "Today" show reports to the news division and operates under the news' guidelines and standards. So that that was not the case at all.

Mr. Dornan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Feighan. Congressman Levine.

CBS COVERAGE OF THE TWA HOSTAGE CRISIS

Mr. Levine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to followup with Mr. Smith one point in your testimony which I found interesting. Mr. Smith, in your opening statement, you stated that you believed that your coverage played a constructive role in ensuring the well-being of the hostages, and perhaps in facilitating their release. And I would be interested in the reasons that led you to those conclusions.

Mr. Jack Smith. Well, first of all, Congressman, I draw that conclusion from statements of the families. While we were talking with them and while we were interviewing them, that they would tell us that our coverage of the story itself was providing them with information as to the status of their loved ones.

And I think that if you or I were in that same situation and we had a brother or a son who was captive, that we would give whatever was precious to us for a picture, or a conversation if you will, just some piece of information about our brother and son and what condition they are in at the present time.

And I think that that is what we did over the run of this story. And I think that that was valuable, first of all, to the families who suffer almost as much as the hostages who are in captivity.

I think also, Congressman, that it provided to the American people, to the citizenry, the same information perhaps on a less emotional level, because they did not have a family involvement, but the American people were able to see, I believe, that these hostages were alive, that they seemed to be well, they were certainly on edge, they were captives. Which I think that we always stressed throughout our reporting when we did show the pictures of them, did show the interviews, that these were captives, that they were being held by gunmen.

Which, I think, was proven when they were released, Congressman, that they had sustained in relatively decent condition. And I am talking about physical condition, because I cannot assess whatever mental stress they were under. We know that they were under great mental stress, but what the effects of that is difficult to judge at this moment.

I also think that by the very fact of the people who had control of the hostages showing them and presenting them in the condition in which we saw them led to the process moving forward to what was always stated as the ultimate goal by the negotiator, the man in the middle, and that was to release the hostages. He was anxious to get them out of there.

And I think that as soon as they started showing up on broadcast and we saw that they were alive and relatively well but under duress and captivity, that this process was going to move along. I think that the negotiators had a greater stake in seeing that they were released once that they had been shown that way.

IMPORTANCE OF MEDIA SUPPORT TO HOSTAGE FAMILY MEMBERS

Mr. **Levine**. Frankly, this has been in many respects one of the more interesting hearings that I have attended in awhile, and in many ways that I had not anticipated. I respect your answer. I think that there is something to that answer. And I have respected the responses that we have received from each of the panelists this afternoon in the later session as well as the panelists in the earlier session.

One of the responses that intrigued me from one of the panelists in the earlier session, each of whom were either hostages themselves at one time or related to hostages, and particularly from a relative of a current hostage, was that instead of asserting or stating that the press should be more restrained and the press should be more careful about the coverage, the message I got from these people, in particular from one witness, was that in light of the inadequacy of what our own Government was able to provide to the hostage families in a variety of areas, I think, ranging from moral support to just plain information, that the press played a particularly critical role for them in terms of everything ranging from hand-holding to information delivery, et cetera.

I do not know the extent to which any of you wish to comment on this in this context. But I would be interested in your thoughts in terms of what our Department of State ought to be able to offer or provide to hostage families that they were not able to provide, and therefore caused those hostage families to turn more to the press based upon your experiences particularly in the most recent situation that we have seen. And whether or not in fact your experiences are that there is in fact a significant vacuum provided by Federal Governmental agencies that hostage families have felt that they have needed to fill by going to the press.

Mr. **Grossman**. Well, I'll take a stab at it, Congressman. I think from my own perspective it would not be appropriate for us as news executives, if you will, to advise the Department of State on policy matters.

Mr. **Levine**. Let me just interrupt. I'm not seeking advice on policy matters, let me be clear on that. I'm thinking of this other area, and I think that your comments do demonstrate the value of full reporting.

Mr. **Grossman**. There's no question that it does in the end influence the exercise of policy. What people know has got to be taken into account in terms of what a President or the Department of

State can do. Both the Secretary of State and the President have acknowledged that they learned a great deal from the television coverage.

But we have seen over and over again in our own interviews with the hostage families and the hostages themselves how important it was for them to get that information and get access to that information, and that is a key factor. Indeed, passing the Speaker in the hallway a little while ago he complimented us on our coverage, thought it was terrific and it was clear that it was important to the members of this body.

And Senator Leahy himself, who is vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, told us that he was getting information. That's where he gets his intelligence information. And so that all of that is critical in a democracy, and it's only in a totalitarian state that you get the press closing down, covering up instead of covering the major issues.

Mr. LEVINE. If anybody else wishes to respond I'd be interested, and if not, that's a helpful response.

Mr. TURNER. Congressman, I spent 2 months in Beirut and 11 months of my life as a point man for CNN in trying to recover Jerry Levin when he was kidnaped March 7 a year ago, and although not an expert, I did have some emotional and professional experiences under fire, if you will.

It was my sense then and now that the difficulty in Lebanon is you deal with fog and mist and shadows, and no one knows who has whom for certain, and therefore there is no one to call an air strike in on or to go bribe. You're dealing with religious fanatics who believe deeply in whatever it is they're doing.

It is not a situation with easy solutions.

Mr. LEVINE. Thank you.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Gentlemen, if we could ask for your very generous indulgence once again, we have a floor vote, actually two successive votes, and we would like to reconvene in 15 minutes, if that would be convenient with your schedules, and then we can move along as quickly as possible.

I'm very grateful for your indulgence. Thank you.

[Brief recess.]

Mr. FEIGHAN. Gentlemen, we will reconvene the hearing, and apologize for the delay. The succession of the votes took much longer than we had anticipated.

Mr. Smith.

NATURE OF MEDIA COVERAGE

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate your courtesy in staying for us. We were unfortunately debating some of the more difficult issues that roll around this place from time to time.

I read your statement with some interest. Nowhere do I see really the point addressed that a number of us made this morning, and I made with the first panel, and I was wondering how you feel about it, and Mr. Dornan indicated that I was the one that raised the issue about the American public watching it and hating it at the same time, this dichotomy of saying to themselves "This is digraceful. I hope they would never do this to me," but watching it nonetheless.

You know, you have no control over a terrorist act, a hijacking, a bombing or the like. You cover that as a news story, and I give great credit to the networks for being quite professional about covering those news stories in general.

Those are the things that you don't have any control over. You don't make that, you cover it, and if you're being manipulated, and you are to some degree, by the terrorists, it's probably something that we can never really do anything about.

It's a legitimate news story. It may be disgusting, it may be disgraceful, it may be immoral in terms of its relation to the impact on people, but nonetheless it is news, and it's extremely newsworthy, and whether or not we can ever get to the point where we don't play it up as news because we have that capability of somehow forcing ourselves not to recognize it and cover it well, I don't think it will happen.

However, I view the first amendment on the basis of need to know, which is the point I'm driving at. While you're covering that story, you have news to cover as—either editorialize or illustrate more with news analysis and the like.

And you all have programs that do that. It's what I consider to be the secondary happenings that you create that bother me and bother a lot of the American public. Once the incident occurs, there are a whole bunch of ancillary news stories that begin to generate but separate from the main incident, and everybody really makes reference to it, and I will too.

This unbelievably microscopic, invasive, almost at some points obscene invasion of the families and the people that are related to these hostages and of all the other kinds of ancillary things that go on. The monster rears its head.

You get a piece of action. You cover that action legitimately. Whether the coverage is good or bad is of no consequence at this moment. You're there, and you're legitimately there covering a news story.

But then as that news story abates, because Mr. Berri is not holding a press conference for four hours, or there's no word from the hijackers, you begin to make news. You want to have this continue. You're on a roll. It's called my "you're on the roll" theory.

You don't want to get off that roll. It's a hot item. You begin to manufacture news. I heard one of you say that "We don't interview the families unless they want to be interviewed.' Now, you know that you catch people walking from here to there, you shove a microphone in front of their face, you catch them in all kinds of disadvantaged positions.

They're not making rational decisions either, and it really is, to my way of thinking at this moment, two issues. It's the manufacture of the news that is to me the most depressing, says the most about what the deficiencies are in the fourth estate, not the news coverage, because I think overall there's going to never be a time when reasonable men won't differ reasonably about whether you should or should not have released this piece or covered this exactly the way you did or whether you overcovered or undercovered the main event, the news story, the happening, the event.

It's all the secondary coverage that makes me feel so badly about the excesses, or what I consider to be the excesses, of all the media. I'm not singling out you're the heads of networks, believe me. I don't mean to single you out.

You happen to be more immediate than the newspaper, which may cover it today and have to print it tomorrow. The reality is that it's all media and I'm curious as to whether you are willing if you feel this way, are willing to indicate that even to you sometimes you wince at the excesses, maybe even at your competitors' excesses.

I wouldn't want you to say at your own. The fact is that you keep generating the news even though it's not there in the main event to generate, and let me just give you an example. Look at what happened in the controversy a few weeks ago about the case in Illinois where the rapist was convicted on the basis of testimony which the witness then recanted.

All of a sudden everybody wanted those people on the show. They wanted them for interviews. They wanted them for television. They were willing to pay them here, put them up here. One network was whisking them in. One network was enticing them with this.

One network made a public spectacle out of what, frankly, happens, you know, an awful lot of times. It just happens not to be a rape case every time, but there's a lot of recanted testimony in criminal proceedings around this country every day of the week.

And we make such an issue out of all the secondary coverage after the main event is not happening. Does that bother you at all? It bothers me.

Mr. Turner. Well, Congressman Smith, you have here representatives of four independent news-gathering organizations, and singly and individually it may not be too much. I'm assuming that your concern is in the aggregate. But how is that to be controlled when what in my view CNN is doing it about right?

The news executives at CBS, I'm sure, feel the same way about that, ABC, NBC, PBS, and who knows how many other ad hoc organizations? But combined, the totality of it is something over which none of us has any control, because it is a free society.

I don't know the answer to it. I'm raising the question.

Mr. Smith of Florida. Do you agree with the premise at all?

Mr. Turner. Yes and no. I don't know the time when any of our people have been intrusive with, say, the hostages, the hostage families. They certainly have instructions how to conduct themselves, but at the hostage family household you have more than the four networks.

You have, Lord only knows, how many local stations, local radio stations, and the newsweeklies, and together, in the aggregate, you may have a zoo.

Mr. Smith of Florida. Mr. Smith.

Mr. Siegenthaler.

Mr. Jack Smith. Congressman, again we come back to the questions of the families, and I think that a question that——

Mr. Smith of Florida. It's not just the family. Let me get off that. It's all the ancillary programming that comes alive as the result of this main event. You're on a roll, so you begin plucking at every new kind of story.

It's not only the families that you get to. There's so much more. We become inundated for that short period of time, and then all of a sudden it's almost like you're on cocaine or heroin. You need a fix, and keep injecting the fix, and all of a sudden the main event is over and you don't see anything about it.

It's all over. Look what's happened in the last few weeks. I mean, practically zero. It goes from the high to practically zero. There's something telling about that, isn't there?

Mr. JACK SMITH. Let me make this observation, Congressman. I've been through some news stories that have been very tragic where people lost their lives, where people have been held captives apart from this story, and I must tell you that I personally never thought I was on a roll and that I was as pleased personally when those stories ended as I believe the members of the family. And I can't have the depth of feeling that the hostages themselves, had but as a journalist in this particular story, in this instant story, I was very pleased to see it end.

I never felt at any point in covering it that there was a roll going on that we had to sustain. I would have liked to have seen that story end within 48 hours without the death of Petty Officer Stetham.

We take—there is not a sense of gratification, if you will, that this story sustains. I certainly don't take it personally, I don't think any of my colleagues at CBS do, but as long as the story is sustained in and of itself, and I think this is where you and I would probably come to some agreement, because there are ebbs and flows in these stories.

And there are times when the negotiating process becomes quiet, and there is not a great deal of information that comes out, and I think at that time in these stories we try and drop back and give it some context, and I hope that we provided experts from Government, from the universities, on our broadcasts during these periods so that we could properly establish what they thought was going on at that time, or where we were in the march of the negotiations.

The families were part of this story. I don't believe we turned to them when we were ebbing on the story. I think we had them in the story from the very beginning. Once again, I'd like to say that we approached the families with respect, and when we were told that they didn't want to talk to us we pulled off.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you, Mr. Smith, and I think if we can move on to the next question. Thank you, Jim. I'm sorry, but obviously the bells have rung again, so I'm not going to want to hold you any longer.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Mr. Luken.

EDITING POLICIES OF THE NETWORKS

Mr. LUKEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to come back to something basic I've heard you gentlemen testifying about this situation, and it sounds all favorable, no particular problems as I hear it from you. But during all of this there were extensive interviews of hostages over your stations, apparently unedited.

Do you know of any particular editing that went on? You've made a great thing about there was only one occasion where it went on live, but as a practical matter you didn't have the technology to go on live, did you?

Mr. Jack Smith. That's right.

Mr. Luken. You didn't have the technology to go on. So you're taking credit for something that you didn't have the power to do. All right. So you didn't have the technology to go on live. I saw no evidence from what I saw that anything was edited.

Another fact: these were hostages. Are hostages in such a situation under the complete control of their captors, or are they not? Will you answer that question? Is anybody suggesting that they weren't under the complete control of their captors?

Mr. Jack Smith. Well,——

Mr. Luken. Were they not?

Mr. Grossman. Congressman, I would like to have you cite an instance in which an interview with a hostage should have been edited. I think the point we're all making was that the material was——

Mr. Luken Well, I'll cite an incident. You want me to cite an incident?

Mr. Grossman. Yes, sir.

Mr. Luken. Let's say the one where Dan Rather asked the hostage "What would you like President Reagan to do?" I think that question from an anchorperson, for him to address to a hostage, who is under the complete control of the kidnappers, the people who are negotiating for the release, for him to address that, I think you could have edited that out.

I think it's an affront to all of us. Dan Rather said to a hostage, according to what I read here, "What would you like President Reagan to do?" That followed the famous quote from a similar interview earlier the same day from David Hartman of ABC, who said "Mr. Berri, any final word for President Reagan this morning?"

I think you could have edited that out. I think at that point you become, those anchors have become negotiators, they have become diplomats. I think they are at that point interfering in what is a governmental role. I think that at least they're coming close to the line.

I'm not a fan of Mr. Meese, but I can understand Mr. Meese's frustration at this point, representing the Government, representing the Justice Department, and Secretary of State Shultz I'm sure was frustrated at this point.

As a practical matter, the networks became the diplomats and the negotiators, and they were making news. That's what you were doing, and you were interviewing hostages, and you should have been saying every 5 minutes when you interviewed those hostages "These people are under total coercion, they're under total control, they are absolutely incapable of free choice or a free statement," and yet you were putting them on and asking them their opinion, not only asking them their opinion, but asking them to direct their opinion to the President of the United States.

I'm not a fan of the President of the United States. I'm a Democrat. I don't vote for him, I wouldn't vote for him maybe if he were the last Republican on Earth, but I don't think he should be impeded in such a situation.

I've had my say.

Mr. **Grossman**. Any response?

In the instances you cited I am not personally capable of responding to, because they were not on NBC. I could be wrong. I don't believe those——

Mr. **Luken**. I think that's unfortunate and an evasion, I'll be frank with you. I've been listening to you all this time. These statements are very notorious, and I think you could express an opinion.

Mr. **Grossman**. Well, I was going to say, I cannot myself vouch for those instances, but I do not believe in either of those cases that you cited those questions were addressed to the hostages. I believe they may have been addressed to Mr. Berri.

Mr. **Luken**. Well, I didn't hear them, but I'm reading this from Mr. Tom Shales in the Washington Post, and it's very clear what he says that it was. If the CBS representative here can contradict it I'll withdraw it, but he says this time there were pictures of them as Rather asked questions about what messages they had for Reagan.

He said they were talking to the same hostages. "What would you like President Reagan to do?" was the question.

Mr. **Grossman**. All right. Well, as I say--what I will say insofar as our guidelines are concerned is that journalists should not place themselves or be placed in the position of diplomats negotiating. There's no question about that.

It is often the case where both sides, or either side, whether it's our State Department, or in the case of Mr. Berri ideas are floated that television reports.

But I certainly agree with you, Congressman, that it is inappropriate for a television reporter or a journalist to put himself in the position of a negotiator—or a diplomat——

Mr. **Luken**. Heaven forbid.

Mr. **Grossman**. Yes, Heaven forbid—and certainly the guidelines, and I believe all of our guidelines, would reflect that concern and that sensitivity, because by definition they then abandon the job of being journalists. No question about that.

Mr. **Luken**. You know, I will give you another example I thought should have been edited. Further, again, this happens to be CBS.

CBS INTERVIEW WITH FATHER JAMES MC LAUGHLIN

Father James McLaughlin told CBS's Dan Rather that the hostages were "getting impatient with the lack of initiative in Washington."

This was played over the air. "Getting impatient." And he went on further to say that "Special interests outside our Nation"—evidently a reference to Israel, you don't have to draw any pictures, do you?—"Special interests outside our Nation" was what he was getting "impatient" about.

And he said that President Reagan should ask Israel for the freedom of those 700 Lebanese detainees.

I'll ask the representative from CBS——

Mr. **Jack Smith**. Yes, I'd like to speak to it, Congressman, because it is CBS News that you are discussing.

Mr. **Luken**. I think that should have been edited out.

Mr. **Jack Smith**. First of all, I don't know that I could take the authenticity of those questions being directed to the individual from a newspaper column; I would rather rely on a transcript from CBS, but——

Mr. **Luken**. You are not familiar with that interview with Father McLaughlin?

Mr. **Jack Smith**. Let's say for the sake—yes, I am; and I believe Father McLaughlin was out of captivity at that time. Correct, Congressman?

I believe that that was an interview with Father McLaughlin after he was released. That is my recollection.

Mr. **Luken**. Well, it would be totally inconsistent with what he said, because what he said was, they are "getting impatient" with the lack of initiative in Washington.

Mr. **Jack Smith**. If memory serves me——

Mr. **Luken**. This was in the present tense.

Mr. **Jack Smith**. If memory serves me——

Mr. **Luken**. I would—you know, as a betting man, I would bet you money that he said that in the—while he was a hostage. That is in the present tense.

He said "Special interests outside of our Nation" and I don't remember a lot of recriminations after the fact, do you? These were said during the time of captivity.[1]

Mr. **Jack Smith**. Well, that's the question that I have as to whether or not that was said while Father McLaughlin was in captivity, or after he was released, because, as I recall, he was one of those that was released at one point during the early days of the situation.

But what I would like to address, Congressman——

INTERVIEW WITH TWA HOSTAGES

Mr. **Luken**. Well, frequently during the hostage crisis, it seems to me that I heard these kinds of questions generally addressed—I mean, I want to ask you, and I don't want to ask you because we don't have the time, but these people were under coercion—you that—ABC, I cited the statement before—ABC, in their answer to me, said that they—they cited as a defense to their interviewing hostages that they asked the hostages before they went on the air whether they felt that their interview would endanger them in any way.

You asked people who were totally under coercion, who were totally under control, had guns on them at the time, and you asked them for their opinion as to whether or not it would endanger them?

What an affront that is.

I'll ask the gentleman from ABC.

Mr. **Siegenthaler**. Yes, sir.

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[1] See appendix 2.

Mr. Luken. I hope you withdraw this immediately. You are not telling us that you are serious about that?

Mr. Siegenthaler. I think we should be precise in our definition of "guns to their heads."

I can speak specifically.

Mr. Luken. Are you saying that they were not under complete control and coercion?

Mr. Siegenthaler. I'm saying that they were under the complete control of their hostage takers, but in two occasions, our correspondent on the scene was able to take them aside before we began rolling, and was able to say, indicate by blinking your eye, or out of the hearing of the hostage takers if you do not wish me to proceed, and we will pack up the cameras and the—rather——

Mr. Luken. Sir, sir——

Mr. Siegenthaler [continuing]. And rather than do that——

Mr. Luken. This is so palpably offensive to me. He is still talking to people who are under complete control. He is still talking to people who had been given an indication by their captors as to what they should say, and what they should say privately or publicly at that particular time.

What they should say privately or publicly. You wouldn't even had them on if the captors didn't deliver them to you. And you don't have the sophistication to recognize that the captors would have told them what to say? Privately or publicly?

Mr. Siegenthaler. Well, sir, that is the construction you are putting on it.

Mr. Luken. Absolutely, and I think anybody would.

Well, if I could—I would just conclude by saying that I have gotten a little bit heated, and I apologize for that about this hostage situation, this terrorist controlled situation, this drama coproduced by the terrorists and television; and I don't mean to imply that I think that the job that the networks did in all cases was bad, on balance.

It might not have been too bad. I am not directing it at that.

But I would like to direct, that you gentlemen give serious consideration to the fact that it has been stated here over and over again, that this isn't the last hostage situation, that you should be addressing in concert—and NBC has already said that they are doing something, and the others have expressed some reticence about it—but in concert addressing the next hostage situation and making some provision so that you can be prepared insofar as you can to be prepared to avoid the excesses, to avoid the interviews.

Next time you may have the technology and predictably you will be falling all over each other if you are driven by competition to put these shows on live just as in one case it was done here.

But I hope that you will be meeting and gathering outside of the pale of Government and considering how you may avoid perhaps some of these mistakes whether these mistakes that I have pointed out you consider mistakes or whether everything I said is right. There has been a good deal of criticism. The number of network commentators themselves immediately after the incident when the dust had not settled said there should be a summit; they said there should be meetings; there should be some guidelines, and so on.

I hope you consider it.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. **Feighan**. Thank you very much, Mr. Luken.

And let me thank the panelists and for several reasons. One, for your generosity of the time of this afternoon, and your tolerance of our somewhat chaotic schedule, but more importantly to thank you for the candor in your response to the concerns that have been raised by members of this committee.

ASSESSMENT OF THE MEDIA'S COVERAGE OF THE TWA HOSTAGE CRISIS

I would end on the note that my colleague, Mr. Luken, was reaching, and that is that many of us, in fact, do believe that on the whole the coverage that was presented to the American people was very professional, was very responsive, was very helpful.

But it was certainly not perfect, and I think that all of you have indicated in your responses to questions this afternoon that you recognize that those moments of uncertain reporting, those moments of perhaps excessive reporting did occur.

Many have offered the observation that if we are to err in reporting on events of this nature clearly we all want to err on the side of an open and free and aggressive press rather than one that is restrained excessively even by its own leadership, and certainly we don't want to be in conditions when it is restrained by any governmental interference.

I think it is important that you engage—continue to engage, as I stated in my opening remarks, in the self-analysis and self-criticism that I think the industry has engaged in over the past few weeks.

It is extremely important, as well, I think, that that self-analysis or retrospective be conducted in public and be conducted with governmental committees, be conducted with private sector committees—the American Bar Association might be one—other forums that have taken up this issue, in light of both experiences coming out of Iran and Beirut.

I appreciate the fact that your industry generally has been very responsive to that discussion and to a role in the constructive criticism that has been developing.

We have to, I think, go through that process, because it is an unfortunate commentary we probably would all concur in; and that is, that we will find ourselves in similar circumstances at some time in the future, probably several times in the future.

I have one thought that I would leave with you, and that is that I think that the way the media proceeds in the coverage of events of this nature will flow primarily from their view of the fundamental nature of the event.

Is the event that is being covered the action of one or several individuals who are crazed, who are imbalanced and acting out of their individual behavior; or is it in fact the incidents or event that is undertaken by a sovereign state or by surrogates for a sovereign state?

And when it is the latter, it is clearly an event that is warlike in nature, and I think that we are finding ourselves more and more dealing with terrorist situations that fit the category of warfare, symbolic warfare, perhaps, but warfare nevertheless, and the principles that would guide reporting and responsible journalism in those circumstances are of warfare, are the ones that should apply when we are dealing in a terrorist situation.

I very much—on behalf of the committee, and on behalf of the Congress, again, thank you for your participation in this hearing today, and I hope that it is but the beginning of many more formal and informal exchanges so that we can prevent the kind of governmental intrusion that some would propose the industry should be subjected to. Thank you very much.

Mr. **Jack Smith**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 6:36 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

APPENDIX 1

JULY 17, 1985, LETTER TO THE NETWORKS CONCERNING MEDIA COVERAGE OF TERRORIST EVENTS AND RESPONSES THERETO

Grant Tinker, Chairman
National Broadcasting Company
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, NY 10020

Dear Mr. Tinker:

I am writing, as a member of the Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance Subcommittee, to you and other T.V. network CEO's on the subject which has been described by many commentators within the industry as "Neutralizing Television as a Terrorist Weapon". The recent American TWA hostage experience in the Middle East suggests that the American media "have yet to learn how to avoid serving as the 'ransom' that is now paid to terrorists who take hostages".

Many of the members of the subcommittee are deeply concerned about the astonishing spectacle of T.V. news shows from the middle east apparently "co-produced by television and the terrorists".

The above-quoted references do not originate with me or other members of Congress, but are statements from respected media spokesmen made since the hostage crisis. I believe they reflect deep seated concerns regarding performances of the networks when they become a major part of making events, rather than simply reporting them.

Many commentators from the industry have made suggestions similar to that made by Ron Powers on "CBS Sunday Morning" on July 7, to the effect that a broadcast summit should be convened to consider guidelines for future hostage and terrorist situations which thrust T.V. into the news-making situation. Such a summit, or other convening of T.V. representatives, would be voluntary and would be in the highest tradition of self-regulation by American broadcasting. If the networks follow through and voluntarily adopt specific guidelines we would have the optimum situation of private non-governmental action to insure against future problems.

THIS STATIONERY PRINTED ON PAPER MADE WITH RECYCLED FIBERS

Admittedly, some T.V. commentators have made laudatory statements about the networks' performance. These uncritical reviews defended T.V.'s actions and claimed positive results from the incidents others have questioned.

We can all agree that during the crisis American T.V. always conducted itself in good faith with a sincere intent to report news in a professional manner true to the highest traditions of unfettered journalism. If the matter were confined to reporting only, the issue would be settled with that observation.

However, in the highly charged competitive environment of these terrorist controlled situations, live drama was being created by the abductors. Some T.V. anchorpersons discussed on the air the necessity of maintaining control of the airwaves by using edited interviews. This discussion should now take place, apart from the the crisis atmosphere, with a sense of urgency that safeguards be adopted before the next terrorist attack. As a matter of fact, I would seriously argue that potential abductors of Americans might be discouraged from their criminal acts if they knew they would be denied the "ransom" they seek, extensive, uncontrolled, live T.V. coverage.

Senator Robert Bryd, minority leader of the Senate, has also strongly endorsed the call for "a summit meeting of network and broadcast industry executives to ask questions and come up with answers to their proper role in reporting the news on acts of terrorism in the future." I doubt that any member of the Congress would disagree.

However, since your industry is highly competitive, it may be especially difficult for you to do the one essential thing--meet with your competitors and agree on standards for a future course of action. Again, I emphasize this summit meeting should take place without representatives of government being at the table.

But, we might be helpful in serving as a catalyst for bringing the parties together. I am supremely confident that the desired result will be accomplished if all of you make the undertaking.

Sincerely,

Tom Luken

THOMAS A. LUKEN
Member of Congress

TAL

Enclosures
cc: Leonard Goldenson
Thomas Wyman
Ted Turner
Edward Fritts

Robert Hynes
Tom Sawyer

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

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Congress of the United States
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Washington, DC 20515

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CONSUMER PROTECTION AND FINANCE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND LONG TERM CARE

July 18, 1985

Ted Turner
Cable News Network
1050 Techwood Drive
Atlanta, Georgia 30318

Dear Ted:

I am writing, as a member of the Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance Subcommittee, to you and other T.V. network CEO's on the subject which has been described by many commentators within the industry as "Neutralizing Television as a Terrorist Weapon". The recent American TWA hostage experience in the Middle East suggests that the American media "have yet to learn how to avoid serving as the 'ransom' that is now paid to terrorists who take hostages".

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Sincerely,

THOMAS A. LUKEN
Member of Congress

TAL

Enclosures

NBC National Broadcasting Company, Inc 30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, N Y 10112 212 664-4611

Lawrence K. Grossman
President
News Division

July 23, 1985

The Honorable Thomas A. Luken
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Rayburn House Office Building
Room 2368
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Congressman Luken,

Grant Tinker has asked me to respond to your thoughtful letter to him of July 17 regarding television's coverage of the TWA hostage crisis.

We at NBC News have undertaken a thorough review of our own standards, policies and guidelines in light of our experiences during the recent hijack/hostage crisis. Our review was started the day after the crisis ended in response both to our own concerns and to the concerns that others have expressed. We are circulating the results of that review to all members of the NBC News staff, and I am pleased to share them with you and with all interested parties. You will find them enclosed with this letter.

We would, of course, welcome any appropriate specific suggestions regarding our policies and guidelines. We feel strongly that the public will best be served by having each of our nation's free and independent news organizations follow its own journalistic standards and practices of reporting during such crises.

We have already had informal conversations with other news organizations with a view to opening up clear lines of communications during such crises in order to minimize the danger from those seeking to take advantage of a life threatening situation to further their own ends.

We appreciate your interest and concern, and we would be pleased to consider and respond to any questions or ideas you and your colleagues may have concerning these sensitive and important matters.

Sincerely,

Lawrence K. Grossman

enc.

c: Grant Tinker
Leonard H. Goldenson
Thomas H. Wyman
Ted Turner
Edward O. Fritts
Robert Hynes
Tom Sawyer

James T. Broyhill
Henry A. Waxman
Jim Slattery
John Bryant
Carlos J. Moorhead
Thomas J. Bliley
Jim Bates
Howard C. Nielson
Don Ritter
Dan Coats
James H. Scheurer

Roone Arledge
Richard C. Wald
Ed Joyce
Howard Stringer

July 26, 1985

Congressman Thomas A. Luken
The United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Luken:

Mr. Leonard Goldenson, Chairman of the Board of American Broadcasting Companies Inc., has asked me to reply to your letter of July 17.

We share your belief that in covering terrorist incidents news organizations must resist efforts by terrorists to manipulate the media to their own ends. We also believe that it is important that news organizations be attentive to criticism and participate in the ongoing debate concerning news coverage of the TWA hostage crisis so that the lessons learned can guide us in future situations.

To that end ABC News has scheduled a special Viewpoint program on July 30 which will devote 1½ hours to examining media behavior in the hostage crisis. We have invited White House and State Department officials as well as vocal critics of television coverage of the crisis to appear.

We also agree with you that it is sensible for news organizations to put in place guidelines arrived at apart from the crisis atmosphere concerning terrorist situations which thrust television into a potential newsmaking role. For many years ABC News has followed a comprehensive set of its own written policy guidelines, including guidelines on the coverage of terrorist acts, a copy of which is attached for your information. We believe that the general principles enunciated in these guidelines are sound. We are currently evaluating the guidelines and whether or not any changes are necessary as part of our internal process of self-examination of our TWA hostage crisis coverage.

ABC News' coverage of the TWA hostage crisis conformed to our written guidelines. We believe that, on the whole, our coverage was responsible, given our obligations as journalists, our responsibilities as good citizens and the competitive context in which we operate. For example, we received two requests from the government to withhold information for reasons of safety of the hostages or national security. One was a Pentagon request not to reveal that six hostages held military passports. The second was a State Department request not to report that one hostage was an employee of the National Security Agency and not to interview members of his family because of the Department's concern that they might accidentally reveal that information. ABC complied fully with both requests. In addition, our correspondents in Beirut told the hostages before any cameras were turned on that we would leave if the hostages felt that television would endanger them in any way or if for any reason they preferred not to be interviewed. They decided it was in their own interest to be interviewed, to reassure their families that they were still alive. We, of course, made the decision to telecast those interviews.

While we endorse the desirability of guidelines, we do not believe that a "summit" meeting for the purpose of enacting an industry-wide code is appropriate for a number of reasons. First, we already have guidelines in place which we feel are adequate and which are subject to further review. Second, guidelines are not a complete solution. They cannot supplant careful, hands-on, case-by-case judgments as each crisis unfolds. This is particularly true in terrorist situations where each incident is to a large extent unique. These judgments are ones we believe each news organization must make by its own standards.

Your letter suggests that were industry guidelines enacted potential abductors would know that they would be denied the uncontrolled live television coverage they seek. In the TWA hostage crisis, operating under our own guidelines, ABC denied the terrorists uncontrolled access. All interviews and statements from Beirut telecast by ABC, with the exception of one live telephone interview on "Good Morning America," were pretaped and edited by us. In the future, the guidelines will clearly be applicable to all operating divisions of the company, not limited to ABC News. In all instances we tried to put the story in perspective, reminding the American public, for example, that the hostage interviews took place during captivity.

One can only speculate about the effect that television had on the crisis. There is certainly something to be said for the view, which we believe from our experience is the prevailing view among the hostage families, that the glare of television cameras acted as an insurance policy protecting the hostages and perhaps hastening their release, rather than the other way around.

There is no easy solution to terrorism and there is no gainsaying the fact that television now has the potential of becoming a participant in every hostage story as it did in this instance. We are aware that this places a heavy and complex burden on us to cover these situations with great sensitivity and responsibility. While we must report the news as accurately and thoroughly as circumstances permit, we must at the same time avoid being manipulated by terrorists and avoid actions that might jeopardize the lives of the hostages. We believe as you do that private, non-governmental action by the industry is the proper approach to dealing with these issues. We would be willing to participate in discussions which would contribute to a careful examination of these issues. We have given and will continue to give due consideration to all serious criticism of our actions and to all suggestions, while reserving the responsibility for deciding how best to utilize such criticism and suggestions in the future.

Sincerely,

/S/ Robert R. Siegenthaler

Enclosure
RRS:rv
cc: Mr. Leonard Goldenson

COVERAGE OF TERRORIST ACTS

Reporting on acts of terrorism, especially those involving hostages, requires strict adherence to the same general principles and many of the specific guidelines developed for covering riots and civil disorders. We must take great care that our actions do not unintentionally make a sensational situation even more sensational. We must do nothing that could jeopardize the lives of hostages, or interfere with efforts by authorities to secure their safe release. We must guard against efforts by terrorists to use, or manipulate us for their own ends.

Here are the specific guidelines:

1) No such incident should be broadcast live except in the most compelling circumstances, and then only with the approval of the President of ABC News or a designated Vice President. (This policy does not prohibit live and live-to-tape reports by correspondents at the scene.)

2) Telephone interviews with hostages and/or terrorists during the incident should be handled with great care and undertaken only after ascertaining that ABC's use of telephone lines does not interfere with the authorities' communication, or further jeopardize the safety of hostages.

3) Demands of the terrorist(s) should be reported as an essential ingredient of the story. But we must avoid becoming a platform for propaganda and rhetoric. In most cases, this means we will condense, edit or paraphrase the demands and explain the background against which they are made.

4) ABC News personnel assigned to the story should obey all instructions issued by police or other competent authorities. But they should report to their supervisors any such order that appears intended to manage or suppress the news.

Even when all the principles and guidelines are scrupulously applied, it may still be said that news coverage aggravated a particular situation, or contributed to the "contagion" of terrorism. Mindful as we are of this, we cannot regard suppression of such reporting as being justified. To suppress news of terrorism would raise serious questions about out credibility on other issues. ("What else are they keeping from us?"). To suppress the news would surrender objective reporting to whatever rumors were being circulated. And to suppress the news for whatever reason, good or bad, violates the fundamental principle that governs a free press in a free society.

ABC News **Spring 1982**

COVERAGE OF RIOTS AND OTHER CIVIL DISORDERS

The coverage of civil disorders requires particular vigilance. As with wars, the first casualty in these situations tends to be the truth.

ABC News intends to cover riots and related disturbances with particular concern for the accuracy and objectivity of our reporting. We are also determined to cover such stories as inconspicuously and unobtrusively as possible.

What follows are some guidelines developed over the years:

1) Do not call a disturbance a "riot" unless the term is clearly justified by the size and severity of the situation.

2) Accounts by participants should be treated with caution, and, if used at all, verified by other sources. Interviews with participants should be broadcast with care since they tend to incite rather than inform. Attribute statements, crowd estimates, etc., very carefully.

3) Avoid reports about "crowds gathering" and other such anticipatory information. Our duty is to report the story when it happens, not before. But reporters should be on the scene quickly so that when we report, we report accurately.

4) Avoid the use of inflammatory catchwords and cliches such as "An angry mob erupted with explosive violence as tensions mounted and full-scale rioting was feared." Good journalism demands specificity – cool, calm, factual reporting of just what happened.

5) Facts must be reported in perspective. The size of the crowd, for example, ought to be given in relation to the size of the community.

6) News personnel required on the scene must remain as unobtrusive as possible. This means traveling in unmarked cars whenever possible. Also it means being restrained and neutral in what you say and what you do at the scene.

7) Avoid using lights except when they are essential to cover important aspects of the story. If it appears they may be instigating, perpetuating or intensifying a dangerous situation, turn them off.

ABC News **Spring 1982**

8) Obey police instructions. But report to your supervisor any police action that appears designed primarily to suppress or limit legitimate news coverage. We do not want to enter into local agreements limiting coverage. No such agreements can be made without the specific approval of ABC News management.

9) Cover the disturbance exactly as it happens with no staging, simulation, reenactment or other means which in any way influences the participants to do anything, or refrain from doing anything.

10) We cannot properly report on violence and ignore its causes. Therefore, we want as soon as possible to explore the background of the situation and the issues and circumstances that led to the disturbance. If the cause is not clear, let's say so. But only after making every effort to find out.

11) We would rather miss a story than mis-report it. Use bulletins with care. Remember the difference between rumor and fact. And eliminate adjectives in order to avoid coloring the story.

All these are good guides, but they cannot substitute for the judgment, discretion and integrity of newspersons covering explosive situations.

Finally, it cannot be overemphasized that we cover events as reporters, not as participants. In inflammatory situations especially; everyone assigned by ABC News must be vigilant that their individual or collective actions are as detached and unobtrusive as possible. Still, it is possible that even the most professionally detached news team may by its very presence contribute to a disturbance by passively causing others to take actions that they otherwise might not take. It then becomes the responsibility of those on the scene to exercise their judgement about when to pull back and, if necessary, when to pull out.

We are also concerned about the safety of our people. We want to get the story. But we would rather lose a story than lose a life. Those on the scene must decide when risks to their safety dictate moving to another location or leaving the scene entirely.

ABC News

APPENDIX 2

TRANSCRIPT OF JUNE 28, 1985 CBS NEWS SPECIAL REPORT, CONCERNING THE TWA HOSTAGE CRISIS

Friday, June 28, 1985
2:30 - 2:45 PM

ANNOUNCER: This is a CBS NEWS SPECIAL REPORT. From CBS News heaquarters in New York, here is Dan Rather.

DAN RATHER: Good day.

There is a flurry of reports that the remaining 39 TWA hostages in Beiurt may be taken soon to Damascus, Syria under United Nations auspices as part of a deal worked out to bring their ultimate freedom. However, the United Nations says officially that these reports should be treated with what it called, and I quote, "extreme caution." In a CBS News interview, direct from our CBS News headquarters in New York with the headquarters of Shiite militia leader Nabih Berri in Beirut this morning, Nabih Berri said that he continues to be what he called optimistic that the hostages' situation will change within the next 48 hours. He reminded us that he had said yesterday he was optimistic that it would change within 72 hours. He said, "Now I tell you that within the next 48 hours I'm optimistic th— their situation will change."

This word came as the hijackers rejected a Swiss offer to take the hostages into the Swiss Beirut embassy, under certain conditions. Lebanese government sources continue to say that any hostage transfer agreement still depends on Israel agreeing to free its Lebanese prisoners, whose release the hijackers have been demanding from the first.

Three of the hostages appeared today at the west Beirut fortress home of the Shiite leader Nabih Berri, who claims to have responsibility for the whole group. The three are Allyn Conwell of Houston, who's been acting as a kind of spokesman; Reverend James McCloughlin of Geneva, Illinois; and Simon Grossmayer of Algonquin, Illinois. Grossmayer has only one lung and has a history of some cancer.

There were erroneous reports today, in some other quarters, that Grossmayer had been freed. He has not been freed. Nabih Berri discussed this with CBS News this morning and said he would have Grossmayer examined again and raised the possibility that he might be freed, but Grossmayer has not been freed, up to and including this moment. I talked today with all three of the Americans that I mentioned and asked Conwell first about the status and conditions of the hostages right now.

ALLYN CONWELL (Houston, Texas): The 36 that are domiciled in various houses around Beirut are under the control of the Amal militia. Now, the Amal militia aren't the people that originally hijacked the plane. The original terrorists—the ones that I label terrorists—are the first two individuals, primarily, that took the plane, are both members of another group, some more radical faction existing in the— this Beirut chaos. Those are the people I'm referring to.

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And, it's my understanding from Mr. Berri that the crew members, the three remaining crew members that are, indeed, on the airplane, that there is a shared protection or holding—whichever the case may be—of the— of the crew, with the terrorists and the Amal militia. In other words, the Amal militia has people on the plane and the terrorists are still on the plane.

RATHER: Mr. Conwell, you— you keep saying, and— and we appreciate you giving us reports, that everyone's physical health, so far as you can make out, is all right.

CONWELL: Yes, sir?

RATHER: What about your spirits? What about the spirits of— of the others in the group?

CONWELL: Well, there are indeed some of us that— that are depressed. Some of are worried. Some of us are perhaps more fragile than others. That's certainly true. Some of us have some abilities to withstand this thing better than others, but the thing that is— is very fortunate for all of us is that, whatever our weaknesses or our strengths, we share these. We all tend to draw strength from the stronger individuals and we all tend to share whatever capabilities we have in order to diminish the— the lesser desirable aspects of— of each one of us.

RATHER: Mr. Conwell, if— you said a time or two before, in response to questions, that you didn't feel that you were being used for propoganda purposes.

CONWELL: Well, no, I— I do indeed feel that I'm being used for propaganda purposes. I think that's one of the primary goals in this— in this particular hostage situation now. Certainly the Amal, the people under whom I'm under their control, want to utilize the situation to their best advantage and with that goal—whether good or bad, I pass no judgment at this point—of securing the freedom of their relatives and loved ones. So, yes, as far as being propaganda— propaganda media, I certainly am. We all are.

RATHER: And how do you feel about that?

CONWELL (laughing): Well, it's a role that I pretty well have to accept, under the conditions; but, fortunately for me, the— the people don't ask me to speak out against something that I don't believe in.

RATHER: Well, first of all, good day to you, Mr. Grossmayer.

SIMON GROSSMAYER (Algonquin, Illinois): Good day to you too, sir.

RATHER: And I'm very pleased to hear your voice and to— to be able to see you, and I know that you're family will as well. We had asked Mr. Berri if we could make contact with you, mostly because all of us are concerned about your health. Are you all right?

GROSSMAYER: There is concern for my health. I've been seen by several doctors, and Mr. Berri talked to me this morning in his office and he, too, is concerned about my health.

RATHER: Did he indicate to you that he might be letting you go free soon?

GROSSMAYER: Not at this morning's meeting. He said that he would have to wait for a report; and, after it would get the report, he would have to go back to the original people to see if my release could be effective. Before I let you go Mr. Rather I would like to assure my daughter, who's expecting a child, you know, I am okay, and certainly my family that— that I— I'm okay.

RATHER: Are you all right, Father?

FATHER JAMES McLOUGHLIN (Geneva, Illinois): Yeah.

RATHER: And how about the other hostages?

FATHER McLOUGHLIN: Oh, am I all right? Yes, I'm all right. And I think, by and large, our— health of the hostages is very good. There spirits go up and down with the news, and with hope that our faith in God and— and the goodness of our fellow Americans has carried us through. I think, to this point, we are getting impatient that, with the lack of initiatives, on behalf of us, by our government, but our spirits are still good.

RATHER: Mr. Conwell mentioned this morning, and there's been a couple of mentions of it, about morale. Now, I gather that morale, overall, well, you tell me, how is morale?

FATHER McLOUGHLIN: Well, I— I think morale is pretty good, because there's been a lot of things on the news. We listen to the BBC hourly and, you know, you can wake up at odd hours to catch the news broadcasts, and there's been a lot of news, but— and now it's starting to, you know, the initiatives aren't being picked up, and it's starting to look like there might be a longer haul than we thought, and there's not the cooperation that— as— as well as we can perceive through the— the media—press and radio television, too—that, you know, we'd like to see. So, that's discouraging.

RATHER: You say it's discouraging?

FATHER McLOUGHLIN: Discouraging.

RATHER: Father, I repeat, for instance, I know that this is a difficult situation to say the least, but do you have any particular message to President Reagan and the other decision-makers in this country?

FATHER McLOUGHLIN: I'm glad you asked. (Laughing) Yes, I— I really do. I think that I'd like to tell the decision-makers of the United States that, you know, from earliest education in my childhood, through college and university, that we were taught that our government was of, for and by the people of the country, and not special interests outside of our nation, and I would like to see them take that message of Mr. Lincoln very seriously in our regard.

RATHER: Do you have any expectation of being moved soon?

RATHER: Did he indicate to you that he might be letting you go free soon?

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RATHER: Do you have any expectation of being moved soon?

FATHER McLOUGHLIN: Well, I'm not sure now. We did, the last couple of days, expectations of being moved, but now we're not quite sure, because there's nothing coming, you know, through the press or even through Mr. Berri, of what Washington's reaction to his initiative is.

RATHER: Father McLoughlin, what would you have— what would you like President Reagan to do?

FATHER McLOUGHLIN: I think he should do what the Israeli government has asked him to do, and that is ask for the freedom of those 700 Lebanese detainese.

GROSSMAYER: Well, my feelings are I think the same as Allyn Conwell and Father McLoughlin stated. You know, all people who are held, I think, at this point should be released. They just want to go home.

RATHER: Mr. Conwell, when you spoke with Mr. Berri this morning or at any other time, have you heard anything about the conditions of the other, the original seven Americans who were being held in Lebanon before the airliner was hijacked?

CONWELL (earlier today): I'm— I'm very well convinced that certainly the Amal have had no participation in the— either the kidnapping, and they have not opposed by anyone to my knowledge to even participate in negotiating the conditions of the release of those seven. In the process of me trying to find that information, I have become more aware of the so-called demands of the people who did kidnap them; but as I don't know who kidnapped them and I don't know where they're held, and I unfortunately cannot reassure their families that they're in good health at present. I— I pray that we can.

RATHER: And Mr. Conwell you may be aware Secretary of State Shultz and others now are including those seven, saying that in any arrangement that the United States wants those seven to be returned, as well as— as your group. You are aware of that?

CONWELL: No, sir, I was not aware of that. That distresses me, because they're certainly requesting an entity, the Amal movement, to make concessions that they have absolutely either no control over or would appear to not even have adequate channels of communications to that other group.

FATHER McLOUGHLIN: Hello, Mr. Rather.

RATHER: Yes, sir.

FATHER McLOUGHLIN: Yes, there are two things that some of the men were concerned about that I say something to our government if you could relay this, and that is that we're very appreciative of the fact that the government did not directly militarily intervene in our situation, and we hope that that resolve continues. We see that military intervention would be to our detriment, to our danger. And then, the second thing was that if anything could be done on behalf of this group to move us to an embassy or to some friendly other place that we could be in a greater degree of safety than we are now, 'cause this city is a very troubled city and there's gunfire every night and some artillery. So, by accident, we could be involved in it, and as well as other causes. So, those are the two concerns that came up most often.

RATHER: Do you think that we— by that— that, I mean reporters, the press, particularly the American press—should stop doing these kinds of— of interviews?

FATHER McLOUGHLIN: No, I don't think that this— the American press should stop doing these kind of interviews.

RATHER: You think these kinds of interviews are— are all right, then?

FATHER McLOUGHLIN: Oh, yes, because we need to communicate with our— our people and the people in the United States that, you know, what our condition is and how we're doing. I can recall—even though I was not personally involved in the— with any of the hostages in Iran in 1979, '80—that, you know, everyone was just very thirsty for any bit of news on their condition, how they were doing, what their lifestyle was like, what their spirits were like, and so on. You know, we remember that, and we want to be of help to our people

.**RATHER:** That interview, from our CBS News headquarters in New York, with three of the hostages who were at the headquarters of the Amal militia leader in Beirut. Earlier today, the militia leader, Nabih Berri, said—before and after the interviews—that he still held out optimism that some change in the hostage situation would happen over the next 48-hour period.

In Chicago Heights, Illinois President Reagan today met in a high school library with 29 members of families of the 39 remaining TWA hostages, including six who had been released earlier by the hijackers. Also there today were relatives of Father Lawrence Jenco, a priest kidnapped earlier in Lebanon. President Reagan told the group, and I quote, "We're doing everything we can to secure the safe and early return of those being held. We are constantly looking for ways to do more. We are praying every day." End of quote from the President.

After answering more than a dozen questions, one of the family members told the President, and I quote now that family member: "My father is there, and I want you to know I support your policies. God bless you!" End of quote.

During a luncheon at the school, President Reagan was asked if there was any progress in freeing the hostages, and I quote now directly Mr. Reagan: "You know me. I'm superstitious. I never talk about a no-hitter if you're pitching one." End of quote. He did not elaborate.

CBS News will have more of the hostage interviews tonight on the CBS EVENING NEWS; and, of course, we'll be reporting all urgent developments, if any, during the day as warranted.

Until then, Dan Rather CBS News, New York. Thank you.

ANNOUNCER: This has been a CBS NEWS SPECIAL REPORT.

APPENDIX 3

BIOGRAPHIES OF WITNESSES

BEN H. BAGDIKIAN

Educated in public schools of Stoneham, Massachusetts. Clark University, A.B. 1941
Home: 25 Stonewall Road, Berkeley, California, 94705. 415-848-2226
Office: North Gate Hall, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720. 415-642-3383
Reporter, Springfield (Mass.) Morning Union, 1941-1942
Aerial navigator, U.S. Air Corps, 1942-1945
Associate Editor, Periodical House, New York City, 1946
Reporter, foreign correspondent, chief Washington correspondent, Providence (R.I.) Journal and Evening Bulletin, 1947-1961
Contributing Editor, Saturday Evening Post, 1963-1967
Project Director, News Media Technology Study, Rand, 1967-1969
Assistant Managing Editor for National News, Washington Post, 1970-1971
Assistant Managing Editor, Ombudsman, Washington Post, 1972
Nelson Pynter Fellow, Yale University, 1972
M. Lyle Spencer Visiting Professor, Syracuse University, 1973
National Correspondent, Columbia Journalism Review, 1973-1974
Project Director, Newspaper Survival Study, Markle Foundation, 1974-1977
Professor, Graduate School of Journalism, University of California, Berkeley, 1977—
Dean, Graduate School of Journalism, University of California, Berkeley, 1985—
Academic Advisory Committee, National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 1969—
President, Mellett Fund for a Free and Responsible Press, 1966-1976
Screening Panel, political and social sciences, National Endowment for the Humanities, 1967-1970
Trustee, Clark University, Worcester, Mass., 1964-1976
Steering Committee, National Prison Project, ACLU, 1974-1981
Social Science Research Council, committee on mass communications and political behavior, 1974-1980
Contributor to Harper's Atlantic, New Republic, Columbia Journalism Review, Saturday Evening Post, New York Times Sunday Magazine, London Times, etc.
Author of books:
- In the Midst of Plenty: The Poor in America (Beacon Press, 1964)
- The Information Machines (Harper & Row, 1970; Japanese Edition, 1973; Portuguese Edition, 1973; Spanish Edition, 1975)
- The Shame of the Prisons (Simon & Schuster-Pocketbooks), 1972
- The Effete Conspiracy and Other Crimes by the Press (Harper & Row, 1972; Portuguese Edition, 1973)
- Caged (Harper & Row, 1976
- The Media Monopoly (Beacon Press) 1983

John Simon Guggenheim Fellow, 1962
George Foster Peabody Award, 1951
Pulitzer Prize, shared in group award for local reporting, 1953
Sidney Hillman Foundation Award, 1955
Sigma Delta Chi National Journalism Award, 1975
National Headliners Award, 1967
Phi Beta Kappa Honorary Membership, 1961
Brown University, LHD, 1961
Clark University, LittD, 1963
Citation of Merit, "Journalism's Most Perceptive Critic," American Society of Journalism School Administrators, 1978

FRED W. FRIENDLY

1981- : Edward R. Murrow Professor Emeritus, Columbia Graduate School of Journalism, and Lecturer, Columbia Law School and College.
Director, Columbia University Seminars on Media and Society/Graduate School of Journalism
Distinguished Visiting Professor at Bryn Mawr College, 1981
Visiting Professor at Yale College, 1984

1966–1980: Advisor on communications to the president of the Ford Foundation; originator and director, Media-Law Seminars; responsible officer for major grants to public broadcasting and other communications activities.

1968–1975: Edward R. Murrow Professor of Journalism and Chairman, Broadcast Program at Columbia University

From 1968–1974, Director Michele Clark Program for minority journalists, Columbia University

1950–1966: Executive Producer, CBS News: "See It Now", with Edward R. Murrow. Originator and executive producer of "CBS Reports." President, CBS News, 1964–1966.

1947–1950: Producer, documentary and other news-oriented programs, NBC. In 1948, produced first of six "I Can Hear It Now" record albums (Columbia Records).

1941–1945: Served in armed forces as Master Sergeant in China, Burma, India and European Theatre of Operations. Duties: Instructor, Signal Corps, and correspondent. 1

1937–1941: Broadcast producer and journalist, WEAN, Providence, Rhode Island.

Education: Providence Public Schools; Cheshire Academy; Nichols College, 1936

Honorary degrees: University of Rhode Island; Grinnell College; College of Wooster; Duquesne University; Brown University; University of Utah

Academic Awards: John Peter Zenger from University of Arizona; Missouri Honor Medal from University of Missouri-Columbia; University of Texas; Columbia Graduate School of Journalism; New York University

Member, Board of Visitors, California Institute of Technology, 1970–1975.

Member, Board of Visitors, National Defense University, 1984 and continuing.

Publications: The Constitution: That Delicate Balance (co-authored with Martha Elliott) to accompany the television series, published 1984 (Random House)

Minnesota Rag, commemorating the 50th anniversary Near v. Minnesota, published June 1981 (Random House)

The Good Guys, The Bad Guys and the First Amendment (Random House)

Due To Circumstances Beyond Our Control (Random House)

See It Now (with Edward R. Murrow) (Simon & Schuster)

Personal Status: Age 69; married to Ruth W. Friendly, faculty, Scarsdale School system; father, 6 grown children. 4614 Fieldston Road, Riverdale, NY.

LAWRENCE K. GROSSMAN

Lawrence (Larry) Grossman became President of NBC News on April 30, 1984.

Prior to his current position, Grossman had been the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Public Broadcasting Service since 1976. He began his media career in 1953 on the staff of Look magazine. In 1956, he joined the advertising division of CBS Television and moved to NBC in 1962 to become Vice President in charge of advertising.

Grossman left NBC in 1966 to form his own advertising and production company, Lawrence K. Grossman, Inc., in New York City, where he remained until joining PBS in 1976. His company specialized in serving media and public service clients, including NBC, CBS, Ladies' Home Journal, Teleprompter, the Council on Aging, the Agency for International Development, the Ford Foundation, The United Negro College Fund and public broadcasting clients including WNET/New York, Children's Television Workshop (CTW) and PBS. His company developed the PBS "Everyman" logo. In 1968, Grossman became founding prisident of Forum Communications, Inc., which applied for the license of Channel 11 in New York City. During the summer of 1975, he undertook an assignment in the Philippines, producing radio campaigns for nutrition education on a demonstration project for the Agency for International Development.

While Grossman was President of PBS, public television grew dramatically. PBS became a leader in broadcast journalism, premiering network television's only prime-time weekly documentary series, "Frontline," and television's only series examining the media, "Inside Story." Grossman was an originator of the highly praised PBS series, "Vietnam: A Television History," and was responsible for the expansion of "The MacNeil/Lehrer Report" to a one-hour format.

Under Grossman's leadership, PBS launched a number of new marketing and technology endeavors to capitalize on the pioneering PBS satellite interconnection system as well as on the system's reputation for quality programming. These initiatives include development agreements with Columbia Pictures for new programming systems, and with Merrill Lynch and the U.S. Department of Agriculture for data distribution. Other PBS enterprises include Confersat, a PBS satellite video conference service; PBS Video, a videocassette marketing service; and the leasing of excess satellite transponder time.

Grossman was born in Brooklyn, NY. He is Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Columbia University and a winner of Columbia's John Jay Award for Public Service. He is the author of two books written in collaboration with NBC News in the 1960s.

He is married to the former Alberta S. Nevler of Swampscott, MA, a teacher in special education now on leave from the Fairfax County, VA, school system, while pursuing a doctorate in the teaching of writing at New York University. They have three daughters: Susan, a pediatric nurse at New York's Mount Sinai Hospital; Jennifer, a production assistant at ABC News' "20/20"; and Caroline, who is in public information at the Worchester (MA) Art Museum.

ROBERT SIEGENTHALER

Robert Siegenthaler formerly Vice President, Production, ABC News, and Executive Producer of Special Events, was named Vice President of News Practices, in March, 1985.

Mr. Siegenthaler's responsibilities include shaping, maintaining and enforcing ABC News polcies; developing ABC News personnel; and formulating the major policy statements of ABC News. He is also Executive-in-Charge of "Viewpoint," the only regularly-scheduled network program which provides a forum for criticism and analysis of television news.

A 24-year veteran of ABC News, Mr. Siegenthaler has held such major assignments as Executive Producer of the "ABC Evening News," Special Events, Instant News Specials, and "America Held Hostage," the nightly series of specials on the Iran hostage crisis which later evolved into "Nightline."

As Vice President, Executive Producer of Special Events, Mr. Siegenthaler was in charge of ABC News coverage of six presidential nominating conventions, six national elections, 12 summit meetings, three presidential inaugurations and several NASA space missions, including the first moon landing of Apollo 11 and all Space Shuttle flights.

The Special Events unit, under Mr. Siegenthaler's guidance, has been acclaimed for its creative blend of reporting and innovative use of cameras, microwaves and satellites. Among its many accomplishments were the comprehensive coverage of such major international news stories as the U.S. invasion of Grenada, the bombings at the U.S. embassies and marine headquarters in Beirut, the shooting of Pope John Paul II and the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

Mr. Siegenthaler has represented the three-Network broadcast pool as chairman of the committee which planned and executed coverage of President Nixon's historic trip to the People's Republic of China in 1972, and as pool producer for the Nixon Impeachment hearings of the House Judiciary Committee in 1974.

He also has written and produced more than two dozen ABC News documentaries.

As Vice President, Production, Mr. Siegenthaler has coordinating responsibility for the expansion of new technologies in news gathering, transmitting and production in support of all ABC News programs.

Mr. Siegenthaler began his career in journalism as a reporter for the Cincinnati Times-Star after graduating from Xavier University.

He and his wife, Anita, live in Harrington Park, NJ. They have three children.

JACK SMITH

Jack Smith has been CBS News Washington vice president and bureau chief since March 1981. He came to the Washington Bureau from the CBS News Midwest Bureau in Chicago, where he has been bureau chief since 1975.

Smith began his CBS career in 1969, when he joined the news staff of WBBM-TV, the CBS Owned station in Chicago. He worked as an assignment editor and producer at WBBM until 1972, when he went to the CBS News Midwest Bureau. There, he was a producer and assistant bureau chief before becoming bureau chief.

Smith first worked in the news business as a reporter with the City News Bureau of Chicago, where he covered police and politics. From there, he went to the Chicago Daily News, as a general assignment reporter. In 1963, he jointed Commonwealth Edison Company in Chicago, working in public, industrial and government relations.

He was born and raised in Chicago. He is a graduate of John Carroll University in Cleveland, where he studied literature, history and philosophy. He also studied finance at Loyola University's Graduate School of Business, earning an MBA degree.

He and his wife, Marilyn, have five childen, three girls and two boys.

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